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EARLY NEW ENGLAND PEOPLE.

SOME ACCOUNT OF THE

ELLIS, PEMBERTON, WILLARD, PRESCOTT, TITCOMB, SEWALL, AND LONGFELLOW, AND ALLIED FAMILIES.

BY SARAH ELIZABETH TITCOMB.

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MIND-CURE

ON A

MATERIAL BASIS

BY

SARAH ELIZABETH TITCOMB

AUTHOR OF "EARLY NEW ENGLAND PEOPLE"


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TO

THE MOST UNSELFISH AND DEVOTED OF

FATHERS,

THIS BOOK IS GRATEFULLY DEDICATED

BY

HIS DAUGHTER.

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MIND-CURE

ON

A MATERIAL BASIS.

CHAPTER I.

THE CURE OF DISEASE BY CONCENTRATION OF THOUGHT.

THE writer, having acquired the method of curing disease which is practised by the "Christian Scientists," or "Metaphysicians," commonly called Mind-curers, came to the conclusion that the success attending that method is due to *Concentration of Thought*, and not to the theology underlying the method.

That disease, even organic, can be *cured*, as well as caused, by the Mind, or what is termed the Imagination, is a well-attested fact. In regard to the medical and popular use of the term, Dr. Hack Tuke observes, —

"It signifies, in popular and medical language, that a man imagines certain (bodily) phenomena to have occurred which have not; or it is meant that certain bodily phenomena which really have occurred are due to no other cause than that he imagined they would. The signification of the term

contained in the first clause is too often assumed to be the whole truth. That of the second clause is almost, if not altogether, lost sight of. Because effects are produced, and cures performed, by means of a mental condition called the Imagination, it is constantly assumed that these results are imaginary; in other words, that they are all fancy. This is much to be deplored, and one of the objects we have in view is to dispel, as far as possible, so mischievous an error. It is generally implied that these phenomena are of a merely functional or subjective character, more or less dependent on the state of mind, more especially the Will, and that a change of mental condition has been naturally followed by a change in the phenomena, although apparently physical. Such is the broad definition of the Imagination, as it presents itself to the mind when employed in reference to medical facts of every-day occurrence. This is what the orthodox practitioner means, as he complacently smiles, or is indignant, when the success of his heterodox rival is dinned into his ears, and he asserts that it was all the effect of Imagination; and, in this sense, he is understood by his assailant. But the fact remains, and because it remains, and cannot be really explained-away, it must be explained. The essential must be separated from the accidental, and utilized for therapeutical purposes. It matters little to the patient by what name the remedy is called, whether 'Imagination,' or some of the many 'pathies' of the day. It is emphatically a case in

which 'a rose by any other name will smell as sweet.' But to the philosophical practitioner it ought to matter a great deal; it ought to be a question of exceeding interest." [1]

Dr. Tuke thinks that what really happens when one is cured by what is termed the Imagination [2] is, that the attention is arrested and forcibly directed to the part, the prominent idea being the firm conviction that the morbid symptoms will pass away. He observes, —

"On analyzing the mental states combined under the medical and popular use of the term [Imagination], it will be found that the Attention is strongly directed to a part of the body with which certain phenomena are associated, that the ideas most vividly presented to the mind are in direct relation to them, and that the force of these ideas is intensified by accompanying states of mind already referred to — Expectation, Hope, or Faith. When a person, on swallowing a bread-pill in the belief that it has aperient properties, is purged, it is said to be through his Imagination; the mental condition present yielding, on analysis, a definite direction of thought to the intestinal canal; such leading idea exciting the same peristaltic action

[1] *Illustrations of the Influence of the Mind upon the Body in Health and Disease*, pp. 18, 19, L. 1872.

[2] "The Imagination," says Dr. Tuke, "is the grandest mechanical power that the human intelligence possesses, and one which will appear more and more marvellous the longer we consider it. It is an operation of mind altogether inexplicable, and can only be compared with chemical affinity" — vol. cit. p. 21.

as would have been induced by castor oil. The force of this current of thought is augmented by Expectation" (vol. cit. p. 19).

In this connection the eminent English physiologist, Dr. William B. Carpenter, observes: "Of the influence of this 'expectancy' in producing remarkable changes in the bodily organism, either curative or morbid, the history of Medicine affords abundant and varied illustrations" (*Mesmerism and Spiritualism*, p. 12, L. 1877).

According to Dr. Carpenter, Dr. Hack Tuke, Dr. Charles Fayette Taylor, Dr. Thomas Laycock, Sir William Holland, and others, if a person can be led to expect a certain result, that result is sure to follow.

Dr. Carpenter's theory is, that expectation of either health or disease may become the *dominant idea* in a person's brain, and so control the person both mentally and physically, producing either health or disease as the case may be. An idea may become the dominant idea in a person's brain, unconsciously to the person, as shown in epidemic Delusions.[1]

[1] Of epidemic Delusions — the Flagellant and Dancing manias of the Middle Ages; the supposed Demoniacal Possession in the nunneries of France; the Mewing and Biting manias in the nunneries of Germany; the ecstatic revelations of Catholic and Protestant visionaries; the strange performances of the *Convulsionnaires* of St. Medad; the Tarentism of Southern Italy; the Tigretier of Abyssinia; the Leaping Ague of Scotland—Dr. Carpenter says "the condition underlying them all is *the subjection of the mind to a dominant idea*" — vol. cit. p. 3. For an account of most of these delusions see Dr. Hecker's account

The cure of disease by concentration of thought is probably effected by the idea of health becoming, unconsciously to the sick person, the dominant idea in the sick person's mind by transferred thought. Thus the mind-curer's mind is concentrated upon the idea that the sick person has no disease, and this idea, being transferred from the active brain of the mind-curer to the passive brain of the sick person, it becomes there the dominant idea, and the sick person becomes well.

That the dominant idea in the patient's mind becomes an idea of health in consequence of the thought of the mind-curer is evident from the fact that many mind-curers do not lead their patients to "expect a certain result" by talking to them; also from the fact that cures are effected when the patient has no knowledge of being treated.

That thought can be transferred from one brain to another, the experiments made by the Society for Psychical Research (London) have demonstrated. This Society, as is well known, embraces some of the most distinguished names in the scientific and philosophical circles of Great Britain.[1]

of the "Dancing mania," forming part of his treatise "On the Epidemics of the Middle Ages," translated for the Sydenham Society by Dr. Babington.

[1] The President of the Society is Prof. Henry Sedgwick of Trinity College, Cambridge; while among the Vice-Presidents may be mentioned Prof. W. F. Barrett, F.R.S.E., of the Royal College of Science in Dublin; the Bishop of Carlisle; Prof. Lord Rayleigh, F.R.S., of Cambridge; and Prof. Balfour Stewart, F.R.S., of the Owens College, Manchester.

The first report of the Committee on Thought-transferrence[1] given to the Society contains the following conclusion: "There does exist a group of phenomena to which the word 'thought-reading,' or, as we prefer to call it, *thought-transferrence*, may be applied, and which consist in the mental perception, by certain individuals at certain times, of a word or other object kept vividly before the mind of another person or persons, without any transmission through the recognized channels of sense" (*Mind Reading and Beyond*, p. 69, B. 1885, W. A. Hovey).

In regard to thought-reading Dr. Carpenter remarks: "Every one who admits 'there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy' will be wise in maintaining a reserve of possibility as to phenomena which are not altogether *opposed* to the laws of physics or physiology, but rather *transcend* them. Some of the writer's own experiences have led him to suspect that a power of intuitively perceiving what is passing in the mind of another, which has been designated as 'thought-reading,' may, like certain forms of sense-perception, be extraordinarily exalted by the entire concentration of the attention" (*Mental Physiology*, p. 633, N. Y. 1874).

The experiments made by the Society for Psy-

[1] The committee consisted of Edmund Gurney, M.A., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; F. W. H. Myers, M.A., late Fellow of Trinity College; F. Podmore, B.A., and Prof. Barrett.

chical Research have proved that not only thoughts and visual impressions — diagrams and the like — but tastes and *pains* may be transferred from one mind to another by concentration of thought.

If concentration of thought can cause pains, is it unreasonable to assume that it can cure pains?

As to the process by which thought is transferred from one brain to another, it is impossible at present to determine. The Committee on Thought-transferrence, just referred to, observe, —

"It is quite open to surmise some sort of analogy to the familiar phenomena of the transmission and reception of vibratory energy.[1] A swinging pendulum suspended from a solid support will throw into synchronous vibration another

[1] Prof. Joseph Lovering, of Cambridge, Mass., says: "All structures, large or small, simple or complex, have a definite rate of vibration, depending on their materials, size, and shape, and as fixed as the fundamental note of a musical chord. . . . When the bridge at Colbrooke Dale was building, a fiddler came along and said to the workmen that he could fiddle their bridge down. The builders though this boast a fiddle-de-dee, and invited the itinerant fiddler to fiddle away to his heart's content. One note after another was struck upon the strings, until one was found with which the bridge was in sympathy. When the bridge began to shake violently, the incredulous workmen were alarmed at the unexpected result, and ordered the fiddler to stop." "Tyndall tells us that the Swiss muleteers tie up the bells of the mules, for fear that the tinkle should bring an avalanche down. The breaking of a drinking-glass by the human voice, when its fundamental note is sounded, is a well authenticated feat." "The nightingale is said to kill by the power of its notes"—*Half-hour Recreations in Popular Science*, Second Series, pp. 401, 402.

pendulum attached to the same support, if the period of oscillation of the two be the same; the medium of transmission here being the solid material of the support. One tuning-fork or string in unison with another will communicate its impulses through the medium of the air. Glowing particles of a gas, acting through the luminiferous ether, can throw into sympathetic vibration cool molecules of the same substance at a distance. A permanent magnet brought into a room will throw any surrounding iron into a condition similar to its own; and here the medium of communication is unknown. Similarly, we may conceive, if we please, with many modern philosophers, that for every thought there is a corresponding motion of the particles of the brain, and that this vibration of molecules of brain-stuff may be communicated to an intervening medium, and so pass under certain circumstances from one brain to another, with a corresponding simultaneity of impressions. No more than in the case of the magnetic phenomena is any investigator bound to determine the *medium* before inquiry into the fact of transit" (vol. cit. pp. 67, 68).

Serjeant Cox, President of the Psychological Society of Great Britain, tells us that the evidence of the phenomena of "thought-reading"[1] is overwhelming. He remarks: "No supernatural power

[1] Serjeant Cox considers the term thought-reading to be misleading. He says: "The common conception of 'thought-reading' is that thoughts are things — words printed somehow

need be invoked to explain these phenomena. Physiology will assist Psychology to a solution of the problem. The brain is the material — that is the molecular — organ by which the operations called mental are conducted. This brain is constructed of a countless multitude of fibres, so fine that many millions of them are contained within the compass of a sixpence. These fibres are instruments of infinite and inconceivable delicacy. They vibrate to waves of the atmosphere, and respond to vibrations of other brain fibres that are imperceptible to sense. Even the vastly coarser strings of a harp take up waves of the atmosphere, that our senses do not perceive, and echo the sound made by other harp-strings in motion. But the atmosphere is not the only medium for transmitting motion.

upon the mind or brain — which the person having the faculty of thought-reading peruses, precisely as he would read a book, or that it is a picture positively painted upon one mind and actually viewed by the other mind. With such a name and such conceptions of the theory, it is not surprising that the fact itself should be received with incredulity, as wholly inconsistent with what we know of brain structure and mental action. Thoughts are not written upon the brain, and if they were so written the *eye* of another person could not read them there. Even the overwhelming evidence of the existence of the phenomena has not sufficed to remove the prejudice caused by the unfortunate name inflicted upon it. At some risk I prefer to throw aside that familiar and misleading name, and to substitute for it one that precisely expresses the fact without appearing to affirm the source of the fact or the means by which it is produced. I therefore adopt the descriptive but not prejudging title of *Mental Sympathy and Communion*" — vol. cit. p. 22.

Itself floats in a more pervading fluid which physicists have agreed to call "the ether." Any person who has witnessed the experiments of Prof. Tyndall with sensitive flames, showing how the atmosphere in a large room cannot be stirred so slightly that the flame will not betray the motion, will readily understand how the vibration of the finest brain fibre may be communicated to other brain fibres. The telephone is a still more startling illustration of the multitudinous atmospheric waves imperceptible to our very obtuse senses,[1] which can perceive only the smallest fraction of the things and motions that surround us. But infinitely more delicate must be the waves of the ether. They must penetrate the most compact substance, solidity being only a human conception, not a fact in nature. Brain action is brain motion. When any mental act is done, the fibres of the brain are set in motion, and of these motions the Conscious Self takes cognizance. The psychological conclusion from this physiological fact will be at once apparent. An idea of thought in my mind is attended with certain molecular movements of certain fibres in my brain. The motions of these fibres in my brain is communicated by ether waves

[1] "The singular instrument called the *Microphone* proves the presence about us of innumerable waves of sound, so slight as to be inaudible to us. It reveals to the ear a new world, as the microscope has opened a new world to the eye. This revelation is another proof of the fact that our senses are constructed to perceive only an infinitesimal portion of the sights and sounds about us."

to the corresponding fibres in your brain, setting up in them a similar motion precisely as the harp that is played upon evokes the same tone from the strings of the untouched harp. These motions of my brain impart to your brain identical impressions, and consequently we think and feel in unison, — not, of course, always in concert, but in the same direction."

"These impressions," continues Serjeant Cox," "communicated from brain to brain, are not perceived at all times, because we are constructed to be conscious of one impression only at one instant of time, and, for the most part, Consciousness is engaged in taking cognizance of some other more vivid impressions. Moreover, some brains are less sensitive than others — have coarser fibres — and therefore are more slow to catch the finer impulses. Let it be understood that this explanation is presented to the reader not as the assertion of a proved fact, but merely as a suggestion of the manner in which the undoubted phenomena of *Mental Communion and Sympathy* might be accomplished by purely natural means, without attributing them to the supernatural, the miraculous, or the spiritual" (*Mechanism of Man*, vol. 2, pp. 22–27, L. 1879).

Mr. W. D. Gunning gives the following case of "thought transferrence:" "An eminent physician of Philadelphia, who was making some investigations on the 'odyle' of Reichenbach, told me that he went one day to hear a 'trance-medium, an

'inspirational' speaker. The medium was a frail, sensitive woman, and one of the most successful of her class. The doctor went to try an experiment. He wrote out a very short lecture, memorized it, and tore up the manuscript. When he entered the hall, the audience had assembled, and the medium sat on the platform. He fixed his eye on her, and, by a strong effort of will, caused her to rise and walk forward to the desk. Then he thought over his lecture, keeping his will on her, and she delivered it, word for word, as the words rose up in his mind.[1] The woman intended no deception. She knew that she was not speaking her own thoughts, and, very naturally, she referred the control to a spirit."

"Now *something*," says Mr. Gunning, "must have passed from the doctor's mind into the brain of the medium. There was no speech, no gesture, no visible sign, and yet the thoughts matured in one brain were passing, by a subtle chemistry, into the brain of another."

Mr. Gunning's conclusion is, that the thoughts were carried from the doctor's to the medium's brain on waves of nerve-fluid (we will call it nerve-fluid, he says), and that the thoughts were

[1] Mr. Gunning says: "The doctor's case does not stand alone. When Dr. Bell began the investigation of Spiritualism, he was surprised to find the medium echoing back his own thoughts. . . . Others have had the same experience , I have had it myself." Mr. Gunning tells us that it was only when his mind was intently fixed upon the medium, that his thoughts were echoed back — vol. cit. p. 14.

uttered from the woman's lips as they were shaped in the doctor's brain, because each wave falling into her brain produced there the same motions as those produced in the brain in which it was generated, just as the electric fluid clicks the same symbols in the office which receives the despatch as in that which sent it.

Mr. Gunning observes: "The brain takes note, not of real objects, but of their representations. Al Hassan did a great service when he demonstrated that the ray of light does not pass from the eye to the object, as all the philosophers had taught, but from the object to the eye. We are just learning the significance of the Arab's demonstration. Rays of light flowing from an object into the eye shake the optic lobes of the brain, and we see, not the object, but a representation of it. Now, if any other force could affect the optic lobes of my brain as light affects them, I would see, although in utter darkness; and if any other force could shake the auditory centres as sound shakes them, I would hear, although in the silence of an Arctic night; and if, my brain being quiescent, any other mind could induce in it those motions which my own thoughts induce, I would act and speak the thoughts of that mind as if they were my own" (*Is it the Despair of Science?* pp. 11–13, B. 1870).

That Mr. Gunning is right in his conclusion, a study of the phenomena designated as Spectral Illusions appears to afford proof. "These are

clearly," says Dr. Carpenter, "*sensorial* states *not* excited by external objects; and it is also clear that they frequently originate in cerebral changes, since they represent *creations* of the mind, and are not mere reproductions of past sensations" (*Mental Physiology*, p. 113).

Proof of the correctness of Mr. Gunning's theory is also afforded by those so-called subjective[1] sensations "which have their origin," says Dr. Carpenter, "in *local* changes that produce impressions on the nerves of the parts to which they are referred, we have examples in the flashes of light which are symptomatic of disease of the retina or of the optic nerve; and in the singing in the ears, which, while sometimes due to a disordered condition within the ears themselves, appears more frequently to arise from an affection of the auditory nerve in its course by the pulsations of a neighboring artery" (vol. cit. p. 156).

In connection with the fact of transferred thought, the question arises as to the manner in which transferred thought can produce such a marvellous result as the cure of disease. The motions produced in the brain by transferred thought are

[1] "The designation 'subjective,'" says Dr. Carpenter, "is commonly given to all those sensations which arise out of either bodily or mental states whose existence is not consequent upon any 'objective' or external change. But strictly speaking, it should be limited to the working of the Ego's own mind; since those which are produced by physical impressions made on the nerves *within* his body, just as truly belong to the *Non-ego*, as do those made by operations from *without*" — vol. cit. p. 155.

soon superseded by other motions, and one would suppose that the effect of the transferred thought would end with the cessation of the motions. That such is not the case may be inferred from what is known of the effects of automatic, unconscious, mental activity, termed by Dr. Carpenter, Unconscious Cerebration.[1]

That the cerebrum may act upon impressions transmitted to it, and may elaborate intellectual results, such as we might have attained by the intentional direction of our minds to the subject, *without any consciousness* on our parts, is only the psychological expression of a doctrine that originated with Leibnitz and has been almost universally adopted by metaphysicians in Germany.

Sir William Hamilton, who alone of British psychologists has fully developed the theory of Latent States of Mental Activity, or Mental Latency, distinguishes three degrees of the condition. The first is to be seen in acquired knowledge. "I know a science, or language," he says, "not merely when I make a temporary use of it, but inasmuch as I can apply it when and how I will. Thus the infinitely greater part of our spiritual treasures

[1] "Few discoveries," says Serjeant Cox, "have been more abused and ridiculed by the Metaphysical School of Mental Philosophers. None, however, is more completely confirmed by examination of mental facts and phenomena. The conception of it once clearly formed, every day, almost every hour, of our lives, supplies us with proofs of Unconscious Cerebration, whether we note the actions of our minds or observe the actions of others — vol. cit. p. 21.

lies always beyond the sphere of consciousness, hid in the obscure recesses of the mind."

"The second condition of Latency exists," Sir William Hamilton states, "when the mind contains certain systems of knowledge, or certain habits of action, which it is wholly unconscious of possessing in its ordinary state, but which are revealed to consciousness in certain extraordinary exaltation of its powers. The evidence on this point shows that the mind frequently contains whole systems of knowledge, which, although in our normal state they have faded into absolute oblivion, may, in certain abnormal states, as madness, febrile delirium, somnambulism, catalepsy, etc., flash out into luminous consciousness, and even throw into the shade of unconsciousness those other systems by which they had for a long period been eclipsed and even extinguished. For example, there are cases in which the extinct memory of whole languages [1] was suddenly restored, and, what is even more remarkable, in which the faculty was exhibited of accurately repeating, in known or unknown tongues, passages which were never within the grasp of conscious memory in the normal state." [2]

[1] Dr. Büchner says: "It is credibly asserted that in the hospital of St. Thomas, in London, a man, after recovery from a severe injury to the head, spoke in a foreign language. The language proved to be his mother-tongue—Welsh—which, however he had forgotten during a thirty years' residence in London" — *Force and Matter*, p. 124.

[2] Sir William Hamilton gives an account of the Comtesse de

The third class of latent modifications are included in the question stated by Sir William Hamilton, "whether, in the ordinary processes of mental life, there are mental modifications, *i.e.*, mental activities and passivities of which we are unconscious, but which manifest their existence by effects of which we are conscious." Sir William's answer is, "I am not only strongly inclined to the affirmative — nay, I do not hesitate to maintain, that what we are conscious of is constructed out of what we are not conscious of, — that our whole knowledge, in fact, is made up of the unknown and incognizable" (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. 1, pp. 339–348, L. 1859).

Serjeant Cox observes: "The mental condition to which the appropriate name of Unconscious Cerebration has been given may be thus described: In certain conditions some of the mental faculties work without consciousness by ourselves of their action. The brain, or some portion of it, thinks,

Lavel, who, when asleep, sometimes talked in the Breton language, but did not understand a single syllable of what she had uttered in her sleep, upon its being related to her. She was born in the province of Brittany, and was nursed in a family where nothing but that language was spoken. Sir William Hamilton also gives an account of a young woman who could neither read nor write, but who, while sick with a nervous fever, talked Latin, Greek, and Hebrew with most distinct enunciation. It was discovered that when nine years old she had been charitably taken by a Protestant pastor, a very learned man and a great Hebraist, who was in the habit of walking up and down a passage in his house, into which the kitchen door opened, reading with a loud voice out of his favorite books, the Greek and Latin Fathers, and Rabbinical books. — vol. cit. p. 343.

feels, has ideas, goes through complicated and elaborate courses of thought, and even prompts to action without consciousness of the operation of the individual, who, at the same moment, is consciously employed in some other mental work. Sometimes there is a self-consciousness of the *results* of such action; sometimes, also, the results are cognizable by others, although quite unrecognized by the actor" (vol. cit. p. 11).

Dr. Carpenter shows that "much of our highest mental activity is to be regarded as the expression of the automatic action of the cerebrum; and that it may act upon impressions transmitted to it, and may elaborate results such as we might have obtained by the purposive direction of our minds to the subject, *without any consciousness on our parts.*" "Looking," he adds, "at all those automatic operations by which results are evolved without any intentional direction of the mind to them, in the light of 'reflex' actions of the cerebrum, there is no more difficulty in comprehending that such reflex actions may proceed without our knowledge, so as to evolve *intellectual products* when their results are transmitted to the sensorium, and are thus impressed on our consciousness, than there is in understanding that impressions may evolve muscular movements, through the reflex power of the spinal cord without the necessary intervention of sensation."[1] "Cerebral changes may take place *unconsciously*, if the sensorium be

[1] *Principles of Human Physiology*, p. 607, 5th edit. 1855.

either in a state of absolute torpor, or for a time non-receptive as regards those changes, its activity being exerted in some other direction, or, to express the same fact psychologically, that mental changes, of whose *results we subsequently* become convinced, may go on *below* the plane of consciousness, either during profound sleep, or while the attention is wholly engrossed by some entirely different train of thought." "The more we examine into what may be termed the mechanism of thought, the more clear does it become that not only an *automatic*, but an *unconscious* action enters largely into all its processes." "There is considerable ground to believe that the best *judgments* are often mentally delivered in difficult cases, by the unconscious resolution of the difficulties in the way of arriving at a conclusion, when the question (after being *well considered* in the first place) is left to settle itself.

"It has, on several occasions," continues Dr. Carpenter (quoting from a lecture delivered by himself) "occurred to me to have to form a decision as to some important change, either in my own plans of life, or in those of members of my family, in which were involved a great many of what we are accustomed to call *pros* and *cons*. . . . And I believe that in all such cases where we are not pressed for a decision, our best plan is to let the question *settle itself* by Unconscious Cerebration; having first brought before our minds, as fully as possible, everything that can be fairly urged on

both sides." Dr. Carpenter quotes the following account given by Oliver Wendell Holmes.

"I was told within a week," says Dr. Holmes, "of a business man in Boston, who, having an important question under consideration, had given it up for the time as too much for him. But he was conscious of an action going on in his brain, which was so unusual and painful as to excite his apprehensions that he was threatened with palsy or something of that sort. After some hours of this uneasiness, his perplexity was all at once cleared up by the natural solution of his doubts coming to him, worked out, as he believed, in that obscure and troubled interval." Dr. Holmes observes: "I question whether persons who think most — that is, have most conscious thought pass through their minds — necessarily do most mental work. 'The tree you are sticking in will be growing while you are sleeping.' So with every new idea that is planted in a real thinker's mind, it will be growing when he is least conscious of it. An idea in the brain is not a legend carved on a marble slab: it is an impression made on a living tissue, which is the seat of active nutritive properties. Shall the initials I carved in bark increase from year to year with the tree? and shall not my recorded thought develop into new forms and relations with my growing brain?" (*Mental Physiology*, pp. 518–534.)

In this connection Sir Benjamin Brodie remarks: "It seems to me on some occasions . . . as if there were in the mind a principle of order, which oper-

ates without our being at the time conscious of it. It has often happened to me to have been occupied by a particular subject of inquiry; to have accumulated a store of facts connected with it, but to have been able to proceed no further. Then, after an interval of time, without any addition to my stock of knowledge, I have found the obscurity and confusion in which the subject was originally enveloped to have cleared away; the facts have seemed all to settle themselves in their right places, and their mental relations to have become apparent, although I have not been sensible of having made any distinct effort for that purpose" (*Psychological Inquiries*, vol. I, p. 20).

In speaking of the fact that it is an every-day occurrence to most of us to forget a particular word, or a line of poetry, and to remember it some minutes or hours later, Frances Power Cobbe remarks: "We try, perhaps anxiously at first, to recover it, well aware that it lies somewhere hidden in our memory, but unable to seize it . . . deliberately turn away, not intending finally to abandon the pursuit, but precisely as if we were possessed of an obedient secretary or librarian, whom we could order to hunt up a missing document, or turn out a word in a dictionary, while we amused ourselves with something else. The more this very common phenomenon is studied, the more I think the observer of his own mental processes will be obliged to concede, the research is made absolutely without him. He has neither pain nor pleasure,

nor sense of labor in the task, any more than if it were performed by another person; and his conscious Self is all the time suffering, enjoying, or laboring on totally different ground" (*Darwinism in Morals*, p. 308, Edinb. 1872).

The following passage from an early work of Abraham Tucker's, presents the most familiar illustration of the process of Unconscious Cerebration: —

"But, though the mind, by her notice, begins the formation of a train [of ideas], there is something in our internal mechanism that strengthens and completes the concatenation. It has been generally remarked by school-boys, that after having labored the whole evening before a repetition, to get their lesson by heart, but to very little purpose, when they rise in the morning they shall have it current at their tongue's end without any further trouble. Nor is it unusual with persons of riper years, when being asked for a determination, which they cannot form without a number of things to be previously considered, to desire time to sleep upon it; because, with all their care to digest their materials, they cannot do it completely; but after a night's rest, or some recreation, or the mind being turned for a while into a different course of thinking, *She finds they have ranged themselves anew during her absence*, and in such manner as exhibit almost at one view all their mutual relations, dependencies, and consequences, *which shows that our organs do not stand idle the moment we cease to*

employ them, but continue the motions we put them into after they have gone out of sight, thereby working themselves to a glibness and smoothness, and falling into a more regular and orderly posture than we could have placed them with all our skill and industry" (*The Light of Nature Perused*, vol. 1, p. 248, 24th edit. 1805).

At one of the lectures on the mind-cure, which the writer attended, a certain theological idea was propounded by the lecturer, which the writer felt sure might be refuted by some fact in nature. Upon her return from the lecture she meditated upon the subject until midnight, but fell asleep without having arrived at a solution of the problem. On awakening in the morning she found the solution of the problem in her mind. She was aware of the fact before she was fully conscious of being awake.

On another occasion the writer felt great dissatisfaction in regard to a certain matter, and "turned the subject over" in her mind many times, but without being able to come to a satisfactory conclusion regarding it, so decided to leave the matter as it was. At the same time there was a point of minor importance that she had been unable to settle, and having had the experience in having a point settled by Unconscious Cerebration just alluded to, she decided to leave this point to be settled in the same manner. She thought of all of the facts bearing upon the case just before falling asleep, and fully expected that the conclusion

would be worked out for her by Unconscious Cerebration during the night. Great was her surprise in the morning to find that the subject had been entirely ignored, but that the more important subject that she had unwillingly decided the day before to leave as it was, had been worked out in the most satisfactory manner. This fact would appear to show that the unconscious mind is able to choose between two or more subjects; though it might be explained on the ground that the important subject was in the writer's mind prior to the less important subject, and that the unconscious mind, having started with one subject, could not be compelled by the conscious will to leave it for another.

"Most persons," says Dr. Tuke, "can insure waking in the morning by strongly fixing the attention upon the time desired just before falling asleep. This affords an excellent instance of mental activity without consciousness of the process, the person being in fact asleep at the time the latent idea comes into operation. This familiar fact involves an automatic calculation of the lapse of time. The Fakir, before passing into his hibernating trance, determines when he shall awake, and strongly impresses upon his mind the day or even the hour when he shall revive, and revive he accordingly does. The late Sir James Simpson, at a meeting of the Edinburgh Medico-Chirurgical Society, referred to a striking case witnessed by three physicians, in which a person 'beologized'

was commanded to sleep thirty-five hours, and did so, with two short intervals of permitted awakening" (vol. cit. pp. 85, 86).

The following is told of Charlotte Brontë by her biographer, Mrs. Gaskell: (*a*) "She said that it was not every day that she could write. Sometimes weeks or even months elapsed before she felt that she had anything to add to that portion of her story which was already written. Then, some morning she would waken up, and the progress of her work lay clear and bright before her in distinct vision, its incidents and consequent thoughts being at such times more present to her mind than her actual life itself" (*Life*, p. 234).

(*b*) "Whenever she had to describe anything which had not fallen within her own experience, it was her habit 'to think of it intently many and many a night before falling to sleep, wondering what it was like, or how it would be;' till at length, sometimes after the progress of her story had been arrested at this one point for weeks, she wakened up in the morning with all clear before her, as if she had in reality gone through the experience, and then could describe it word for word as it had happened" (*Life*, p. 425).

Dr. Charles F. Taylor gives in the *Popular Science Monthly* (May, 1879, p. 41) the case of a young man who had been unsuccessfully treated for a case of ununited fracture of the left thigh-bone. Two years before, the young man had met with an accident, and had broken his thigh-bone

just above the middle. In due course of time the fracture united, and the patient got about, and walked with perfect facility for one year, when, in crossing the street, he fell and broke the same bone again, as was supposed, about four inches below the seat of the former fracture. Dr. Taylor found, upon examination, that there was no ununited fracture, and, moreover, that the bone had not been broken at the second accident, although the young man had been treated for such fracture for over a year by three eminent physicians, one of them being a surgeon with a national reputation. Dr. Taylor observes: —

"The muscles were wasted, soft, and without tonicity, and, there being a large outward bending in the middle of the bone, with lapping of more than two inches, it would roll about when touched, like a crooked stick on the floor, and it was almost impossible to keep it still long enough to make a diagram." "The explanation of the case is exceedingly simple: he thought he had fractured his femur at the second accident. This impression caused him instinctively and quite unconsciously to withhold muscular action in that limb — that is, he did what he ought to have done if the limb had been fractured. It was the completeness of the control over the muscles, the utter restraint of all muscular action, causing the totally relaxed condition which was mistaken for a broken bone. Of course the trouble was purely mental. But it was not a condition of mind of which he was in the

slightest degree conscious. He was not aware of the fact that he was restraining the muscles from action during this long time; so effectually restraining them that all spontaneity was destroyed by a direct and positive effect of the will. He held his limb in a mental vice of such force and persistency that its nutrition was interfered with, and it was wasted to the last degree. And yet he did not know it. There was no shamming. His condition was a great distress to him. . . . A mere explanation of his condition was not sufficient for him to relax his mental hold on the limb. The mental *impression* [1] subordinated his will and the ordinary desire. His treatment consisted in providing situations which would assist him to *let go* of his leg. I caused him to take certain violent exercises with the upper extremities. The intention was to make them so violent that his whole attention would be required for the upper, and there would be none left for the lower extremity. The plan succeeded. Within three days he gave up restraining the limb — let go of it; in fact, spontaneity was restored, and he began to walk; began involuntarily, and without being conscious of it, as he was not conscious of restraining it at and after the second injury.

In this, as in all such cases, accepting by the patient of the opinion that the power exists is not sufficient to restore the member to use . . . sim-

[1] An excellent example of what Dr. Carpenter calls the control exercised by the *dominant idea*.

ply to know and understand the mental nature of the case is not enough to establish control, because it is not the intelligence principally which is at fault." [1]

In the same article Dr. Taylor gives the case of a little girl of three years of age, who saw a very lame child on the street one day, and, on returning home, was found, to the surprise of her parents, to be lame herself.

A surgeon celebrated as a joint-doctor was consulted, and pronounced it a case of hip-joint disease. The limb, which was very much drawn up, quickly came down to its natural position, and after

[1] Dr. Taylor remarks: "It will be observed that I have not used the word 'imagination' in connection with the phenomena under consideration. I have not used this term, because it does not apply to the facts. Imagination is an attribute of the mind, an important but wholly distinct mental faculty. But it is not the whole mind, neither does it present a special condition of the mind. The imagination is often given full play in many of these cases, and undoubtedly assists in producing that mental state which ultimately ends in mental allotropism. But, however conspicuous the imagination may be in such a case, its only importance consists in being one of the many factors tending to produce a certain definite result, which, when reached, is not imagination nor the direct product of the imagination. I speak of this because I think a great deal of harm has been done by the use of this word. It is employed, generally, as if the use of it carried some explanation, and it is understood by the subject as casting some imputation. Besides, abnormal mental timbre, productive of positive effects on the organism, is quite as apt to be manifested in certain wholly unimaginative persons as in the imaginative. The most marked cases which have come under my observation have been those of persons whose characteristics have been strong common sense and self-forgetfulness."

three months of treatment was pronounced cured. Upon taking off the bandages, however, the limb was again drawn up. The case was pronounced by Dr. Taylor to have been from the beginning a case of Unconscious Cerebration. When last seen by Dr. Taylor the child was fourteen years old, and the limb continued to be drawn up although the hip-joint was in perfect condition.

Dr. Taylor gives the particulars of two cases of supposed paralysis which proved to have been caused by Unconscious Cerebration. He also gives several cases of lameness (one of three years' standing) which were caused by stiffened muscles, the stiffened condition having been caused and continued by Unconscious Cerebration (*Bodily Conditions as related to Mental States*).

Allowing that transferred thought becomes the *dominant idea* in the brain to which it is transferred, and that it continues to control the brain by Unconscious Cerebration, the mystery of the cure of disease by transferred thought is entirely done away with by the Single-substance Doctrine,[1] which demonstrates that mind is a property or product of matter;[2] in other words, that mind and

[1] For proof of the Single-substance Doctrine, see Chapters 3–5 of this volume.

[2] The realization that matter is simply a manifestation of "associated force" makes this theory less difficult to accept than it otherwise would be. Prof. Walling says: "Some of the so-called primary properties of matter, such as impenetrability, hardness, elasticity, etc., are not real properties of matter *per se*, but the phenomena upon which the supposition of their

body are *one*, instead of two separate entities. The theory held by many physiologists — that mind is an attribute of the body as a whole, instead of being located in the brain only — still further simplifies the subject of mind-cure.

Dr. Lindsey observes in this connection: "Physiologists are gradually adopting a more and more comprehensive conception of mind, and are coming to regard it as a function or attribute not of any particular organ or part of the body, but of the body as a whole.[1] Long ago the illustrious Milton, discoursing of mind and its seat, properly described the human mind as an attribute of man's body as a whole. In various forms or words this view has been expressed in recent times by Müller, Lewes, Laycock, Bushnan, Bastian, Maudsley, Carpenter, and others. According to these authors the seat of mind is throughout the body (Müller); mind pervades the body (Laycock and Bushnan); mind comprehends the bodily life (Maudsley); psychical life has no one special centre (Lewis); the whole nervous system is the seat or organ of mind, the brain being only its chief seat or organ (Bastian). The brain, then, is only *one* organ of mind — the organ, it may be said, only of special mental functions. . . .

existence is based are manifestations of associated force and consequent motion."—*Abstract of a Paper on Atomic Motion.*

[1] The notion that the whole soul is in the whole body, and in every part, was taken up by Augustine, then by Claudius Mamertus, and from them passed over to the School-men, with whom it was a favorite maxim.

"We must henceforth regard the true site, seat, or organ of the mind as the *whole body;* and this is the only sound basis on which the comparative psychologist can begin his studies. There would be the less difficulty in accepting such a basis were it only borne in view that the *muscular* as well as the nervous system, that muscular action, has an intimate relation to mental phenomena — to ideas as well as feelings. Muscular action is essential in certain, if not in all, mental processes, e.g., in feeling or emotion. Outward muscular expression (e.g., facial) and inward ideas or feelings are inseparably correlated (Maudsley).

"Further, certain phenomena generally referred in man to mind are exhibited where *no brain* exists, where it never has existed, or where it has been removed or destroyed, artificially, or by disease. There is no brain proper in the Hymenoptera, certain authors think, and yet its equivalent or analogue executes what in man would be set down as intellectual actions (Houzeau).

"But, in order to understand the nature and variety of the mental phenomena that are compatible with the absence of brain in the highest animals, there is no more important subject of study than the actions of headless and brainless infants and animals. The following must here suffice as illustrations: —

"1. In what is known to physiologists as Goltz's croaking experiment (*Quakversuch*) in the frog, after the cerebral hemispheres have been removed,

gentle stroking of certain parts of the body, by means of the finger or any broad smooth surface, produces a croak of satisfaction, 'once at each stroke, with machine-like regularity;' but if the animals are 'touched or stroked with a sharp instrument, they do not croak, but execute defensive movements. . . . When any nerve-trunk is irritated they sometimes utter a sound indeed, but it is the cry of pain and never the croak of contentment' (Brunton).[1]

[1] If you put a frog, that has had its cerebral hemispheres removed, "in the flat of your hand, it sits there crouched, perfectly quiet, and would sit there forever. Then if you incline your hand, doing it very gently and slowly, so that the frog would naturally tend to slip off, you feel the creature's forepaws getting a little slowly on to the edge of your hand, until he can just hold himself there, so that he does not fall; then, if you turn your hand, he mounts up with great care and deliberation, putting one leg in front, and then the other, until he balances himself with perfect precision upon the edge of your hand; then, if you turn your hand over, he goes through the opposite set of operations until he comes to sit in perfect security upon the back of your hand. The doing of all this requires a delicacy of co-ordination, and an adjustment of the muscular apparatus of the body, which is only comparable to that of a rope-dancer among ourselves; though in truth a frog is an animal very poorly constructed for rope-dancing, and on the whole we may give him rather more credit than we should to a human dancer. Their movements are performed with the utmost steadiness and precision. . . . And what is still more wonderful is, that if you put the frog on a table, and put a book between him and the light, and give him a little gog behind, he will jump — take a long jump, very possibly — but he won't jump against the book; he will jump to the right or to the left, but he will get out of the way, showing that, though he is absolutely impervious to ordinary impressions of light, there is still a

"2. According to Magendie, Longet, Flourens, and Schiff, a pigeon with its cerebral hemispheres removed, if thrown into the air, flies; if laid prone, gets up; shuts its eyes in a bright light; preens its ruffled feathers; follows with its head the movements of a candle; stands on one leg and then changes to the other, maintaining its balance or equilibrium; shakes its head and puts it under its wing for sleep — in other words, it receives and responds to certain kinds of external, as well as internal impressions.

"3. In Ppuflüger's well-known vinegar experiment on decapitated frogs, if a drop of acetic acid be applied to one thigh the animal wipes it off, or endeavors to do so, with the opposite foot or leg; the animal, in short, makes experimental efforts to expunge the irritant, while its leg also 'makes efforts to push away the probe with which its cloaca is being irritated' (Carpenter).

"4. Suction of the mother's teats by the brainless puppy (Grainger).

"5. The decapitated salamander swims (Dumeril).

"6. The brainless rat, if a sharp noise be made, bounds away as if alarmed (Vulpian).

"7. The anencephalic infant not only moves its limbs, but sucks and cries.

"Similar actions are performed by animals that

something which passes through the sensory nerve, acts upon the machinery of his nervous system, and causes it to adapt itself to the proper action" — *Address given by Professor Huxley, before the British Association at Belfast*, 1874.

have been not only decapitated, but dismembered or cut into sections. Thus the segments of a myriapod walk — the capital segment avoiding obstacles — in the absence of vision (Houzeau). . . By almost common consent of physiologists these phenomena, when exhibited in brainless animals, are assigned to the category of what are variously called reflex, automatic, mechanical excito-motor, or sensori-motor actions, which are supposed to be independent of or unassociated with, intelligence, memory, reason, sensation, consciousness, and will; but it appears to me that this assignation has been altogether, or at least too much, determined by the fact that the brain is absent, and that consciousness and volition are supposed to depend upon the existence of a brain. On the contrary, I hold that both consciousness and volition, in some form or degree, are exhibited not only by animals deprived or destitute of brain, but even of a nervous system, as well as by certain plants, as I have elsewhere shown. Unless we make this concession — adopt this view of the comprehensive character of consciousness and will — it is obvious that mental philosophers must so re-define these terms as to restrict their application to animals provided with a brain and spinal cord; and any such re-definition will probably be difficult, mischievous, and unscientific" (*Mind in the Lower Animals*, vol. II. pp. 3–6).

Dr. Maudsley asks: "Is the brain the exclusive organ of mind? If it be so, to what category of

functions shall we refer the reflex acts of the spinal cord, which take place independently of the brain, and which often achieve as definite an end, and seem to display as intelligent an aim, as any conscious act of volition?" After relating the Goltz's croaking experiment Dr. Maudsley asks: "What are we to say in explanation of movements that have such a look of adaptation? Are they mental, or are they only physical? If they are mental, it is plain we must much enlarge and modify our conception of mind and of the seat of mind; if physical, it is plain that we must subtract from mind functions that are essential to its full function, and properties that are the very foundation of its development in the higher centres. Some eminent physiologists now maintain, on the strength of these experiments, that the accepted doctrine of reflex action is quite untenable, and that the spinal cord is really endowed with sensation and volition; and certainly these adapted actions seem to give us all the signs of being felt and willed, except telling us they are so" (*Body and Mind*, pp. 15–17).

Philosopher Fischer, of Basle, says: "That the soul is imminent in the whole nervous system is proved, as it feels, perceives, and acts in every part thereof. I do not feel pain in a central part of my brain, but in a particular spot and place" (quoted by Dr. Büchner in *Force and Matter*, p. 143, L. 1870).

Sir William Hamilton remarks: "To localize

mind is to run into contradiction and absurdity. . . . We cannot localize the mind without clothing it with the attributes of extension and place; and to make the seat or locality a point only aggravates the difficulty. We have no right to limit it to any part of the organism; the mind cannot be denied to feel at the finger points. . . . There is no good ground to suppose that the mind is situate solely in the brain, or exclusively in any one part of the body. On the contrary, the supposition that it is really present wherever we are conscious that it acts, — in a word, the Peripatetic aphorism, the soul is all in the whole and all in every part — is more philosophical, and, consequently, more probable than any other opinion" (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. II, pp. 127, 128).

Dr. Nichols remarks: "Extended experiments have been made in freezing the brain of living animals, and it has been shown that when, by the use of freezing mixtures, the living brain is frozen solid, the animal is not destroyed. Its powers may be retained in an ice-bound condition for hours, with every faculty practically dead; and yet, set free from cold, they are revived, and all come back again as healthful as ever.[1] This is a marvellous

[1] Dr. Hufeland, a distinguished German philosopher and physician of the last century, remarks: "Of the extraordinary power which heat has to nourish and awaken life, the following entirely new and decisive instance deserves to be mentioned: On the 2d of August, 1790, a carabinier named Petit threw himself, entirely naked, into the Rhine, from a window of the military hospital at Strasburg. This circumstance was observed

revealing, and seems to show that the mind is not wholly resident in the brain. The freezing of the body as a whole results in the prompt separation of mind and matter, and if the whole of the mind was resident in the brain, freezing the nervous tissue would cause death.

"The deduction might be drawn from these experiments that heat is the source of mind, or, indeed, is mind, inasmuch as, when it is present in the brain, its functions are active; when it is withdrawn, they are dormant. This conclusion would necessitate the belief that mind is co-related with the energies known as heat, electricity, and light, and give color to the views of a class of philosophers who regard mind as a form of energy no more exalted than other forces in nature" (*Whence, What, Where?* pp. 36–38, B. 1883).

about three o'clock in the afternoon; and the body remained about half an hour in the water before it was drawn out, to all appearances perfectly dead. It was placed in a bed thoroughly warmed, with the head raised up, the arms stretched out close to it on each side, and the legs laid together. No other process was employed than the application of warm cloths to the stomach and legs. Warm stones, also, wrapped up in cloth, were placed in different parts of the bed. In the course of seven or eight minutes a small motion was observed in the eyelids. A little while after, the under jaw, which had been fast locked to the upper one, became loose; the patient foamed at the mouth, and he was able to swallow a few spoonfuls of wine. His pulse now returned, and at the end of an hour he was able to speak. Warmth, in cases of apparent death, acts evidently with as much power as on the first expansion of life it nourishes the smallest sparks of the vital principle still remaining, fans them and gradually rouses them into a flame"—*Art of Prolonging Life*, pp. 33, 39, B. 1796.

By accepting the well-established, well-proven theories of physiologists and psychologists — Expectant Attention, the Dominant Idea, Thought-transferrence, Unconscious Cerebration, the Single-substance Doctrine, the Mind in Attribute of the Whole Body — the Mind-Cure has a *material basis*, and is accounted for by Nature's laws, without having recourse to supernatural, immaterial, and spiritual agencies.

The following experiments in curing disease by concentration of thought were made by the writer.

A Mrs. H., of this city (Boston), sixty-five years of age, had suffered from neuralgic headache since the summer she was nineteen, her nervous system at that time having received a severe shock in consequence of a serious accident that happened to her father. She was rarely free from a headache, and much of the time suffered extremely, the headache frequently becoming what is termed a sick headache. Everything had been done for her that Materia Medica could do, but without avail.

In treating[1] Mrs. H. the writer simply concen-

[1] The writer has never known a patient to be made worse by this form of treatment. The "Christian Scientists," in treating, think of the patient as a *perfect spirit* without a material body. It very frequently happens that this form of treatment makes a patient worse, and the patient is told that it is due to chemicalization (the meeting of truth and error), in the mind of the patient. A more simple explanation would be, that in thinking of a sick person as being a *perfect spirit*, without a

trated her mind upon the thoughts (after mentally addressing Mrs. H. by her full name).[1] You have not got neuralgic headache. A shock to your nervous system could not have caused neuralgic headache.[2]

The first treatment was given in February, 1884, and the treatments were continued for twelve days, all but four of them being given at the distance of half a mile from the patient. The twelfth day Mrs. H. had a headache, and the writer gave her a treatment, but told her she should try no longer to cure her, as the treatments did not appear to be successful. In November following, the writer met Mrs. H., who told her that she had not had a headache since the day she received her last mind-treatment. It is now nearly fifteen months since the mind-treatments were given, and Mrs. H. has had but two headaches during that time, those being caused by severe colds.

A case of chronic rheumatism of two years' standing was treated, the patient, who was seventy-six years of age, being unable to get from one

material body, an *impossible* existence, the "Christian Scientists," by the power of thought, come near to extinguishing the vital spark.

[1] This is considered essential. It is also considered essential that the mind-curer should, before treating a patient, concentrate the mind upon the thought, "I cannot take the disease," as sympathy or imitation sometimes makes the disease the *dominant idea* in the mind-curer's brain.

[2] It is considered essential by many mind-curers that the *cause* of a disease should be known, and its power to cause disease denied.

room to another without assistance, on account of the lameness in one knee. In about a week the patient could not only walk without difficulty, but could go up three flights of stairs in succession.

A widow, who was dependent upon her own exertions for the support of herself and two children, had been an invalid for a number of years, being unable to work a great deal of the time.[1] The mind-treatments in this case were given every day (Sundays excepted) for a month, but after the first five or six, the patient had perfect health. It is nearly a year since the treatments were given, and the patient continues to enjoy perfect health.

In a case of six months' standing which was in some respects similar to the preceding, there had been excruciating pain the greater part of the time, although the patient was under medical treatment, and was, a part of the time, in a hospital. The first mind-treatment relieved the pain permanently, and the patient was cured after being treated a month.

In another case of the same disease of ten years' standing, the treatments were given for a month, and then discontinued, as there was no apparent benefit derived from them. A month later the writer called upon the patient, who told her that she had suffered none from the extreme pain she had been subject to, since the day her case was given up by the writer. The improvement con-

[1] The particulars of this case will be given upon application to the writer.

tinues. In this case the trouble had been rendered very much more serious by mistaken local treatment which the patient had received six months prior to the mind-treatments.

In another case of the same disease of nine years' standing, though not nearly so serious as the one just mentioned, there was a complete cure in a week. In this case the patient had faith in the efficacy of the mind-cure.

A stiff foot, that was not used for nearly two years on account of a fracture of the ankle bone, was cured by five or six treatments. The patient had begun to walk, but did not have full control of the foot previous to the mind-treatments.

A puny, sickly baby of six months, took a severe cold and appeared to be suffering from asthma (the child's father was subject to asthma). There was a violent throbbing in the chest, which was very perceptible when the hand was laid upon it, and every breath produced a grating sound. The child was treated at six o'clock P.M., and when visited the next day was found to have recovered entirely. The child has been perfectly healthy since. It is nearly a year since the treatment was given.

A friend of the writer was subject to frequent and severe attacks of sick headache. One Sunday morning, about a year ago, the writer met the daughter of her friend at church, and upon inquiry learned that her friend was ill with one of her sick headaches that was just coming on. Although

in church, the writer immediately gave her friend a treatment, and was told afterwards by her friend that her headache did not amount to anything that day. She continued to treat her friend for the headaches, although at a distance of twenty miles from her, for about ten days. There was no recurrence of the headaches for eight months, but at the end of that time the patient took a severe cold and had a headache.

A little girl of seven years was treated for a case of spinal disease of three and a half years' standing. After the second treatment there was decided improvement in the child's general health, and she continues to grow stronger and straighter.

A gentleman residing on the same street with the writer was very ill with Bright's disease. He had been delirious for weeks, and all hope of his recovery had been abandoned by one of the two physicians who attended him. On passing the house one day, the writer gave the patient, whom she had never seen, a treatment. She found afterwards, upon inquiry, that the patient had recovered from his delirium almost immediately after the treatment was given. She continued to treat the patient, unknown to him or his family, for a fortnight, when she learned that he was able to be up and about the house. Not long after, he went into the country for the summer.[1]

A dog suffering from chorea was treated, and

[1] The names of those treated will be given upon application to the writer.

although the nature of the disease was not at first known (there was violent and constant twitching of one leg), the improvement was noticeable from the first. The twitching is now hardly perceptible.

The writer can induce sleep in herself [1] when inclined to be wakeful, by concentrating her mind upon the thought that she is going to sleep.[2]

It is very evident that it was not faith that cured in the cases just mentioned, as only three of the patients had heard of the mind-cure, and two of the three had no faith in it. The treatments were not requested in any case, but were given voluntarily, so that the fact of receiving the treatments was no indication of faith in the receiver.

[1] In treating one's self the same form of treatment is enjoined by the mind-curers that is used in treating others.

[2] Dr. Tuke, in commenting upon the influence of Expectation and the Dominant Idea upon the vessels of the brain in causing *sleep* and inducing waking from sleep at a certain time, observes: "In many persons it is well known, and as Sir John Forbes demonstrates, it is only necessary to expect sleep, and it supervenes, while a person impressed with the idea that it will not come may be rendered restless for hours" — vol. cit. p. 93.

Dr. Carpenter says: "It is unquestionable that the supervention of sleep may be promoted by the strong *previous expectation* of it; and this is true, not merely of ordinary, natural sleep, but of the states of artificial Reverie and Somnambulism." "It is related that the Abbé Faria, who acquired notoriety through his power of inducing Somnambulism, was accustomed merely to place his patient in an arm-chair, and then, after telling him to shut his eyes and collect himself, to pronounce in a strong voice and imperative tone the word 'dormez,' which was usually successful" — *Mental Physiology*, p. 579.

Doubtless many will think it impossible for them to cure disease by concentrating the mind upon the thought that the sick person has no disease, as it is impossible not to believe in the reality of disease.

Strange as it may appear, it does not seem to be necessary that the mind-curer should believe that the patient has no disease, no more than it was necessary for Dr. Haygarth and Mr. Smith to believe that the false Tractors would cure rheumatism.[1] The thought of the mind-curer, that the sick person has no disease, is transferred to the brain of the sick person, and becomes there the *dominant idea*, without regard apparently, to the belief back of the thought. This may be owing to the fact that the belief is lying dormant at the time, and that thought only produces motions in the brain. It appears that what is only imagined in the mind-curer's brain becomes a reality in the brain to which the thought is transferred.

It is well known that many mind-curers prefer to treat their patients at a distance from them. Marvellous cures have been effected when the mind-curer was hundreds of miles from the patient.

In this connection Dr. Carpenter observes: "Looking at Nerve-force as a special form of physical energy, it may be deemed not altogether incredible that it should exert itself from a distance, so as to bring the brain of one person into direct dynamical communication with that of another,

[1] See account of "Perkins' Magnetic Tractors" further on in this chapter.

without the intermediation either of verbal language or of movements of expression. A large amount of evidence, sifted with the utmost care, would be needed to establish even a *probability* of such communication. But would any man of science have a right to say that it is *impossible?*" (*Mental Physiology*, p. 634.)

Dr. Tuke tells us that "Unzer and John Hunter clearly perceived and expressed the mental or psycho-physical law which lies at the foundation of the principal phenomena properly comprised under the influence of the Intellect or Thought upon the body, including sensation as well as motion, especially in regard to Expectation, and what is ordinarily understood as the Imagination."

"Unzer, in his great work published in 1771, points out, under the division of expectation and foreseeing, that expectation of the action of a remedy often causes us to experience its operations beforehand."

"Hunter," says Dr. Tuke, "had his attention drawn to the phenomena of Animal Magnetism, and in his Lectures on Surgery, 1786–7, explained those which he witnessed, on the principle of Attention and Expectation." He says: "I was asked to go to be magnetized, but at first refused, because the spasm on my vital parts was very likely to be brought on by a state of mind anxious about any event . . . and I feared lest it should be imputed to animal magnetism. But considering that, if any person was affected by it, *it must be by the Imagina-*

tion being worked up by the attention to the part expected to be affected, and thinking I could counteract this, I went, and accordingly when I went I was convinced by the apparatus that everything was calculated to affect the Imagination. When the magnetizer began operations, and informed me that I should feel it first at the roots of my nails of that hand nearest the apparatus, *I fixed my attention on my great toe*, where I was wishing to have a fit of the gout; *and I am confident that I can fix my attention to any part until I have a sensation in that part.* Whenever I found myself attending to his tricks, I fell to work with my great toe, working it about, etc., by which means I prevented it having any effect upon me."

"Although it is nearly a century," says Dr. Tuke, "since these sentences were written, they really contain the gist of all that has been written since on the influence of Expectation and the Imagination" (vol. cit. pp. 3–5).

"Muller," says Dr. Tuke, "expresses himself as decidedly as John Hunter in regard to the influence of Expectation. 'It may be stated,' says Muller, 'as a general fact, that any state of the body, which is conceived to be approaching, and which is expected with certain confidence, will be very prone to ensue, as the mere result of that idea.' He only makes one condition, 'if it do not be beyond the bounds of possibility'" (vol. cit. p. 5).

Dr. Laycock remarks: "Let a person concen-

trate his attention upon the interior of his head for a few moments, and he will experience sensations analogous to formication. Anyone may produce at will a sensation in his finger-ends, by directing his attention to it. The effect of fearful attention on the nervous system has occasionally proved fatal" (*Nervous Diseases of Women*, pp. 110, 112, L. 1840).

Prof. Dubois and M. Bonnet, also dwell explicitly upon the effects of *attention* in augmenting the intensity of ordinary sensations.

Expectant Attention has been found to be the cause of the phenomena attributed by Mesmer to Mesmerism. The Commissioners [1] of the French Academy of Medicine, in their examination of the phenomena of Mesmerism, came to the conclusion that there was no evidence of any special agency proceeding from the magnetic tub used by Mesmer; for, on blindfolding those who seemed to be most susceptible to its influence, all its ordinary effects were produced when they were without any connection with it, *but believed that it existed.* And so, when in a garden of which trees had been magnetized, the patients, either when blindfolded, or when ignorant which trees had been magnetized, would be thrown into a convulsive fit if they believed themselves to be near a magnetized tree, but were really at a distance from it; whilst, con-

[1] It should be borne in mind that the Commissioners were among the most eminent *savans* of their time, such as Bailly, Benjamin Franklin, and Lavoisier.

versely, no effect would follow their close proximity to one of these trees when they believed themselves to be at a distance from any of them. The Commissioners, in their report of their examination of the phenomena of Mesmerism, make the following statement: —

"That which we have learnt, or, at least, that which has been proved to us in a clear and satisfactory manner, by our inquiry into the phenomena of Mesmerism, is — *that man can act upon man*, at all times and places almost, by striking his imagination; that signs and gestures the most simple may produce the most powerful effects; that the action of man upon the imagination may be reduced to an art, and conducted after a certain method when exercised upon patients who have faith in the proceedings." "We have seen the imagination, when exalted, become powerful enough to make a person lose the faculty of speech in a moment." "Upon persons endowed with sensitive nerves we have produced convulsions and what are called crises. Animal Magnetism alone, employed for thirty minutes, has produced no effect, and immediately the imagination has produced upon the same person, with the same means, under circumstances absolutely similar, a very severe and well-characterized convulsion." "As to the imagination, we know the derangement which a vivid and sudden impression has often occasioned in the human machinery. The imagination renews or suspends the animal functions; it ani-

mates by hope or freezes by fear; in a single night it turns the hair white; in a moment it restores the use of the limbs or the speech; it destroys or develops the germ of disease; it even causes death."[1]

The investigations of the phenomena of Animal Magnetism, or Mesmerism, made by Mr. Braid, a surgeon of Manchester, England, "throw a flood of light" on the influence of the mind upon the body, his experiments being a repetition, on an extensive scale, of John Hunter's experiments on himself. Mr. Braid disclosed the fact that artificial somnambulism was not produced by any imaginary magnetism, nor by the will of the operator, nor by any force proceeding from him, but that in fact, it was a condition *self-induced.* The passes that were supposed to direct a magnetic stream (whose very existence was unproved) from the operator to the nerves and brain of the patient were shown to be nothing more than *contrivances to concentrate the attention* of the patient.

Mr. Braid induced many of these mesmeric phenomena by his own method, which, he held, owed its success to "an impression made on the nervous centres by the physical and psychical condition of the patient, irrespective of any agency proceeding

[1] "The portrait No. 113, in the British Museum, is of Thomas Britton, surnamed the musical small-coat-man. A ventriloquist, one of the company at a dinner party at which he was present, predicted his death that night; and such was the impression made, that it actually took place"—*Nervous Diseases of Women*, p. 112, Dr. Laycock.

from, or excited into action by another" (*Hypnotism*, VI. 1843, p. 32).

Mr. Braid tells us that he requested four gentlemen, in good health, and from forty to fifty-six years of age, to lay their arms on a table with the palms of their hands upwards. Each was to look at the palm of his hand for a few minutes with fixed attention, and watch the result. Entire silence was enjoined. In about five minutes the first, one of the present members of the Royal Academy, stated that he felt a sensation of *great cold* in the hand; another, who is a very talented author, said that for some time he thought nothing was going to happen, but at last a *darting, pricking* sensation took place from the palm of the hand, as if electric sparks were being drawn from it; the third gentleman, lately mayor of a large borough, said that he felt a very uncomfortable sensation of heat come over his hand; the fourth, secretary to an important association, had become rigidly cataleptic, his arm being firmly fixed to the table (*Hypnotism*, XX. p. 93).

Serjeant Cox explains the manner in which cures are effected by the hypnotic process — which is performed by making passes — as follows: "By directing the *attention* of the patient to the parts of the body over which the hand is drawn, this *attention* being accompanied, as a necessary consequence, by a flow of nerve force to that part, thus restoring the equilibrium of vitality and sending to the diseased part the vital force of which it is deficient" (vol. cit. p. 231).

Sir Henry Holland gives the particulars of mesmeric experiments made by Mr. Chenevix with two young girls. "These experiments induced nervous sensations — heat, weight, or inability of motion — in any limb to which the attention was expressly solicited, by mesmeric means applied, and by the questions asked." Dr. Holland found that precisely the same sensations could be produced "with the *show* of the same means applied (a mere slip of paper placed by the mesmerizer upon the limb), but with nothing actually done." Dr. Holland says, "I was led at the time, and often since, to make the trial on myself, and always with sensations more or less resembling those described above, when sufficient effort was made to *localize* the attention and keep it fixed on the point designed" (*Chapter on Mental Physiology*, p. 25).

In experiments made, says Dr. Carpenter, with Baron von Reichenbach's *odyle* upon sensitive subjects, they were made "to *see*, it was averred, flames streaming from the poles of magnets, could *smell* odors issuing from them, and could *feel* sensations of warmth or coolness when magnets were drawn over any part of the surface of the body; some of them being also similarly affected by crystals, and one in particular, by almost *any substance whatever*, so that they saw (in the dark) flames issuing from nails or hooks in a wall, or streaming from the finger-ends of human beings." Mr. Braid found by his experiments "that whatever sensations were pro-

ducible by the agency of magnets, crystals, etc., the very same sensations occurred when the 'subjects' *believed* that such agency was being employed, although nothing whatever was being done; and further, that the character of the sensations experienced by the subjects depended very much on the *ideas* they had been led to form of them, either by their own mental action, or by the suggestion of others" (*Mental Physiology*, pp. 159, 166).

"I had myself," says Dr. Carpenter, "the opportunity of witnessing these 'vigilant phenomena' (as Mr. Braid termed them, from their being presented by individuals not asleep, though in a state of abstraction) upon one of Mr. Braid's best 'subjects,' a gentleman residing in Manchester, well known for his high intellectual culture, great general ability, and strict probity. He had such a remarkable power of voluntary abstraction, as to be able at any time to induce in himself a state akin to profound reverie (corresponding to what has been since most inappropriately called the 'biological'), in which he became so completely 'possessed' by any idea strongly enforced upon him, that his whole state of feeling and action was dominated by it. Thus it was sufficient for him to place his hand upon the table, and fix his attention upon it for half a minute, to be entirely unable to withdraw it, if assured in a determined tone that he *could not* do so. When his gaze had been steadily directed for a short time to the poles of a

magnet, he could be brought to see flames issuing from them, of any form or color that Mr. Braid chose to name and when desired to place his hand upon one of the poles, and to fix his attention for a brief period upon it, the peremptory assurance that he *could not* detach it was sufficient to hold it there with such tenacity that I saw Mr. Braid drag him round by the traction of the magnet which he held, in a way that reminded me of George Cruikshank's amusing illustration of the German fairy story of the Golden Goose. The attraction was dissolved by Mr. Braid's loud cheery 'all right, man,' which brought the subject back to his normal condition as suddenly as the attraction of a powerful electro-magnet for a heavy mass of iron ceases when the circuit is broken" (*Mesmerism and Spiritualism*, pp. 34, 35).

Dr. Carpenter, in a letter to Sir Benjamin Broady, shows how powerfully a *dominant idea* controls the belief, and, through the belief, the actions, in the "biologized state."

The letter is as follows: "All the phenomena of the 'biologized state' will be found to consist in the occupation of the mind by the ideas which have been suggested to it, and in the influence which those ideas exert upon the actions of the body. Thus the operator asserts that the subject cannot rise from his chair, or open his eyes, or continue to hold a stick; and the subject thereby becomes so completely possessed with the impossibility of the act, that he is incapacitated from ex-

ercising it, not because his will is controlled by that of another, but because his will is in abeyance, and his muscles are entirely under the guidance of his ideas. So again, when he is made to drink a glass of water and is assured that it is coffee, or wine, or milk, the assurance, delivered in a decided tone, makes a stronger impression on his mind than that which he receives through his taste, smell, or sight; and, not being able to judge and compare, he yields himself up to the dominant idea. The same with what has been designated as 'control over the memory.' The subject is assured he cannot remember the most familiar thing, his own name, for example; and he is prevented from doing so, not by the will of the operator, but by the conviction of the impossibility of the mental act, which engrosses his own mind, and by the want of that voluntary control over the direction of his thoughts which alone can enable him to recall the desiderated impression. The same with the abolition of the sense of personal identity. Now, almost every one of these peculiar phenomena has its parallel in states of mind whose existence is universally admitted. Thus, the complete subjection of the muscular power 'to the dominant idea' is precisely what is experienced in nightmare; in which we are prevented from moving so much as a finger, notwithstanding a strong desire to do so, by the conviction that the least movement is impossible. The misinterpretation of sensory impressions is continually seen in per-

sons who are subject to absence of mind, who make the most absurd mistakes as to what they see or hear, taste or feel, in consequence of the pre-occupation of the mind by some train of thought which renders them unable rightly to appreciate the objects around them. In such persons, too, the memory of the most familiar thing — as the absent man's own name for example, or that of his most intimate friend — is often in abeyance for a time; and it requires but a more complete obliteration of the consciousness of the past, through the entire possession of the mind by the intense consciousness of the present, to destroy the sense of personal identity. This, indeed, we often do in effect lose in ordinary dreaming and reverie. The essential characteristic of both these states, as of the 'biological' condition, is, the suspension of voluntary control over the current of thought, so that the ideas follow one another suggestively; and however strange or incongruous their combinations or sequences may appear, we are never surprised at them, because we have lost the power of referring to our ordinary experience. . . . Thus, however strange the phenomena of the 'biological'[1] state may at first sight appear, there is not one of them which, when closely scrutinized, is not found to be essentially conformable to facts

[1] It is said that Dr. P. P. Quimby, to whom is due the credit of the discovery and development of the system of mind-cure in modern times, was very successful in producing the "biologized state" and possessed wonderful power of concentration of mind.

whose genuineness every physiologist and psychologist is ready to admit" (*Mind and Matter*, pp. 89, 90).

Mr. Braid's definition of hypnotism is, "A peculiar condition of the nervous system, induced by a fixed and abstracted attention of the mental and visual eye." "When we consider," says Mr. Braid, "that in this process we have acquired the power of raising sensibility to the most extraordinary degree, and also of depressing it far below the torpor of natural sleep; and that from the latter condition any or all of the senses may be raised to the exalted state of sensibility referred to, almost with the rapidity of thought, by so simple an agency as a puff of air directed against the respective parts; and that we can also raise and depress the force and frequency of the circulation, locally or generally, in a most extraordinary degree, — *it must be evident we have thus an important power to act with* [in the cure of disease]. Whether these extraordinary physical effects are produced through the Imagination chiefly,[1] or by other means, it appears to me quite certain *that the Imagination has never been so much under our control, or capable of being made to act in the same beneficial and uniform manner, by any other mode of management hitherto known*" (quoted by Dr. Tuke in vol. cit. pp. 408, 409).

By this process Mr. Braid performed marvellous

[1] Mr. Braid did not induce unconsciousness in more than one in ten cases.

cures. Dr. Tuke gives the particulars of a case of partial blindness that was cured by four hypnotic operations. The operations were simply the direction of the nervous force to the eyes, "by wafting over them, and gently touching them occasionally, so as to keep up a sustained act of attention of the patient's mind to her eyes and the function of vision."

Another case quoted by Dr. Tuke was the removal of opacity of the cornea, an affection not in any degree "on the nerves" (vol. cit. pp. 410, 411).

Mr. Braid was successful in exciting the sense of hearing in even the deaf and dumb, in curing paralysis, rheumatism, and, indeed, all diseases. Dr. Tuke observes of hypnotism, or Braidism, as he terms it: "Braidism possesses this great advantage, that, while the Imagination, Faith, or Expectation of the patient may be beneficially appealed to, this is not essential; the mere concentration of the Attention having a remarkable influence, when skilfully directed, in exciting the action of some parts, and lowering others" (vol. cit. p. 415).

Judging from the revelations made by the practice of the mind-cure, it would have been possible for Mr. Braid to have produced the same results without any outward direction of the nerve-force to the parts affected.

In regard to the power of the Imagination, Dr. Tuke observes: "Lord Bacon, with his wonderful range of vision, both physical and metaphysical,

did not omit to hint at 'the inquiry how to raise and fortify the Imagination; for,' he adds, 'if the Imagination fortified have power, *then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it*' (XIV. 1, p. 127). He enters a protest against charms, characters, and ceremonies, but observes that, in regard to 'the operations of the conceits and passions of the Mind upon the Body, we see all wise physicians, in the prescriptions of their regimens to their patients, do ever consider *accidentia animi* as of great force *to farther* or *hinder* remedies, or recoveries.' He says 'It is an inquiry of great depth and worth concerning Imagination, how, and how far it altereth the body proper of the imaginant.' It does not follow, indeed, that, because 'it hath a manifest power to hurt, it has the same degree of power to help. But the inquisition of this part is of great use, though it needeth, as Socrates said, 'a Delian diver,' being difficult and profound.'" Dr. Tuke adds, "If for the word Imagination we substitute Mental States, may we not say that Mr. Braid has proved himself the Delian diver who Bacon hoped would arise?" (vol. cit. pp. 415, 416.)

Lord Bacon, in assuming that because the Imagination has power to hurt, it does not follow that it has power to help, ignores the fact that the French Commissions already referred to as producing convulsions by the Imagination, could also terminate them by the same talisman. Their words are: "To prove incontestably, and to com-

plete the picture of the effects of the Imagination, powerful alike to agitate and to calm, we have put an end to a convulsion by the same charm which produced it, the power of the Imagination."

Madam de St. Amour attained great reputation in France, within the last half-century, for the power she exercised over nervous diseases. It is related that on one occasion a young woman was brought to her, when she demanded, "What is your complaint?" "Epilepsy," replied the girl. "Then, in the name of the Lord, have a fit now!" exclaimed Madam de St. Amour. The effect was instantaneous. The patient fell backwards, and had a violent attack of epileptic convulsions. "*Levez-vous*," said Madam de St. Amour, "*vous êtes guérie*," and the fit subsided (quoted by Dr. Tuke in vol. cit. pp. 65, 360).

In 1799, Perkins' metallic tractors, which were said to exert the "galvanic agency," had obtained a high reputation at Bath as a cure for rheumatism. Dr. John Haygarth, an eminent physician of Bath, in order to ascertain if there was any merit in the metallic tractors, advised the use of false tractors in the General Hospital at Bath. Five cases of chronic rheumatism were selected for the experiment, which was tried by Dr. Falconer in the presence of Dr. Haygarth, Mr. Nichols, surgeon of the Hospital, and Mr. Parnell, apothecary of the Hospital. The false tractors, which were simply wooden pegs, "were drawn over the skin so as to touch it in the slightest

manner." "Four of the patients believed themselves immediately, and three remarkably, relieved." At Dr. Haygarth's suggestion, the false tractors were used by Mr. Richard Smith, a distinguished surgeon of Bristol, in the Bristol Infirmary, with remarkable success. "Such effects were produced as were almost incredible," "being greater and more wonderful than what are related to have been produced by the patent tractors of Perkins." Mr. Smith tells us that he was able to give but four or five minutes to a patient instead of twenty or thirty minutes, the amount of time given by those who used the real tractors, his patients crowded in upon him so. Mr. Smith observes: "These things were not done in a corner, but under the inspection of the faculty of the house, and in the presence of the whole ward. . . . It was often necessary to play the part of a necromancer — to describe circles, squares, triangles, and half the figures of geometry, upon the part affected, with the small ends of the tractors. During all this time we conversed upon the discoveries of *Franklin* and *Galvine*, laying much stress upon the power of metallic points attracting even lightning and conveying it to the earth harmless. To a more curious farce I never was witness; we were almost afraid to look each other in the face, lest an involuntary smile should remove the mask from our countenances and dispel the charm." [1]

[1] With regard to these experiments Dr. Tuke says: "It can hardly fail to surprise the reader that these observers were con-

Dr. Haygarth says: "If any one should repeat these experiments, it should be done with due solemnity. During the process, the wonderful cures which this remedy is said to have performed ought to be particularly related. Without these indispensable aids, other trials will not prove as successful as those which are above reported. The whole success undoubtedly depends upon the patient's Imagination"[1] (*Imagination as a Cause and as a Cure of Disorders of the Body*, pp. 2–17, B. 1800).

Dr. Haygarth considers "Epidemical Convulsions due to imitation, sympathy, or some other affection of the Imagination, which is not generally known, nor sufficiently suspected."

In regard to leading the patient to *expect a certain result*,[2] Dr. Tuke observes: "In the 'Lancet' of December 18, 1869, Dr. John Tanner advocates the treatment of hysterical aphonia by electro-magnetism, applied to the tongue only, and states that in more than fifty cases he had applied it without being unsuccessful in any. . . . In his

tent to stop, when they had proved that these instruments were as potent as if metallic. They had relieved their patients by *something*, sooner than they would otherwise have been relieved; and yet it never seemed to occur to them to continue the practice. They called this something 'Imagination,' and thought *that* was quite sufficient to dispose of the whole subject" — vol. cit. p. 401.

[1] In several of the cases experimented upon the pain was rendered far more intense, by the use of the false tractors.

[2] See Dr. C. F. Taylor's account of successful results obtained by leading the patient to *expect* the results, in the *Popular Science Monthly*, May, 1879, p. 52.

commentary upon these cases Dr. Tanner remarks, 'It is all-important, before you apply electro-magnetism, to convince your patient *that she will be cured;* for, if you fail in your power of persuasion, it is probable the result of its application will not be satisfactory.' This almost amounts to a confession that the application is little worth in itself, but that the cure is really effected by powerfully affecting the Imagination" (vol. cit. p. 382).

In writing of agues that have been cured by charms which have been used with a thorough conviction of their being a sovereign remedy, John Hunter remarks: "I am apt to suppose that a spider's leg, when taken for an ague, cures in the same way; at least in one case, for on giving it without the patient's knowledge it had not the slightest effect, but by persuading the patient that it was a spider, the effect was produced; at least the disease did not return" (quoted by Dr. Tuke).

In regard to Expectant Attention, Sir Henry Holland remarks: "The sensation, or action, or suspension of power of action, may all be produced by the excited expectation created at the moment of their several effects." "The attention by an effort of will concentrated upon the seat of the brain, creates certain vague feelings of tension and uneasiness, caused possibly by some change in the circulation of the part; though it may be an effect, however difficult to conceive, on the nervous system itself.[1] Persistence in this effort,

[1] Serjeant Cox asks: "Can the nerve force be directed by

which is seldom indeed possible beyond a short time, produces results of much more complex nature, and scarcely to be defined by the terms of common language." "Stimulated attention, moreover, will frequently give a local sense of arterial pulsation where not previously felt; and create or augment those singing and rushing noises in the ears, which probably depend on the circulation through the capillary arteries." "A similar concentration of consciousness on the region of the stomach, creates in these parts a sense of weight, oppression, or other less definite uneasiness; and whenever the stomach is full appears greatly to disturb the digestion of the food." "If a limb be taken for experiment, a peculiar sense of weight, with a vibratory tingling sensation approaching to cramp, are produced by the consciousness concentrated upon it. There is reason, indeed, to suppose that the muscular structure is actually affected in these cases" (*Chapters on Mental Physiology*, pp. 17–37, L. 1852).

Serjeant Cox remarks: "There is abundance of evidence that the Mind has immense power over the body, and not only to a certain extent can control disease, but even arrest decay. It is a familiar fact, that a firm belief in an alleged curative

any voluntary effort?" His answer is: "There is cogent evidence that it may. It is an established fact, that by fixing the attention upon parts of the structure, positive pains may be produced in those parts." "We never send a command to a limb but we direct the nerve force thither to do the work" — vol. cit. p. 230.

agent will in many cases effect the desired cure, especially in diseases resulting from irregular action of the nerve system. . . . The sustaining power of *Hope* has rescued many a patient from impending death, and the depression of *Despair* has extinguished many a life that the disease itself would have spared. There was profound philosophy in the living statesman who said 'he had not *time* to be ill.' His mind had no leisure to dwell on small ailments and magnify them by thinking. But this was not all the good he gained by his busy brain. The exercise of the mind was in itself a positive benefit. The stimulus to the brain was communicated to the nerve centre with which it is in such close communion, and the consequence was an increased production of vital force, which, conveyed by the nerves to all parts of the structure, caused every function of every organ to be more perfectly performed." "It is a fact familiar to the physician that if the attention be long fixed upon any organ, its operations are thereby disturbed, and actual disease may be produced by thinking of it. This cause is clear. By directing the attention of the mind to any part of our own organism, we, by the very act of attention, transmit thither an increased flow of nerve force. This would have the effect of setting up a morbid sensation, or, if that exists already, the frequent repetition of the painful sensations thereby caused will give to the affected nerve a tendency to reproduce the painful impression on very slight sug-

gestion. This is the explanation of the recurrence of *neuralgia* in its various afflicting forms. The remedy is to distract the attention by fixing it upon some other object" (vol. cit. II. p. 154, I. p. 139).

Dr. Carpenter observes in this connection: "The writer has himself frequently begun a lecture, whilst suffering neuralgic pain so severe as to make him apprehend that he would find it impossible to proceed; yet no sooner has he, by a determined effort, fairly launched himself into the stream of thought, than he has found himself continuously borne along without the least distraction, until the end has come, and the attention has been released; when the pain has recurred with a force that has overmastered all resistance, making him wonder how he could have ever ceased to feel it."

Dr. Carpenter says that "before the introduction of Chloroform, patients sometimes went through severe operations without giving any sign of pain, and afterwards declared that *they felt none;* having concentrated their thoughts, by a powerful effort of abstraction, on some subject which held them engaged throughout."

"Some of Robert Hall's most eloquent discourses," the same author tells us, "were poured forth whilst he was suffering under a bodily disorder which caused him to roll in agony on the floor when he descended from the pulpit; yet he was entirely unconscious of the irritation of his nerves by the calculus which shot forth its jagged points

through the whole substance of his kidney, so long as his soul continued to be 'possessed' by the great subjects on which a powerful effort of his Will originally fixed it" (*Mental Physiology*, pp. 138, 139).

A similar experience in the case of Sir Walter Scott is thus recorded by his biographer: "John Ballentyne (whom Scott, while suffering under a prolonged and painful illness, employed as his amanuensis) told me that though Scott often turned himself on his pillow with a groan of torment, he usually continued the sentence in the same breath. But when dialogue of peculiar animation was in progress, spirit seemed to triumph altogether over matter, — he arose from his couch, and walked up and down the room, raising and lowering his voice, and as it were acting the parts. It was in this fashion that Scott produced the greater portion of 'The Bride of Lammermoor,' the whole of 'The Legend of Montrose,' and almost the whole of 'Ivanhoe'" (Lockhart's *Life of Scott*, chap. XLIV.).

On the other hand, we have an example of extreme pain produced by the imagination. Dr. Carpenter observes: "A butcher was brought into the shop of Mr. Macfarlan, the druggist, from the market-place opposite, laboring under a terrible accident. The man, on trying to hook-up a heavy piece of meat above his head, slipped, and the sharp hook penetrated his arm. On being examined, he was pale, almost pulseless, and expressed

himself as suffering acute agony. The arm could not be moved without causing excessive pain; and in cutting-off the sleeve he frequently cried out; yet, when the arm was exposed, it was found to be quite uninjured, the hook having only traversed the sleeve of his coat."

Dr. Carpenter states that the two following cases, "in which *local* disorder of nutrition followed upon powerful emotion, determined as to their seat by the intense direction of the attention to a particular part of the body," rest upon excellent authority.

"A lady who was watching her little child at play, saw a heavy window-sash fall upon its hand, cutting off three of the fingers; and she was so much overcome by fright and distress, as to be unable to render it any assistance. A surgeon was speedily obtained, who, having dressed the wounds, turned himself to the mother, whom he found seated, moaning, and complaining of pain in her hand. On examination, three fingers, corresponding to those injured in the child, were discovered to be swollen and inflamed, although they had ailed nothing prior to the accident. In four-and-twenty hours, incisions were made into them, and pus was evacuated; sloughs were afterwards discharged, and the wounds ultimately healed."

"A highly intelligent lady known to Dr. Tuke, related to him that one day she was walking past a public institution, and observed a child, in whom she was particularly interested, coming out

through an iron gate. She saw that he let go the gate after opening it, and that it seemed likely to close upon him, and concluded that it would do so with such force as to crush his ankle; however, that did not happen. 'It was impossible,' she says, 'by word or act to be quick enough to meet the supposed emergency; and, in fact, I found I could not move, for such intense pain came on in the ankle, corresponding to the one that I thought the boy would have injured, that I could only put my hand on it to lessen its extreme painfulness. *I am sure I did not move so as to strain or sprain it.* The walk home — a distance of about a quarter of a mile — was very laborious, and in taking off my stocking I found *a circle round the ankle, as if it had been painted with red currant juice, with a large spot of the same on the outer part.* By morning the whole foot was inflamed, and I was a prisoner to my bed many days'" (vol. cit. pp. 138, 158, 682).

Sir Benjamin Brodie records the case of a young lady who had long suffered from hysterical neuralgia of the hip and thigh, but who immediately lost all her symptoms on being thrown from a donkey on which she was riding.

Dr. Tuke observes in this connection: "When we see that the mental emotions caused by a fall from a donkey cure a disorder of which Dr. Copeland says, there are few less under the control of medical treatment, we can scarcely exaggerate the importance of attacking Disease psychologically" (vol. cit. p. 357).

Dr. Carpenter observes: "It is not a little remarkable that the influence of Mental states should be unmistakably manifested, not only in maladies in which nervous disorder has a large share, but also in some — as scurvy and gout — which seem to depend upon the existence of a definite perversion in the condition of the blood" (vol. cit. p. 688).

The following account, Dr. Lind tells us, "was written by an eye-witness, an author of great candor and veracity,[1] who (as he informs us) wrote down every day the state of his patients."

During the famous siege of Breda in 1629, the garrison was afflicted with the scurvy in a most dreadful degree. "When the Prince of Orange heard of their distress, and understood that the city was in danger of being given up to the enemy by the soldiers, he wrote letters addressed to the men, promising them the most speedy relief. These were accompanied with medicines against the scurvy, said to be of great price, but still of greater efficacy: many more were yet to be sent them. The effects of this deceit were truly astonishing! three small phials of medicine were given to each physician, not enough for the recovery of two patients. It was publicly given out, that three or four drops were sufficient to impart a healing virtue to a gallon of liquor. We now displayed our wonder-working balsams; nor were even the commanders let into the secret of the

[1] Frederic Vander Mye.

cheat put upon the soldiers. They flocked in crowds about us, every one soliciting that part may be reserved for their use. Cheerfulness again appears on every countenance, and a universal faith prevails in the sovereign virtues of the remedies. The herbs now beginning to spring up above the ground, we of these make decoctions, to which wormwood and camphor were added, that by the prevalent flavor of those, they might appear medicines of no mean efficacy. The stiff contracted limbs were anointed with wax melted in rapeseed or linseed oil. The invention of new and untried physic is boasted; and amidst a defect of every necessary and useful medicine, a large medley of drugs was compounded. The effect, however, of the delusion was really astonishing; for many were quickly and perfectly recovered. Such as had not moved their limbs for a month before, were seen walking the streets sound, straight, and whole. . . . Many who declared they had been rendered worse by all former remedies administered, recovered in a few days, to their inexpressible joy, and the no less general surprise, by their taking (almost by their having brought to them) what we affirmed to them to be their gracious Prince's cure" (from Dr. Lind's *Treatise on the Scurvy*).

Dr. Carpenter tells us that "there are numerous and well-authenticated cases, in which a severe fit of the Gout has been suddenly dissipated by violent emotion. Dr. Rush recorded one in which

an old farmer, languishing under severe infirmity caused by repeated attacks of this disease, was not only cured of the particular fit, but was restored to perfect health, by the careless driving of one of his sons, which caused the window-sash near which he was lying to be broken" (vol. cit. p. 688).

Dr. Tuke gives the particulars of a large number of cases of disease that were caused by the mind; also of a large number that were cured by the mind, among them being two cases of hydrophobia (see vol. cit.).

There are innumerable instances showing the power of concentration of mind that might be given. "In Avicenna's treatise, 'De Animalibus,'" says Dr. Robert H. Collyer, "a case is reported of a man who had the power of paralyzing the limbs at pleasure by an effort of volition. St. Austin, in his work 'De Civitate Dei,' has recorded the case of a priest, Restitutus, who could, whenever he chose, throw himself into a state of complete insensibility, and be like a dead man.[1] Cardanus relates of himself that he could voluntarily place himself in a state of ecstatic insensibility. It is said that Emanuel Swedenborg and Jacob Behmen had this same power of volition." Dr. Collyer cites the case of a Col. Townsend, of Bristol, who could suspend the heart's action so that those who witnessed the phenomenon

[1] The Indian Brahmins and Fakirs teach the mode of inducing this state.

supposed him to be dead, and then, after having lain for a considerable period, could resuscitate himself by a voluntary struggle.

The stigmata in the case of Louise Lateau, reported by Dr. Lefevre, of Louvain, Belgium, is easily explained, Dr. Collyer says, "by the physiological power of the brain over the rest of the body." Dr. Collyer thinks it "not astonishing that the continued undivided action of the brain, when directed to a special part of the body, should produce the brain impression" (*Mysteries of the Vital Element in Connection with Dreams, Somnambulism*, etc., pp. 68–84, 2d edit. L. 1871).

Dr. Carpenter, in commenting upon the case of Louise Lateau, observes: "As the transudation of Blood from the skin through the perspiratory ducts (apparently through the rupture of the walls of the cutaneous capillaries) under strong Emotional excitement is a well-authenticated fact, there is nothing in the foregoing narration that the Physiologists need find any difficulty in accepting." "In all ages, the possession of men's minds by 'dominant ideas' has been most complete when these ideas have been *religious* aberrations. And hence it is only to be expected that the effects of such 'possession' should exert an unusually powerful influence on the Organic functions, as we have seen it to do on muscular actions. There is to the writer's mind, therefore, nothing either incredible or miraculous in the numerous recorded cases of 'stigmatization;' i.e., the appearance of wounds

upon the hands and feet, on the forehead, and on the side, — corresponding with those of the crucified Jesus, — from which blood has periodically flowed. The subjects of these cases were mostly 'Ecstatics;' i.e., females of strong Emotional temperament, who fell into a state of profound Reverie, in which their minds were entirely engrossed by the contemplation of their Saviour's sufferings, with an intense direction of their sympathetic attention to his several wounds. And the power which this state of Mind would have on the local action of the corresponding parts of their own bodies gives a definite Physiological *rationale* for what some persons accept for genuine miracles, and others repudiate as the tricks of imposture" (vol. cit. pp. 688–690).

Of the singular phenomena of stigmata, Dr. Tuke observes: "So far as they are genuine and not caused by mechanical irritation, they arise from the mind's influence on the capillary circulation through the vaso-motor nerves. No one has treated the subject in a more luminous manner than L. Alfred Maury,[1] who forcibly observes that

[1] Dr. Tuke remarks: "M. Maury's description of the experience of St. Francis d'Assisi, whom he regards as the ancestor of the stigmatized. is so much to the purpose that we shall make free use of it here. One day, when exhausted by fasts and absorbed in reverie and prayer, he imagined that God ordered him to open the Gospels in order that he might there learn his will. 'Open me the Holy Book,' he exclaimed to a friar. Three times was this done, and three times it opened at the account of the Saviour's Passion. St. Francis regarded this as a proof that he must carry his imitation of Christ much

ecstatic mysticism, including these remarkable appearances, 'is the most striking proof of the influence of the Imagination upon the body, and is truly a miracle, in the sense of being one of those marvellous effects of the laws of thought whose secret escapes and whose extent confounds us.' He admits the fact of stigmatization, . . . and explains its occurrence, so far at least as the reference of the phenomena to a certain group of psycho-physical facts may be regarded as an explanation, by a consideration of the influence of dreams upon the skin. In mentioning those cases in which persons have dreamed that they received blows or wounds, and in the morning have found

further than he had hitherto done. Bodily mortification he had doubtless practised, and had crucified his desires; but he had not yet subjected his body to the sufferings of the cross, the penance now evidently required by the Almighty. One thought, one definite idea, henceforth occupied him, — his Master's sufferings. His Imagination revelled, so to speak, in all his sufferings. He strove, while fasting more and more, and praying more and more intensely, to realize them himself. On the anniversary of the Exaltation of the Cross, resigning himself more than ever to one of these ecstatic contemplations, he imagined he saw an angel descend from the vault of heaven, and approach him, the hands and feet attached to a cross. As St. Francis contemplated this vision, full of profound delight and astonishment, the seraph suddenly vanished. But the pious anchorite experienced from this spectacle a strange re-action, and his whole system was more than ever permeated with the idea of the physical sufferings of Christ in his own person. He then suffered pain in his hands and feet, and this was succeeded by inflammation so severe as to terminate in ulceration. These wounds he regarded as the Stigmata of the Saviour's Passion" — vol. cit. pp. 81, 82.

marks of inflammation on the body, and which sometimes, in the course of a day or two, become ulcers, he observes that 'just so with visionaries, under the power of the Imagination, by the concentration of the attention, the blood is directed to the place where they fancy they are affected.' . . . The periodicity of the Stigmata is a further interesting illustration of the influence of Attention and Imagination upon the direction and localization of the cutaneous circulation. On saints' days and on Fridays the seat of the marks became more painful, and a brighter color indicated a fresh afflux of blood to the part, the mystic's thoughts being especially concentrated upon the Passion" (vol. cit. pp. 81–83).

CHAPTER II.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE "CHRISTIAN SCIENTISTS."

THE "Christian Scientists," or "Metaphysicians," with the Idealists, or believers in Bishop Berkeley's philosophy,[1] deny Physical Causation.

The "Christian Scientists" assert that the visible universe is phenomena with no independent reality, being purely a reflection of thought of "Infinite Mind" (the term used to designate the Creator), possessing as little substance as the reflection of a picture thrown by a magic lantern upon a white screen. In other words, "if Infinite Mind could cease to exist, all the appearances

[1] Bishop Berkeley observes: "It is an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to question may, if I mistake not, perceive it involves a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?" — Berkeley's *Principles of Knowledge*, pp. 195, 196, Phila. 1874.

which seem so *vast* and *everlasting* would vanish like a bubble without leaving the *shadow of a dream behind*," [1] just as the picture thrown by the magic lantern on the white screen would vanish if the light were removed from the lantern.

They reason thus: The Creator, being Mind, must have thoughts, as it is impossible to conceive of a mind without thoughts. Mind and thought "being what may be called *Real* or *Polar Opposites*," [2] "*they mutually imply each other.*" Thought, or product of mind, regarded by itself being unpicturable, there occurs in connection with thought the phenomenon of an accompanying mental picture of some kind. "If the thing itself cannot be pictured, there will still be an accompanying mental picture of some manifestation or appearance of the thing." [3] Mental pictures, or images, are therefore the minds' symbols for objective phenomena, "the mediation between unpicturable thought and a representation to the senses of thought." [4] Thus for thought of "Infinite Mind" there exists an accompanying mental picture which is the reality of the visible universe, the visible universe being the *reflection* of the thought of

[1] *Personified Unthinkables*, p. 15, Sarah Stanley Grimké, Ph.B.

[2] "Real or Polar Opposites are necessarily reciprocal. They do not *exclude*, but mutually imply, each other. They are utterly meaningless apart. One cannot exist without the other" —*Personified Unthinkables*, p. 12.

[3] Ibid., p. 7.

[4] Ibid., pp. 8, 9.

"Infinite Mind."[1] As the reflection of a thought has no *substance*, the visible universe is simply phenomena without *substance*.[2]

There being, in accordance with this theory, no substance to matter, or the material part of man, pain and disease are not realities, they tell us, but simply beliefs[3] of mortal mind.

On this ground it is claimed that poisonous substances would not cause death when taken, if there were no belief in the world to that effect.

It will be observed by the reader that the term made use of by the "Christian Scientist" to designate the Creator is "Infinite Mind."[4] It is per-

[1] It is on this ground that "Christian Scientists" assert that "All is *Mind;* there is no matter."

[2] Another theory advocated is that the visible universe and the material part of man are poor counterfeits of the invisible and spiritual universe and man. As counterfeits cannot create themselves, even were it possible for the *invisible* and *spiritual* to be seen and comprehended, and as "Christian Scientists" believe in but one source of power, this theory has no support.

[3] "The fundamental erroneous judgment is, that there is any such thing in the universe as PHYSICAL CAUSATION, a belief in which leads both directly and indirectly to disease. Often directly in the case of the individual, but more commonly indirectly as a race-belief held throughout the known history of mankind" — *Personified Unthinkables.*

[4] "According to all accounts, the first person who taught the doctrine of a God in Greece, properly so called, was Anaxagoras, who, coming after Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and others, who had taught the universe to be infinite, and matter eternal, though the forms of it were changeable, added *another principle*, which he called *mind*, as that which moved and disposed matter." But this philosophy was not his own discovery, as it is said that he was taught by the Magi of Egypt —Priestley's *Disquisitions*, p. 322.

fectly evident that were any other term used, as Lord, God, Jehovah, First Cause, etc., the chain of reasoning employed for the purpose of proving that the visible universe is simply the reflection of the *thought* of the Creator, would not apply. They build a theory solely on the assumption of a title which they give to a Being whose substance it is impossible for man to know.

If mind is a property, or product, of matter, as the weight of authority demonstrates,[1] the Creator is, according to the "Christian Scientists," a material Being. We would ask with Zophar, the Naamathite, "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection?" (Job xi. 7.) We read in the Bible that God is a Spirit, but is it possible to know of what substance a spirit is?

In this connection Dr. Maudsley remarks: "To attempt to comprehend, or even to name, the inscrutable is the grossest absurdity; the incomprehensible must remain ineffable." "Assertions made concerning God fail to do more than reflect the stages of human culture at which they are made" (*Body and Will*, p. 226, L. 1883).

Dr. Joseph Priestley observes: "Let us make use of what terms we please to express the Divine nature, or his mode of existence, we are not able to come any nearer to an adequate conception

[1] Dr. Morton Prince observes: "The weight of authority is in favor of a material basis for all mental phenomena" — *The Nature of Mind and Human Automatism*, p. 8.

concerning them. God is and ever must remain the *incomprehensible*." "All that we can pretend to know of God is his infinite wisdom, power, and goodness. We see and feel the effects of these every moment of our lives; but it is impossible that we should see or feel the substance to which these powers belong; and therefore all that we can conceive or pronounce concerning it must be merely hypothetical" (*Disquisitions*, pp. 143, 144, L. 1771).

Mr. Herbert Spencer remarks: "The consciousness of an Inscrutable Power manifest to us through all phenomena has been growing ever clearer, and must eventually be freed from its imperfections. The certainty that on the one hand such a power exists, while on the other hand its nature transcends intuition, and is beyond imagination, is the certainty towards which intelligence has been from the first progressing" (*Principles of Philosophy*, p. 108, N. Y. 1877).

In regard to a belief in physical causation, Dr. Carpenter observes that common sense gives us a much better result than any elaborate discussion. He quotes an expression which was quoted, he says, by one of the best logicians and metaphysicians of our time, Archbishop Manning, who cited the words and entirely concurred in them. The words are: "In regard to the existence of the external world, the common sense of mankind is practically worth more than all the arguments of all the logicians who have discussed the basis of

our belief in it" (*Half-hour Recreations in Popular Science*, First Series, p. 194, B. 1874).

In regard to Physical Causation, Mr. Herbert Spencer remarks: "We cannot think at all about the impressions which the extended world produces upon us, without thinking of them as caused." "Our belief in objective reality is a belief which metaphysical criticism cannot for a moment shake. When we are taught that a piece of matter regarded by us as existing externally cannot be really known, but that we can know only certain impressions produced on us, we are yet by the relativity of our thought compelled to think of these in relation to a certain cause — the notion of a real existence which generated these impressions becomes nascent. If it be proved to us that every notion of a real existence which we can frame, is utterly inconsistent with itself — that matter, however conceived by us, cannot be matter as it actually is, our conception, though transfigured, is not destroyed: there remains the sense of reality, dissociated as far as possible from the special forms under which it was before represented in thought." "It is an awkward fact that Idealism cannot state its case without assuming Realism by the way. Erase from its argument all terms implying the objective reality of things, and its argument falls to pieces" (*Principles of Psychology*, pp. 37, 93, 36, L. 1835).

Mr. Morell remarks: "True it is, we never can *prove* the existence of a material world, but equally

true it is, that can never prove its non-existence, or show that such an idea must necessarily involve absurdity. All we can do is to reduce the question to its several hypotheses, and then accept the one which gives the fullest and most satisfactory account of the phenomena we have to explain.

"That all men *practically* do, and must believe in some objective reality, presenting the phenomena of matter, is certain; to deny this would be only to controvert one fundamental idea by arguments drawn from another; in other words, to admit that our intellectual nature is in conflict with itself; so that one primitive dictate of our consciousness being falsified, there could be no shelter from a sweeping scepticism when directed against the rest" (*History of Modern Philosophy*, p. 143, L. 1851).

That the Creator has personality, the "Christian Scientists" deny. They claim that "Infinite Mind" is a pervasive Force or principle of Life.

If, owing to the limited intelligence of man, it cannot be positively affirmed that the Creator has personality, it cannot, for the same reason, be denied.

In this connection a correspondent of the *Edinburgh Review* remarks: "Is the power around us not a person? All existing beings must be either persons or things; and no sophistry can deter us from the invincible persuasion which all human creatures possess, that persons are superior to things."[1]

[1] Quoted by Matthew Arnold, in *God and the Bible*, p. 35.

On this point Dr. Mivart observes: "To deny personality to First Cause, is to debase it to a lower level than ourselves. It has this practical effect, because we cannot conceive anything as impersonal, and yet of a higher nature than our own. And, indeed, this circumstance is not owing to mere mental impotence, but to a positive and clear perception. For to be a person, means to be a being possessing knowledge and will; and every being which has not these faculties must be infinitely inferior to one which has them" (*Lessons from Nature*, p. 361, L. 1876).

The "Christian Scientists" affirm that the mind or spirit[1] of man is an idea of "Infinite Mind," and possesses a spiritual body, as an idea unexpressed, or unclothed, would be a nonentity.

The doctrine of the *emanation of souls from the Divine Mind*, which includes the doctrines of the pre-existence and immortality of the soul, as well as the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, originated with the Pagans of the East. The Greek philosophers borrowed it from the Pagans, and from them it passed to the early Fathers in the Christian Church.

In this connection Dr. Priestley observes: "We find nothing said by any Christian writer concerning the soul before Justin Martyr, who had been a Platonic philosopher, and who, using their language, speaks of souls as emanations from the Deity.

[1] The words, "mind" and "spirit" are synonymous with them.

"But as this doctrine of the high *descent of the soul* has not the least countenance in the scriptures, we soon find that it did not meet with a hearty reception among Christians, and that it was abandoned by all who were not peculiarly addicted to philosophy. Irenæus expressly denied the transmigration of souls; he believed that they were immortal only through grace, and maintained that those of the wicked shall cease to be, after they have been tormented a long time" (vol. cit. p. 245).

It is taught by the "Christian Scientists" that the material body of man is not created by "Infinite Mind," as "Infinite Mind" is spirit, and in accordance with the law, "Like produces like," can produce spirit only.[1]

The words of Dr. Maudsley are very appropriate in this connection. He says: "The portion of the universe with which man is brought into consciousness by his existing sentiency is but a fragment, and to measure the possibilities of the Infinite Unknown by the standard of what he knows is very much as if the oyster should judge of all Nature by the experience gained within its shell" (*Body and Mind*, p. 268, N. Y. 1884).

The "Christian Scientists" account for the material body of man, on the ground that it is a shadow or reflection of the spiritual body.[2]

[1] This idea came from Pagan philosophy — See Beaufobre, vol. i. pp. 588–590.

[2] Animals are said to be ideas of man, and it is asserted by the "Christian Scientists," that, if man had no evil thoughts, there would be no ferocious animals.

Allowing that there is a spiritual body, would it be possible for an immortal (they claim that it is immortal), immaterial, *invisible*, spiritual body to produce a mortal, material, *visible* shadow or reflection? If such a seeming impossibility were true, it follows that some law of Nature must be the cause, and, Nature's laws being unchangeable, the spiritual body would forever produce the material body. In that case death and disintegration of the material body would be an impossibility.

The "Christian Scientists" assert that the spirit, or mind, of man, is not in the material body, as, being an idea of "Infinite Mind," and thus a part of "Infinite Mind," it cannot be in the material body without a violation of the law, "The greater cannot be contained within the less."

As the problem as to what matter is has not as yet been solved,[1] it is impossible to say what can or cannot be contained in it. If the assertion made by the "Christian Scientists" were true, it could not be said that "God is everywhere," as he would on the same ground be excluded from this world, and, indeed, from all his works.

The "Christian Scientists" assert that there is no sin or error,[2] as "Infinite Mind," being perfect,

[1] Dr. Nichols says: "The study of the behavior of matter has not resulted in throwing satisfactory light upon the problem as to what it is. To the modern experimenter, matter is only known by what it does" — *Whence, What, Where?* p. 53.

[2] The "Christian Scientists" consider this positive proof that there is no sickness, as error and sickness are with them synonymous words. They say that as sickness is error, and as

cannot create sin, or error; and man, being an idea of "Infinite Mind," and thus a part of "Infinite Mind," must be perfect also, as "Infinite Mind" can have no ideas that are not perfect.

That the Creator is perfect we cannot doubt; and man also must be perfect, as the being the Creator made him, a being possessing Free Will. We read that "God created man in his own likeness and image" (Gen. I. 26, 27), therefore man was created a *free will* agent, and, having free will, he has the power to disobey God, in other words, to sin.

Here we are met by the assertion that the account of the creation of man contained in Genesis is a legend.

In regard to this account,[1] Dr. Nichols remarks:

God could not have created error, sickness does not exist save as a belief in mortal mind. When pressed as to what source mortal mind derives its intelligence from, they are forced to admit that mortal mind does not exist, and is merely a term. This admission is equivalent to an assertion that there is not *even a belief* in sickness.

[1] Mr. Alger, in commenting upon the fact that many scholars have thought the account was not of Hebrew origin, but was borrowed from the literary traditions of some earlier Oriental nation, observes: "The Hebrews may as well have originated such ideas as anybody else. The Egyptians, the Phœnicians, the Chaldeans, the Persians, the Etruscans, have kindred narratives held as most ancient and sacred. The Chinese, the Sandwich Islanders, the North American Indians, also have their legends of the origin and altered fortunes of the human race. The resemblances between many of these stories are better accounted for by the intrinsic similarities of the subject, of the mind, of nature, and of mental action, than by the sup-

"Whether it be regarded as a legend of very early times, a story characteristic of the East, or as a supernatural revelation of man's genesis, the student or investigator cannot but view it as extraordinary. If we are required to accept it after ecclesiastic or scholastic interpretations, which place the occurrences about six thousand years ago, and which insist upon a literal rendering of the text, — the way is beset with difficulties. If, on the other hand, the narrative be regarded as a dim shadowing forth of the outlines of a creative act, instituted by divine interference in some early epoch of the world's history, it at once commands the respect of those who recognize the existence of a Supreme Creator in the universe.

"There is in the narrative certain material evidence, which, independent of all other considerations, lends to it a startling significancy. The prominent incidents of the transaction so briefly presented are wonderfully in accordance with possibilities, or, there is evidence of a wise adaptation of means to ends. We are told without any show of hesitancy that man was made out of the 'dust of the earth;' that is, he came from the same general mother or source as all organic life. If the statement were that he was formed out of the rocks or out of the trees of the garden, it would be far less significant of his true chemical constitution as made known through modern re-

position of derivation from one another" — *Doctrine of a Future Life*, p. 22, Phila. 1864.

search. Rocks and trees are not so constituted as to meet fully the necessities of his material organization, and the same may be said of quite all the substances or prominent objects which were open to observation in early times. In the 'dust of the earth' we have an expression which may fairly be interpreted to mean the *soil* of the earth, which includes both the organic and inorganic constituents found in the physical organization of man. In this material we have the lime, potash, soda, magnesia, iron, phosphorus, indeed quite all the chemical bodies essential to man's organism. In the humus of the soil we have the materials needed for the formation of living tissues, the carbon, hydrogen, and nitrogen. The source from which man is stated to have been derived is seen to have been fully capable of supplying every needed element without the interposition of a miracle to summon the rarer molecules from afar. A human narrator of such a stupendous transaction would hardly have allowed his excited imagination to go no further than common dust for his man-material; he would have selected the clear air about him, the chemical nature of which was to him a mystery, or he would have interwoven the rainbow or the gorgeous hues of the setting sun into the noble form of man.

"After the completion of the physical structure, a still more important act remained to be accomplished, — the endowment of life. The narrator proceeds to say that 'God breathed' into the figure

of man 'the breath of life.' This language and statement is even more remarkable than that relating to the formation of the body. . . . If this were only an Eastern tale, told by an ancient story-teller, he would have given life to his figure by agencies far different. . . . Whoever wrote the first chapters of the Book of Genesis, it is certain he was no ordinary chronicler; he was destitute of the gorgeous imagination so common to the authors of the legends and tales of the East, and was clairvoyant in a high degree" (*Whence, What, Where?* pp. 17–21, B. 1883).

The principal obstacle to a belief in the account of the creation of man as given in Genesis, is the generally received belief that the creation of man was the result of a *primary*, *distinct*, and sudden act of creational construction; such a belief being inconsistent[1] with the theory of Evolution,

[1] "Whatever may be thought on the matter, two conclusions must be held as indefeasible — namely, 1. That scientific and revealed truth can never contradict each other; and, 2. That men will never cease to inquire into truth, whatever may be the fears of the timid, or the obstacles raised by the prejudices of speculation, and the selfishness of bigotry and hypocrisy. Man is created to know God and his works, and must fulfil the end of his existence.

"But higher considerations than these arise out of this question. Has Revelation, in fact, ceased? or is the present era only another form of God's providential dealings with mankind? When we consider that with Him 'there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning;' when we look at the great beneficial results which modern science has achieved already; still more when we attempt to calculate what the future has in store for mankind; — we cannot but think that

which demonstrates that man has come from the simplest beginnings, solely by such forces and laws as belong to matter.

In this connection Dr. Mivart remarks: "In the strictest and highest sense 'Creation' is the absolute origination of anything by God without pre-existing means or material and is a *supernatural* act.[1]

"In the secondary and lower sense, 'Creation' is the formation of anything by God *derivatively;* that is, that the preceding matter has been created with the potentiality to evolve from it, under suitable conditions, all the various forms it subsequently assumes. And this power having been conferred by God in the first instance, and those laws and powers having been instituted by Him, through the action of which the suitable conditions are supplied, He is said in this lower sense to create such various subsequent forms. This is the natural action of God in the physical world,

Bacon and other philosophers of his day were not too enthusiastic, when contemplating the grandeur of modern science, they earnestly expressed their belief that these are the days referred to by one of the Jewish prophets as those in which 'many shall run to and fro, and knowledge be abundantly increased; and the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as the waters cover the sea.' Science itself, in its highest and fullest development, is religion" — *Mind and Body*, pp. 83, 84, Thomas Laycock.

[1] "The Author means by this, that it is *directly* and *immediately* the act of God, the word supernatural being used in a sense convenient for the purposes of this work, and not in its ordinary theological sense" — Mivart.

as distinguished from His direct, or, as it may be called supernatural action." "'God made man from the dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life.' This is a plain, and direct statement that man's *body* was not *created* in the primary and absolute sense of the word, but was evolved from pre-existing materials (symbolized by the term 'dust of the earth') and was therefore only derivatively created, i.e., by the operation of secondary causes" (*Genesis of Species*, pp. 252, 282, L. 1876).

In a later work, Dr. Mivart, in commenting upon the fact that there is no necessary antagonism between the Christian religion and the doctrine of Evolution, observes: "In order to prove this I had to consider the meaning of the word 'creation,' and I found that it might be taken in three senses, with only two of which, however, we had to do. The first of these was direct creation such as must have taken place when the earliest kind of matter appeared. The second was derivative or potential creation: the creation by God of forms not *as existing*, but *in potentia*, to be subsequently evolved into actual existence by the due concurrence and agency of the various powers of nature. Searching for information on the subject, I found to my surprise that the regular teaching of theology adopted this view, which was maintained by a complete consensus of authorities"[1] (*Lessons from Nature*, pp. 31, 432, L. 1876).

[1] Among those who believed in *derivative creation* may be

Dr. Asa Gray says: "Agreeing that plants and animals were produced by Omnipotent fiat does not exclude the idea of natural order and what we call secondary causes. The record of the fiat — 'Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed,' etc., 'and it was so;' 'let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle and creeping thing and beast of the earth after his kind, and it was so' — seems even to imply them. Agreeing that they were formed of 'the dust of the ground,' and of thin air, only leads to the conclusion that the pristine individuals were corporeally constituted like existing individuals, produced through natural agencies. To agree that they were created 'after their kinds' determines nothing as to what were the original kinds, nor in what mode, during what time, and in what connections it pleased the Almighty to introduce the first individuals of each sort upon the earth" (*Darwiniana*, p. 131, N. Y. 1876).

A strong point with the "Christian Scientists" is the fact that the fundamental elements of the organic and inorganic world are said by modern scientists to be the same. The "Christian Scientists" say that, allowing that the material part of man has *substance*, it cannot have pain or disease any more than a stone or any other inorganic sub-

cited, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, Albertus Magnus, Dennis the Carthusinian, Cardinal Cajetan, Melchoir Canus, Bannes, Vincentius Contenson, Marcedo, Cardinal Norris, Tonti, and Suarez — vol. cit. p. 438.

stance can have pain and disease; and, it being a manifest absurdity that an immaterial, immortal spirit should have pain or disease, there is really no part of man that can be subject to pain and disease.

If *dead* organic matter and inorganic matter are the same, does it follow that *living* organic matter and inorganic matter are the same?

In this connection Prof. Huxley remarks: "In perfect strictness it is true that chemical investigation can tell us little or nothing, directly, of the composition of living matter, inasmuch as it must needs die in the act of analysis, — and upon this very obvious ground objections have been raised to the drawing of any conclusion whatever respecting the composition of actually living matter" (*Lay Sermons*, p. 142).

The fact that organic matter is kept from corruption and disintegration, when associated with life, appears to afford proof that living matter is in some respects different from dead organic and inorganic matter. Dr. Hufelands remarks: —

"All impressions in a living body are modified and counteracted in a manner different from what they are in an inanimate body. In a living body therefore no process merely mechanical or chemical is possible; and every thing assumes the character of life" (*Art of Prolonging Life*, p. 228, B. 1796).

If living matter were the same as inorganic matter, and matter were the inert, solid, im-

penetrable substance it was formerly supposed to be, and mind the immaterial principle as taught, the argument of the "Christian Scientists" might possess some weight; but in the light of the disclosures made by modern scientific investigation it possesses no weight whatever. Owing to the marvellous discoveries made by modern scientists, it is now conceded that matter is possessed of such a conjunction of qualities that even thought or mind is a property belonging to it.[1]

As before mentioned, the theory adduced by the "Christian Scientists," for the cure of disease, is built upon the theory that there is but one substance, that substance being mind. That they are right in asserting that there is but one substance is undeniably true, as the unifying[2] tendency of scientific thought leads to a belief in one substance; but the weight of authority demonstrates that the substance is *matter*, and not mind.

In this connection Dr. Morton Prince observes:

[1] "It is not to be denied that among students of physical and natural science there is at present an increasing tendency to doubt or disbelieve that dualistic philosophy which sharply defines matter and spirit as utterly antagonistic in their properties. There is an increasing tendency to the recognition of but one sub-stratum or essence, whose phenomena are under certain conditions those of matter and under other conditions those of spirit" — Article in *Zion's Herald*, by Prof. William North Rice.

[2] Dr. Carpenter observes: "The culminating point of Man's Intellectual interpretation of Nature, may be said to be his recognition of the Unity of the Power, of which her phenomena are the diversified manifestations. Towards this point all Scientific inquiry now tends" — vol. cit. p. 696.

"It is only within the last few decades, that sufficient evidence has been collected as the result of patient and laborious investigation into the phenomena of nature, to justify the offering of materialism[1] as a satisfactory explanation of the phenomena of the universe and to warrant its acceptance. With every addition to our knowledge, with every fresh discovery in the domains of science, the deeper we penetrate into the mysteries of nature the stronger becomes the doctrine of modern materialism; until to-day it offers the most acceptable explanation of the vital problems with which science has to deal. It is difficult to understand how any one who has taken pains to thoroughly inform himself on the great questions of the day and is conversant with the discoveries of late years in the natural sciences, especially in the department of biology, can fail to find in materialism the most satisfactory explanation that has yet been offered of vital phenomena. It is true that what has been accomplished is insignificant compared with what remains to be done but with every step forward the way becomes clearer" (*The Nature of Mind and Human Automatism*, pp. 5, 6, Phila. 1885).

[1] "Materialism is a word that has two different significations: one class of materialists maintain that there is no Creator; another class teach a Creator, but maintain that man does not consist of different entities, body and soul, and that all phenomena attributed to the soul result from forms and combinations of matter" — Spurzhheim's *Philosophical Principles*, p. 100.

Prof. Bain observes: "The doctrine of two substances — a material united with an immaterial in a certain vaguely defined relationship — which has prevailed from the time of Thomas Aquinas to the present day, is now in course of being modified at the instance of modern physiology. The dependence of purely intellectual operations, as memory, upon the material processes has been reluctantly admitted by the partisans of an immaterial principle; an admission incompatible with the isolation of the intellect in Aristotle and in Aquinas. . . . The arguments for the two substances have, we believe, now entirely lost their validity; they are no longer compatible with ascertained science and clear thinking. The one substance with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental — a *double-faced unity* — would appear to comply with the exigencies of the case" (*Mind and Body*, pp. 129, 196, N. Y. 1873).

Prof. Tyndale remarks: "Believing as I do in the continuity of Nature I cannot stop abruptly where our microscopes cease to be of use. Here the vision of the mind authoritatively supplements the vision of the eye. By an intellectual necessity I cross the boundary of the experimental evidence, and discern in that matter which we in our professed reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium,[1] the promise and potency of

[1] "Pretended worshippers of God have, in the middle ages, carried their contempt for matter so far as to nail their own bodies, the noble works of nature, to the pillory. Some tormented, others crucified themselves, crowds of flagellants trav-

all terrestrial life" (*Address before the British Association at Belfast*, 1874).

Mr. Picton remarks: "Men talked with pride of the mastery wielded by mind over 'brute matter,' which they blasted with gunpowder, and welded by steam hammers and compelled by torture of fire to submit to their will. And the soul was undisturbed in its complacency, because every result achieved seemed only to concentrate attention the more on mind and will as the supreme wonder of the world. But of late years a change of tone has been manifest; and matter itself in its ultimate constitution has become the object not of philosophic inquiry only, but of an enthralling interest, in which vague feelings of alarm and jealousy add to the keenness of curiosity. For the once despicable element, armed by physical science with weapons of deadly precision, threaten to turn the tables on mind, and to reward hasty contempt with the doom of annihilation.

"The truth is, in modern times science and philosophy combine to make impossible that old sword-and-sheath, or shell-and-kernel theory of the world, by which men once expressed the unfathomable contrast of 'within and without.' The intimacy of relationship which scientific research establishes between soul and body is such, that one

elled through the country exhibiting their lacerated backs. Strength and health were undermined in the most refined manner, in order to render to the spirit — considered as independent of the body — its superiority over the sinful flesh" — *Force and Matter*, p. 29, Büchner.

feels relationship to be hardly the word to express what looks much more like identity. And when once this is realized, it becomes impossible henceforward to find satisfaction in the ordinary dualistic notion of two substances fundamentally and essentially distinct. The issue then *seems* to be blank materialism.[1] But when a steady effort is made to follow up materialism to its innermost significance, it is found to be as penetrable as one of Pepper's ghosts: we pass right through it, and come out at the other side, — some say, into the formless void of infinite ignorance, but as others think, into the assured consciousness of eternal all-comprehensive Life as the only substance" (*Mystery of Matter*, pp. 11–13, L. 1873).

The "Christian Scientists" teach that the mind of man, being an idea of "Infinite Mind," has existed as long as "Infinite Mind" has existed, as, possessing all knowledge in the beginning, Infinite Mind can have no new ideas. They also teach

[1] Dr. Maudsley remarks: What an unnecessary horror hangs over the word materialism! It has an ugly sound and an indefinite meaning, and is well suited, therefore, to be set up as a moral scarecrow; but, if it be closely examined, it will be found to have the semblance of something terrible, and to be empty of any real harm. In the assertion that mind is altogether a function of matter, there is no more actual irreverence than in asserting that matter is the realization of mind; the one and the other proposition being equally meaningless so far as they postulate a knowledge of anything more than phenomena. Whether extension be visible thought, or thought invisible extension, is a question of a choice of words, and not of a choice of conception — *Body and Mind*, p. 26, N. Y. 1884.

that the mind of man is immortal on the ground of its being an idea, and thus a part of "Infinite Mind." They tell us that it cannot be destroyed any more than "Infinite Mind" can be destroyed.

As before mentioned, the doctrine of the *emanation of souls from the Divine Mind*, which includes the doctrines of the pre-existence and immortality of the soul, originated with the heathen nations of the East (see chapter on the *Origin of the Doctrine of the Immortal Soul*).

As before stated, *facts* demonstrate that mind, or spirit, is simply the product of a combination of particles of matter. On this subject Dr. Büchner observes: —

"The soul is a product of the development of the brain just as muscular activity is a product of muscular development, and secretion a property of glandular development. That which we call spirit disappears with the dissolution of the individual material combination; and it must appear to any unprejudiced intellect as if the concurrent action of many particles of matter had produced an effect which ceases with the cause" (*Force and Matter*, pp. 197, 13, L. 1870).

It is not to modern science only that we resort for proof on this point. In the following chapters we hope to make it evident that the Bible and modern science coincide perfectly, in demonstrating that mind and body are *one* instead of two separate entities, and consequently that there is no possibility of a future life save by the resur-

rection of the dead, as taught in the New Testament.

The "Christian Scientists" teach that man has a *mortal* mind, as well as an immortal mind.[1] The mortal mind is a part of the material body, and becomes extinct at death, as the name indicates. It is the mortal mind that holds a belief in sickness and sin, and that commits crime. The mortal mind is not created by God, but is a counterfeit of the immortal mind. When, however, as previously stated, they are asked from what source mortal mind derives its intelligence, they are forced to acknowledge that mortal mind *does not exist*, and is merely a term. Otherwise they would be forced to admit that there is more than one source of power and intelligence, and such an admission would overthrow their whole theory. The admission that mortal mind is merely a term, is equally destructive of their theory, as it amounts to an admission that the perfect, immortal spirit of man holds the belief in sickness and sin, and commits crime. As they claim that the immortal spirit of man is a part of God, the admission that the immortal mind commits crime is virtually an assertion that God commits crime, as the spirit of man,

[1] The hypothesis of two souls, one of them being mortal, originated with Pagan nations. "It was," says Beaufobre, "that of the Magi, the Chaldeans, and Egyptians; and Pythagoras and Plato had it from them" — vol. II. p. 420. Among modern believers in this doctrine may be mentioned Spinoza, who believed the intellect to be immortal and the imagination mortal — Spinoza's *Ethic*, pp. 278, 279, L. 1883.

if a part of God, must be God. Division cannot change the nature or substance of a being. It is said that Plato, maintaining that the immortal soul emanated from God, and is thus a part of his substance, frequently called souls God.

CHAPTER III.

THE SINGLE-SUBSTANCE THEORY.

Dr. Joseph Priestley, a voluminous and able writer on theology, mental philosophy, history, and many other things, besides being a distinguished experimenter in physical science, early adopted the theory advanced by Father Boscovich and Mr. Michell, that matter consists of *physical points* only, endued with powers of attraction and repulsion. Dr. Priestley was, in consequence of his scientific studies, as Prof. Bain says, "the fit man" to deal with the crude and inaccurate notion that matter is a solid, impenetrable, inert substance, and wholly passive to rest or motion except as acted on by some power foreign to itself. Of Dr. Priestley's defence of the new theory, Prof. Bain observes: "It was by far the ablest defence of the single-substance doctrine in the last century" (*Mind and Body*, p. 189).

Dr. Priestley remarks: "Since the only reason why the principle of thought, or sensation, has been imagined to be incompatible with matter, goes upon the supposition of impenetrability being the essential property of it, and consequently that

solid extent is the foundation of all the properties that it can possibly sustain, the whole argument for an immaterial thinking principle in man, on this new supposition [Father Boscovich's], falls to the ground; matter destitute of what has hitherto been called *solidity*, being no more incompatible with sensation and thought, than that substance, which, without knowing anything further about it, we have been used to call immaterialism.[1] . . . All the properties that have hitherto been attributed to matter, may be comprised under those of *attraction* and *repulsion*[2] (all the effects of which have been shown to be produced by powers independent of all solidity[3]) and of *extension*, by

[1] Dr. Priestley says: "The common hypothesis is much less favorable to piety, in that it supposes something to be *independent of the divine power*. Exclude the idea of Deity on my hypothesis, and every thing except space necessarily vanishes with it, so that the Divine Being, and his energy, are absolutely necessary to that of every other being. His power is the very *life and soul* of every thing that exists"— vol. cit. p. 40.

[2] According to Richard Baxter, the most acute of the Christian metaphysicians, all the properties of matter, as attraction, repulsion, and cohesion, are the immediate agency of the Divine Being. "Consequently," says Dr. Priestley, "as we perceive material things by means of these their *powers*, it but too plainly follows, that, in fact, matter is wholly superfluous; for if it exists all its operations and effects are resolvable into the pure unaided operation of the Deity." "Pity, that so mischievous a thing, as he every where represents matter to be, should have been introduced at all, when, without the aid of superior power, it could not do even that mischief"— vol. cit. pp. 85, 86.

[3] "Admitting," says Dr. Priestley, "that bodies consist of solid atoms, there is no sort of connection between the idea of

means of which matter occupies a certain portion of space. Besides these properties, man is possessed of the powers of *sensation* or *perception*, and thought. But if, without giving the reins to our imaginations, we suffer ourselves to be guided in our inquiries by the simple rules of philosophizing above-mentioned [Sir Isaac Newton's rules, which were, "*Admit no more causes of things than are sufficient to explain appearances;*" and "*to the same effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes.*"] we must necessarily conclude, as it appears to me, that these powers also may belong to the same substance, that has also the properties of attraction, repulsion, and extension, which I, as well as others, call by the name of *matter;* though I have been obliged to divest it of one property which has hitherto been thought essential to it, as well as to give it others, which have not been thought essential to it." "The reason of the conclusion above-mentioned, is simply this, that the powers of sensation or perception, and thought, as belonging to man, have never been found but in conjunction with a certain *organized system of matter;* and therefore, that those powers necessarily exist in, and depend upon, such a system."

"Had we formed a judgment concerning the

them, and that of *attraction;* so that it is impossible to conceive that any one atom should approach another, without a *foreign power*, viz. that of the Deity; and therefore bodies consisting of such atoms could not hold together, so as to constitute *compact substances*, without this constant agency" — vol. cit. p. 4.

necessary seat of thought, by *the circumstances that universally accompany it*, which is our rule in all other cases, we could not but have concluded, that in man it is a property of the *nervous system*, or rather of the *brain*. Because, as far as we can judge, the faculty of thinking, and a certain state of the brain, always accompany and correspond to one another; which is the very reason why we believe that any property is inherent in any substance whatever. There is no instance of any man retaining the faculty of thinking, when his brain was destroyed; and whenever that faculty is impeded, or injured, there is sufficient reason to believe that the brain is disordered in proportion; and therefore we are necessarily led to consider the latter as the seat of the former.

"Moreover, as the faculty of thinking in general ripens, and comes to maturity with the body, it is also observed to decay with it; and if, in some cases, the mental faculties continue vigorous when the body in general is enfeebled, it is evidently because, in those particular cases, the *brain* is not much affected by the general cause of weakness. But, on the other hand, if the brain alone be affected, as by a blow on the head, by actual pressure within the skull,[1] by sleep, or by inflamma-

[1] "An American medical man was called one day to see a youth aged eighteen, who had been struck down insensible by the kick of a horse. There was a depressed fracture of the skull a little above the left temple. The skull was trephined, and the loose fragments of bone that pressed upon the brain were removed, whereupon the patient came to his senses. The

tion, the mental faculties are universally affected in proportion.

"Likewise as the mind is affected in consequence of the affections of the body and brain, so the body is liable to be reciprocally affected by the affections of the mind, as is evident in the visible effects of all strong passions, hope or fear, love or anger, joy or sorrow, exultation or despair. These are certainly irrefragable arguments, that it is

doctor thought it a good opportunity to make an experiment, as there was a hole in the skull through which he could easily make pressure upon the brain. He asked the boy a question, and before there was time to answer it he pressed firmly with his finger upon the exposed brain. As long as the pressure was kept up the boy was mute, but the moment it was removed he made a reply, never suspecting that he had not answered at once. The experiment was repeated several times with precisely the same result. The boy's thoughts were stopped and started again on each occasion as easily and certainly as the engineer stops and starts his locomotive.

"On another occasion the same doctor was called to see a groom who had been kicked on the head by a mare called Dolly, and whom he found quite insensible. There was a fracture of the skull with depression of bone at the upper part of the forehead. As soon as the portion of bone which was pressing upon the brain was removed, the patient called out with great energy, '*Whoa Dolly!*' and then stared about him in blank amazement, asking: Where is the mare? Where am I? Three hours had passed since the accident, during which the words which he was just going to utter when it happened had remained locked up as they might have been locked up in the phonograph, to be let go the moment the obstructing pressure was removed. The patient did not remember, when he came to himself, that the mare had kicked him; the last thing before he was insensible which he did remember was, that she wheeled her heels round and laid back her ears viciously" — An article by Dr. Maudsley in the *Popular Science Monthly*, September, 1879.

properly no other than *one and the same thing*[1] that is subject to these affections, and that they are necessarily dependent upon one another. In fact, there is just the same reason to conclude that the powers of sensation and thought are the necessary result of a particular organization, as that sound is the necessary result of a particular concussion of the air. For in both cases equally the one constantly accompanies the other, and there is not in nature a stronger argument for a necessary connection of any cause and any effect.

"To adopt an opinion different from this, is to form an hypothesis without a single fact to support it. And to conclude as some have done, that a material system is so far from being a necessary pre-requisite to the faculty of thinking, that it is an obstruction to it, is to adopt a method of argumentation the very reverse of every thing that has hitherto been followed in philosophy. It is to conclude, not only *without*, but directly *contrary* to all appearances whatsoever.

"That the perfection of thinking should depend on the sound state of the body and brain *in this life*, insomuch that a man has no power of thinking without it, and yet that he should be capable of

[1] Mr. Sinnett tells us that Occult science "contemplates no principle in Nature as wholly immaterial. In this way, though no conceptions of the universe, of man's destiny, or of Nature generally, are more spiritual than those of Occult science, that science is wholly free from the logical error of attributing material results to immaterial causes" — *Esoteric Buddhism*, p. 66.

thinking better when the body and brain are destroyed,[1] seems to be the most unphilosophical and absurd of all conclusions. If death be an advantage with respect to thinking, *disease* ought to be a proportional advantage likewise; and universally, the nearer the body approaches to a state of dissolution, the freer and less embarrassed might the faculties of the mind be expected to be found. But this is the very reverse of what really happens."

"That the faculty of thinking necessarily depends, for its *exercise*, at least, upon a stock of ideas, about which it is always conversant, will hardly be questioned by any person. But there is not a single idea of which the mind is possessed, but what may be proved to have come to it from the bodily senses, or to have been consequent upon the perception of sense. Could we, for instance, have had any idea of *color*,[2] as *red*, *blue*, etc., with-

[1] Mr. Baxter says that "nothing could be fitter than matter to initiate beings, whose first information of things is from sense, and to train them up in the elements of knowledge and admiration" — *Matho*, vol. II. p. 211.

In the same volume, Mr. Baxter says: "We know not, nor can we name a greater absurdity, than that union to a dead and torpid substance should give the soul life and power, or any degree of them; or that separation should again deprive it of these. The soul, therefore, must be percipient and active in its own nature, independent of matter" — p. 173.

[2] In a work entitled *Spirit Life*, the Rev. T. Spicer observes: "There is no conceivable connection between *matter* and *thought*." "The soul exists wholly independent of the body which it inhabits, although there are certain actions it cannot perform without using the body to which it belongs. It can

out the eyes, and optic nerves; of *sound*, without the ears, and auditory nerves; of *smell*, without the nostrils, and the olfactory nerves, etc., etc.? It is even impossible to conceive how the mind could have become possessed of any of its present stock of ideas without just such a body as we have; and consequently, judging from present appearances (and we have no other means of forming any judgment at all) without a body, of some kind or other, we could have had no ideas at all, any more than a man without eyes could have any particular ideas belonging to colors. The notion, therefore, of the *possibility* of thinking in man, without an organized body, is not only destitute of all evidence from actual appearances, but is directly contrary to them; and yet these appearances ought alone to guide the judgment of philosophers."

"If the mind was naturally so independent of the body, as to be capable of subsisting by itself, and even of appearing to more advantage after the death of the body, it might be expected to discover some signs of its independence before death, and especially when the organs of the body were obstructed, so as to leave the soul more at liberty to exert itself, as in a state of *sleep*, or *swooning*, which most resemble the state of death, in which it is pretended that the soul is most of all alive, most active, and vigorous. But, judging by ap-

neither see, hear, nor speak, without using the body." Hence it follows that, if there is to be no resurrection of the body, all souls in heaven, according to Dr. Spicer, will be *deaf*, *dumb* and *blind*.

pearances, the reverse of all this is the case. That a man does not think during sleep, except in that imperfect manner which we call *dreaming*, and which is nothing more than an approach to a state of vigilance, I shall not here dispute, but take for granted; referring my readers to Mr. Locke, and other writers upon that subject; and that all power of thinking is suspended during a swoon I conclude with certainty, because no appearance whatever can possibly lead us to suspect the contrary.

"If the mental principle was, in its own nature, immaterial, and immortal, all its particular *faculties* would be so too; whereas, we see that every faculty of the mind, without exception, is liable to be impaired, and even to become wholly extinct before death. Since, therefore, all the faculties of the mind, separately taken, appear to be mortal, the substance, or principle, in which they exist, must be pronounced to be mortal too. Thus, we might conclude that the body was mortal, from observing that all the separate senses, and limbs were liable to decay and perish"[1] (*Disquisitions*, pp. 23, 45–56, 2d edit. L. 1765).

[1] The charge of atheism having been brought against Dr. Priestley he observes: "It was the common charge against the primitive christians and has hardly ever failed to be used, on one pretext or another, against every one who has dissented from the generally received faith." Dr. Priestley thinks that in his case this charge is unusually absurd and ridiculous, "because it supposes less power is requisite to create and animate mere matter and even to make matter intelligent, than to give life

Dr. Mivart says: "The notion of an internal force is very repugnant to some contemporary writers. But it is absolutely impossible to get rid of the idea of innate powers and tendencies the existence of which is everywhere manifested, not only in the organic world but in the inorganic world also. To conceive the universe as consisting of atoms acted on by external forces but having in themselves no power of coherence or response to such external actions, is a manifest absurdity. No one thing can act on any other except that in such other there is an innate capacity of being acted on" (*Lessons from Nature*, p. 280).

In this connection Prof. Bain remarks: "The more careful and studied observations of physiologists have shown beyond question that the brain as a whole is indispensable to thought, to feeling, and to volition. . . . Yet, although the Brain is by pre-eminence the mental organ, other organs co-operate; more especially, the Senses, the Mus-

and intelligence to a spiritual and immaterial substance; that the former may start up into life itself, but that the latter requires an author." He says: "There is nothing more approaching to *impiety* in my scheme than in the common one. On this hypothesis every thing is the *divine power;* but still strictly speaking, every thing is not *the Deity himself*" — vol. cit.

"When we look over the annals of ecclesiastical history we shall often find it is not within the close ranks of the so-called orthodox but from the outlying camp of the so-called heretic or infidel that the champions of the true faith have come" — Dean Stanley in his *Address to the Students at Aberdeen*, 1877.

cles, and the great Viscera. . . . The facts that connect the mind with the brain are numerous and irresistible. . . . The commonest observation is a blow on the head which suspends for the time consciousness and thought; at a certain pitch of severity it produces a permanent injury of the faculties, impairing the memory, or occasioning some form of mental derangement; there are cases on record where a blow on the head has cured idiocy." "Many cases of imbecility of mind are distinctly traced to causes affecting the nutrition of the brain." "Violent emotions are among the causes of paralysis which is a disease of the nerves or nerve centres." "Sudden outbursts of emotion derange the bodily functions. Fear paralyzes the digestion. Great mental depression enfeebles all the organs. Protracted and severe mental labor brings on disease of the bodily organs. On the other hand, happy outward circumstances are favorable to health and longevity." "Deficiency in the circulation is accompanied with feeble manifestations of mind." "General depletion lowers all the functions generally, mind included. On the other hand, when the cerebral circulation is quickened, the feelings are roused, the thoughts are more rapid, the volitions more vehement." "Inanition, or starvation, feebleness of digestion militate against the exercise of the mental functions. We have such facts as the dependence of our feelings and moods upon hunger, repletion, the state of the stomach, fatigue and

rest, pure and impure air, cold and warmth, stimulants and drugs, bodily injuries, disease, sleep, advancing years. These influences extend not merely to the grosser modes of feeling, and to such familiar exhibitions as after-dinner oratory, but also to the highest emotions of the mind — love, anger, æsthetic feeling, and moral sensibility." "Bodily affections are often the cause of a total change in the moral nature." [1] "After great mental exertion or excitement, there is an increase of the product of nerve waste. The alkaline phosphates removed from the blood by the kidneys are derived from the brain and nerves; and these are increased after severe exercise of the mind." "The memory rises and falls with the bodily condition; [2]

[1] Prof. Huxley gives an account of a French soldier who was shot in the head in battle and after his recovery lived two lives, a normal life, and an abnormal life. "In his normal life," says Prof. Huxley, "he is perfectly well, cheerful, does his work as a hospital attendant, and is a respectable well conducted man. The normal life lasts for about seven-and-twenty days, or thereabouts out of every month; but for a day or two in each month he passes suddenly and without any obvious change into his abnormal condition. In this state of abnormal life he is still active, goes about as usual, and is to all appearances just the same man as before. . . . But he neither sees, nor hears, nor tastes, nor smells, nor is he conscious of any thing whatever, and he has only one sense organ in a state of activity, namely, that of touch which is exceedingly delicate. . . . In the normal life he is an upright and honest man. In his abnormal state he is an inveterate thief. He will steal every thing he can lay his hands upon, and if he cannot steal any thing else he will steal his own things and hide them away" — *Address before the British Association at Belfast*, 1874.

[2] "Dr. Pritchard, on the authority of the late Dr. Rush of

being vigorous in our fresh moments, and feeble when we are fatigued or exhausted. It is related by Sir Henry Holland that on one occasion he descended, on the same day, two deep mines in the Hartz Mountains, remaining some hours in each. In the second mine he was so exhausted with inanition and fatigue, that his memory utterly failed him; he could not recollect a single word of German. The power came back after taking food and wine. Old age notoriously impairs the memory in ninety-nine men out of a hundred.

"In the delirium of fever the sense of hearing sometimes becomes extraordinarily acute. Among the premonitory symptoms of brain disease has been noticed an unusual delicacy of the sense of sight; the physician suspects that there is already congestion of blood, to be followed perhaps by effusion."

"Note the mental symptoms of typhus fever, summed up in the phrase 'febrile oppression.' . . . There is great inaptitude for the exertion of the power of thought, or of motion. The expression of the face is dull and heavy, absent, puzzled;

Philadelphia, mentions an American student of considerable attainments, who, on recovering from a fever, was found to have lost all his acquired knowledge. When his health was regained he began to apply to the Latin grammar, had passed through the elementary parts and was beginning to construe, when, one day, in making a strong effort to recollect a part of his lesson, the whole of his lost impressions suddenly returned to his mind and he found himself at once in possession of all his former acquirements" — *Intellectual Powers*, p. 127, Abercrombie.

the patient has the appearance of a person made stupid by drink, etc.' In short the mind is completely at the mercy of the bodily condition; there is no trace of a separate, independent, self-supporting, spiritual agent, rising above all the fluctuations of the corporeal frame."

"Most decisive of all, under this head, is the wide experience of the insane. Among the chief occasions of insanity must be reckoned excessive draughts on the mind — as for example, long and severe mental exertion, and sudden mental shocks, usually of disaster and misfortune, but occasionally even of joy. The association of brain-derangement with mind-derangement is all but a perfectly established fact. In the great mass of insane patients the alteration of the brain is visible and pronounced."

"Any person fancying that trains of thinking have little dependence on the bodily organs should also reflect on such facts as these. When walking, or engaged in any bodily occupation, if an interesting idea occurs to the mind, or is imparted to us by another person, we suddenly stop, and remain at rest, until the excitement has subsided. Again, our cogitations usually induce some bodily attitudes (laid hold of by artists as the outward expression of Thought) as well as movements; and if anything occurs to disturb these, the current of thinking is suspended or diverted. Why should sleep suspend all thought, except the incoherency of dreaming (absent in perfect sleep) if a certain

condition of the bodily powers were not indispensable to the bodily functions."

"It has been noted in all ages and countries, that the Feelings possess a natural language or Expression. So constant are the appearances characterizing the different classes of emotions, that we regard them as a part of the emotions themselves.[1]

"The smile of joy, the puckered features in pain, the stare of astonishment, the quivering of fear, the tones and glance of tenderness, the frown of anger, — are united in seemingly inseparable association with the states of feeling they indicate."

"That the feelings are closely connected with physical manifestations is patent and undeniable. But Thought is at times so quiet, so far removed from bodily demonstrations, that we might suppose it conducted in a region of pure spirit merely imparting its conclusions through a material intervention. Unfortunately for this supposition, the fact is now generally admitted that thought exhausts the nervous substance, as surely as walking exhausts the muscles. Our physical framework is involved with thought no less decidedly than with feeling" (*Mind and Body*).

[1] Mr. Darwin says: "Most of our emotions are so closely connected with their expression, that they hardly exist if the body remains passive" — *Expressions*, p. 239.

Dr. Maudsley observes: "The special muscular action is not merely the exponent of the passion, but truly an essential part of it. If we try, while the features are fixed in the expression of one passion, to call up in the mind a different one, we shall find it impossible to do so" — *Body and Will*, p. 30.

Dr. C. F. Taylor remarks: "Whatever that thing, function, or idea which we call mind may be, . . . it is universally admitted that varying bodily conditions are accompanied by related variations of mental states. Asphasia, insanity, imbecility, are so often found accompanied by certain definite pathological alterations in the brain-substance that they are generally held to be symptomatic of such local changes. So, also, though in a more general way, melancholia and depression, as well as exaltations and excitements of the mind, are known to depend largely on corresponding general bodily conditions of retarded or accelerated physiological processes.

"But it is also held though in a less definite manner, that the health of the body may be affected beneficially or injuriously, by certain states of the mind, as hope or despondency. Or, more in detail, medical men have observed that certain mental states affect certain functions in certain definite ways. As for instance, sudden anxiety, as of the non-arrival of a friend when expected, may cause an increase in the peristaltic actions, while prolonged anxiety is apt to cause the contrary effect. Joy over good news or at the return of a long-absent friend diminishes gastric secretion and causes loss of appetite. The feeble hold on life of the suicidal, and the surprising recoveries from serious diseases and after apparently fatal injuries, in persons whose mental characteristics are hopefulness and determination, are often-recurring facts

familiar to us all" (Article in *Popular Science Monthly*, May, 1879, p. 40).

Dr. Büchner says: "What we term mind, thought, conception, is the result of natural, though peculiarly combined, forces, which, like every other force of nature can only be manifested in certain materials. . . . That the brain is the organ of thought, and that both stand in such an intimate and necessary relation that their separate existence cannot be imagined, is a truth which is scarcely doubted by a physician or psychologist; as daily experience and numerous striking facts forcibly impress him with this conviction. . . .

"The brain is the seat and organ of thought; its size, shape, and structure, are in exact proportion to the magnitude and power of its intellectual functions. Comparative anatomy furnishes us in this respect with the clearest proof by showing the prevailing law, that through all classes of animals, up to man, the intellectual energy is in proportion to the size and material quality of the brain." "The mental capacity of man is enlarged in proportion to the material growth of his brain, and is diminished according to the gradual diminution of its substance in old age." "The brain of the aged becomes atrophied; that is, it shrinks, leaving cavities between the convolutions, which previously adhered to each other. The cerebral substance becomes more tough, its color more grayish, it is less vascular, the convolutions become smaller, and the chemical constitution

approaches, according to Schlassberger, that of infancy. It is a fact known to every one, that the intelligence diminishes with increasing age, and that old people become childish.

"The soul of the child becomes developed in the same degree as the material organization of its brain becomes more perfect. The brain substance of the child is more fluid and pultaceous, richer in water, and poorer in fat, than that of the adult. The differences between the gray and white substance, and other microscopic peculiarities, become only gradually developed; thus the so-called fibration of the brain, which is so plainly seen in the adult, is not easily observed in the child. The more marked this fibration grows, the more manifest becomes mental activity. The gray substance on the surface is but little developed; the convolutions are sparing, and little vascular. 'The histological development of many parts of nervous centre appear very imperfect in the newborn' (Valentin). 'The different mental faculties,' says Vogt, 'develop themselves gradually with the growth of the hemispheres.' . . . 'An abnormal smallness of the brain is always combined with imbecility' (Valentin). The celebrated poet Lenau became insane, and died idiotic; his brain having become atrophied by disease, weighed only two pounds eight ounces. The gradual decline of the intellect, according to Parchappe, is connected with the diminution of the brain. Having taken an average in seven hundred

and eighty-two cases, he proves by figures how the diminution of the weight of the brain was in proportion to the mental perturbation.

"Hauner, physician to the hospital for children in Munich, considers himself justified from his experience in asserting as follows:

"'Having for many years examined the cranial development of all our children, we have gained the conviction that an abnormal smallness of the skull, though not always leading to cretinism and idiocy, is mostly accompanied with limited mental qualifications; while mental perturbations are rarely observable in those possessing abnormally large skulls.'

"The remarkable vivisections and experiments of Flourens prove our law so forcibly, that any refutation of it becomes next to impossible. Flourens performed his experiments on such animals which from their physical constitutions were able to support considerable lesions of the skull and of the brain. He removed the superior parts of the brain in layers; and it is not too much to assert that the mental capacities were removed in the same ratio. . . . Can we desire any stronger proof of the necessary connection of the soul and the brain than that afforded by the knife of the anatomist who cuts off the soul piecemeal? . . .

"Let us now pass from this anatomical sketch to some physiological facts, in order to establish the necessary and inseparable connection of brain and soul. It is through the nervous system radi-

ating from the brain, and which may be considered as presiding over all organic functions, that the brain sways the whole mass of the organism, and reflects again to various parts external impressions, whether of a material or spiritual nature. The physical effects of mental emotions are sufficiently known. We grow pale from terror, we blush from shame or anger. The eye sparkles with joy, and the pulse is quickened. Terror causes sudden fainting; wrath a copious secretion of bile. . . .

"It is an interesting fact, that mental labor not merely increases the appetite, but, according to Davy, augments the animal heat. Men of a sanguine temperament live shorter and faster than others, because powerful mental excitement of the nervous system hastens the change of matter and consumes life more rapidly. . . . Great mental power and knowledge produce a favorable influence on the physical frame. Alibert quotes as a constant observation of physicians, the disproportionately large number of old men found among scholars. On the other hand the various conditions of the body are again reflected in the mind. A copious secretion of bile has, as is well known, a powerful influence on the mental disposition. . . .

"Finally, pathology furnishes us with an abundance of striking facts, and teaches us that no part of the brain exercising the function of thought can be materially injured without producing a corresponding mental disturbance. . . . An inflam-

mation of the brain causes delirium or mania; an extravasation of blood, stupefaction and unconsciousness;[1] a permanent pressure upon the brain, weakness of intellect, idiocy, etc. The greatest number of physicians and psychologists are now of opinion that all mental diseases are caused by physical affections, especially of the brain, though it may not in all cases, owing to the imperfection of our senses, be possible to establish the fact. And even those who do not entirely agree in this view, cannot but admit that no mental disease can be thought of without assuming a functional disturbance of the brain. Roman Fischer compared the results of three hundred and eighteen dissections in the lunatic asylum of Prague. Among these three hundred and eighteen cases, there were but thirty-two in which no pathological changes could be detected in the brain and its integuments, and in five only were there no pathological alterations whatever (the work appeared Luzern 1854). No physician can, according to the present state of science, doubt that, even in these five bodies, there must have been material pathological alterations though they were not visible. Dr. Follet concludes, from the autopsy of above a hundred

[1] "'The greatest thinker of his age,' says Tuttle, 'may in one hour during illness lose all his intelligence; in advanced age he enters a second childhood. The decay of the body induces decay of the mental faculties, which become extinguished with the last breath, like a lamp without sufficient oil, emitting only some feeble glimmers'"—Quoted by Büchner in *Force and Matter*.

lunatics, that the cerebral mass must, for the performance of several intellectual faculties, possess a certain thickness, and that the more this density diminishes and the ventricles become dilated, the weaker become memory and the intellectual faculties in general. According to this physician, mental diseases are the result of disturbed equilibrium of the innervation of the two hemispheres. 'All intellectual perturbations,' says Dr. Waschsmuth, 'proceed from diseases of the brain, which is the organ of thought, as shown by the pathology of the corporeal organ.'"

"The pathological facts which support or prove our opinion are so numerous and comprehensive, that volumes might be filled with them. The weight of our arguments has always been acknowledged by thoughtful men, being accessible to the most simple power of observation.

"'If the blood,' says Frederick the Great, in a letter to Voltaire in the year 1775, 'circulates too rapidly in the brain, as in intoxication or fevers, it confuses the ideas: if there be a small obstruction in the nerves of the brain, it causes madness; if a drop of water spread within the cranium, it causes loss of memory; a drop of extravasated blood, pressing upon the brain and the nerves, causes apoplexy, etc.'

"The law that brain and soul are necessarily connected, and that the material expansion, shape, and quality of the former stand in exact proportion to the intensity of the mental functions, is

strict and irrefutable, and the mind again exercises an essential influence on the growth and development of its organ, so that it increases in size and power just in the same manner as any muscle is strengthened by exercise. Albers of Bonn states that having dissected the brains of many persons who had for years undergone much mental labor, he found in all of them the *substance of the brain very firm and the gray matter as well as the convolutions highly developed.* Comparisons between the skulls of the ancients and the heads of the present generation leave no doubt as to the fact that the cranium of the European has, in the course of historical time, gained in circumference. The important and interesting researches of Abbé Frère, in Paris, have led to the result that the older and more primitive a human type is, the more developed is the skull in the occipital region, and the flatter is the forehead. The progress of civilization seems to have produced the effect that the anterior portion of the skull became more arched, and the occipital part flatter" (*Force and Matter*, pp. 49, 106–123, L. 1870).

Prof. Barker of Yale College remarks: "To-day, as truly as seventy-five years ago when Humboldt wrote, the mysterious and awful phenomena of life are commonly attributed to some controlling agent residing in the organism — to some independent presiding deity, holding it in absolute subjection. Such a notion it was which prompted Heraclitus to talk of a universal fire, Van Helmont

to propose his archæus, Hofman his vital fluid, Hunter his *materia vitæ*, and Humboldt his vital force. All these names assume the existence of a material or immaterial something, more or less separable from the material body, and more or less identical with the mind or soul, which is the cause of the phenomena of living beings. But as science moved irresistibly onward, and it became evident that the forces of inorganic nature were neither deities nor imponderable fluids, separable from matter, but were simply affections of it, analogy demanded a like concession in behalf of vital force. From the notion that the effects of heat were due to an imponderable fluid called caloric, discovery passed to the conviction that heat was but a motion of material particles, and hence inseparable from matter. To a like assumption concerning vitality it was now but a step. The more advanced thinkers in science of to-day, therefore, look upon the life of the living form as inseparable from its substance, and believe that the former is purely phenomenal, and only a manifestation of the latter. Denying the existence of a special vital force as such, they retain the term only to express the sum of the phenomena of living beings."

After considering the evidences that vital and physical forces are correlated, Prof. Barker says: "Nor do these facts rest upon physical evidence alone. Chemistry teaches that thought-force, like muscle-force, comes from the food; and demonstrates that the force evolved by the brain, like

that produced by the muscle, comes not from the disintegration of its own tissue, but is the converted energy of burning carbon" (*Half-hours with Modern Scientists*, p. 60).

Dr. Maudsley observes: "When Nature was first examined objectively the differences in matter appeared manifold, and its modes of energy or activity — that is, its forces — appeared many also. On a more careful use of the senses, however — in fact by the application of the delicate balance to the products of combustion — it became evident that one form of matter only disappeared to reappear in another form; that it never perished, but only changed. Elementary matter thus passes upward into chemical and organic compounds, and then downward from chemical compounds to its elementary condition. Out of dust man is formed by an upward transformation of matter, and to dust he returns by a retrograde metamorphosis thereof. Corresponding with the changes in the form of matter are changes in its modes of energy or its forces; to different combinations and arrangements of molecules correspond different modes of energy. Force therefore is eternal, like matter, and passes through a corresponding cycle of transformations. The correlation and conservation of forces, which have always been more or less clearly recognized as necessities of human thought, are now accepted as scientific axioms, and are daily receiving experimental demonstration" (*Body and Mind*, pp. 224, 225).

Prof. Huxley remarks: "No very abstruse argumentation is needed, . . . to prove that the powers or faculties, of all kinds of living matter, diverse as they may be in degree, are substantially similar in kind. . . . Even those manifestations of intellect, of feeling and of will which we rightly name the higher faculties, are not excluded from this classification, inasmuch as to every one but the subject of them, they are known only as transitory changes in the relative positions of parts of the body. Speech, gesture, and every other form of human action are, in the long run, resolvable into muscular contraction, and muscular contraction is but a transitory change in the relative portions of the parts of a muscle." "Thus it becomes clear that all living powers are cognate, and that all living forms are fundamentally of one character. . . . All work implies wastes and the work of life results, directly or indirectly, in the waste of protoplasm.

"Every word uttered by a speaker costs him some physical loss; and, in the strictest sense, he burns that others may have light — so much eloquence, so much of his body resolves into carbonic acid, water, and urea."

"After all what do we know of this terrible 'matter' except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of our own consciousness? And what do we know of that 'spirit' over whose threatened extinction by matter a great lamentation is arising, like that which was heard

at the death of Pan, except that it is a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause, or condition, of states of consciousness? In other words matter and spirit form the imaginary substrata of natural phenomena" (*Lay Sermons*, pp. 134, 145, 157, L. 1870).

In regard to the process by which mind was formed, Dr. Nichols remarks: "It is assumed that after the lapse of vast cosmic periods in the history of the universe, when matter had condensed into celestial spheres and partially cooled, the most rigid analysis, based on physics as at present understood, could not detect the traces of any modes of force but gravity, motion, heat, chemical action, electricity, magnetism and light. Molecular action on all spheres was intense, chemical change wrought with vast power; but in time the naked elements became locked up in compounds, affinity and heat waned, upheavals ceased, and the forces, all but gravity, merged towards a Sunday of rest. At this period, after air and water had formed, and the jarring elements had become comparatively quiet, two refined and inscrutable *modes of motion*, life and mind, were developed by evolution from inorganic atoms. It is assumed that before nature could evolve life and mind all cosmical agitation must nearly stop, and such was the period when man appeared. It is further assumed that mind was developed by matter only in a mature state. Before the atoms coalesced to form mind, the most refined property in the universe, material struc-

ture itself was most complex. Mind is too refined a mode of motion to continue long on cosmic spheres; it does not appear until they are verging towards their dotage. Thought cannot exist in the presence of undue heat;[1] hence it does not appear until polar frigidity has set in; and its duration is short, as approaching cold will disintegrate complex atoms, arrest the refined modes of motion called mind, and chaos again ensues" (vol. cit. pp. 91–93).

Drs. Bucknill and Tuke observe: "How any combination of cells can be attended by processes of thought is to us inconceivable; but it is not more inconceivable than that similar combinations should result in the phenomena of life or that a combination of atoms should result in the movement of the solar system. All we can say is, that the cerebral cell and gravitating atom are creatures of the Almighty Creator acting in obedience to laws impressed upon them by his fiat, laws whose phenomena we can trace, but whose ultimate nature we cannot understand" (*Psychological Medicine*, p. 351, L. 1858).

[1] In regard to the theory of Evolution Prof. Tyndale remarks: "Many who hold it would probably assent to the position that at the present moment all our philosophy, all our poetry, all our science, and all our art, — Plato, Shakespeare, Newton and Raphael — are potential in the fires of the sun. We long to learn something of our origin. If the Evolution hypothesis be correct, even this unsatisfied yearning must have come to us across the ages which separate the unconscious primeval mist from the consciouness of to-day" — *Use and Limit of the Imagination in Science*, p. 47, L. 1870.

Dr. Maudsley says: "To those who cannot conceive that any organization of matter, however complex, should be capable of such exalted functions as those which are called mental, is it really more conceivable that any organization of matter can be the mechanical instrument of the complex manifestations of an immaterial mind? Is it not as easy for an omnipotent power to endow matter with mental functions as it is to create an immaterial entity capable of accomplishing them through matter? Is the Creator's arm shortened, so that He cannot endow matter with sensation and ideation? It is strangely overlooked by many who write on this matter, that the brain is not a dead instrument, but a living organ, with functions of a higher kind than those of any other bodily organ, insomuch as its organic nature and structure far surpass those of any other organ. What, then, are those functions if they are not mental? No one thinks it necessary to assume an immaterial liver behind the hepatic structure, in order to account for its functions. But so far as the nature of nerve and the complex structure of the cerebral convolutions exceed in dignity the hepatic elements and structure, so far must the material functions of the brain exceed those of the liver. Men are not sufficiently careful to ponder the wonderful operations of which matter is capable, or to reflect on the miracles effected by it which are continually before their eyes. Are the properties of a chemical compound less mysterious essen-

tially because of the familiarity with which we handle them? Consider the seed dropped into the ground: it swells with germinating energy, bursts its integuments, sends upward a delicate shoot, which grows into a stem, putting forth in due season its leaves and flowers, until finally a beautiful structure is formed, such as Solomon in all his glory could not equal, and all the art of mankind cannot imitate. And yet all these processes are operations of matter; for it is not thought necessary to assume an immaterial or spiritual plant which effects its purposes through the agency of the material structure which we observe. Surely there are here exhibited properties of matter wonderful enough to satisfy any one of the powers that may be inherent in it.[1] Are we, then, to believe that the highest and most complex development of organic structure is not capable of even more wonderful operations? Would you have the human body, which is a microcosm containing all the forms and powers of matter organized in the most delicate and complex manner, to possess lower powers than those forms of matter exhibit separately in Nature? Trace the gradual development of the nervous system through the animal series, from its first germ to its most complex evolution, and let it be declared at what point it suddenly

[1] "Everywhere throughout our planet we notice the tendency of the ultimate particles of matter to run into systematic forms and that the very molecules are instinct with a desire for union and growth" — Prof. Tyndale in a *Lecture at Manchester.*

loses all its inherent properties as living structure, and becomes the mere mechanical instrument of a spiritual entity. In what animal, or in what class of animals, does the immaterial principle abruptly intervene and supersede the agency of matter, becoming the entirely distinct cause of a similar, though more exalted, order of mental phenomena?" "Why may it not, indeed be capable of consciousness, seeing that whether it be or not the mystery is equally incomprehensible to us, and must be reckoned equally simple and easy to the Power which created matter and its properties? When, again, we are told that every part of the body is in a constant state of change, that within a certain period every particle of it is renewed, and yet that amid these changes a man feels that he remains essentially the same, we perceive nothing inconsistent in the idea of the action of a material organ; for it is not absurd to suppose that in the brain the new series of particles take the pattern of those which they replace, as they do in other organs and tissues which are continually changing their substances yet preserve their identity. Even the scar of a wound on the finger is not often effaced, but grows as the body grows: why then, assume the necessity of an immaterial principle to prevent the impression of an idea being lost" (*Body and Mind*, pp. 262–264).

In a letter to Mr. Mill, Mr. Spencer says: "I believe that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of

the human race, have been producing corresponding modifications, which, by continual transmission and accumulation have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition — certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experience of utility (Quoted by Bain in *Mental and Moral Science*).

In this connection Dr. Maudsley remarks: "The native Australian, who is one of the lowest existing savages, has no words in his language to express such exalted ideas as justice, love, virtue, mercy; he has no such ideas in his mind, and cannot comprehend them. The vesicular neurine which should embody them in its constitution and manifest them in its function has not been developed in his convolutions; he is as incapable therefore of the higher mental displays of abstract reasoning and moral feeling as an idiot is, and for a like reason. Indeed, were we to imagine a person born in this country, at this time, with a brain of no higher development than the brain of an Australian savage or a Bushman, it is perfectly certain that he would be more or less of an imbecile. And the only way, I suppose, in which beings of so low an order of development could be raised to a civilized level of feeling and thought would be by cultivation, continued through several generations; they would have to undergo a gradual process of humanization before they could attain to the capacity of civilization.

"Some, who one moment own freely the broad truth that all mental manifestations take place through the brain, go on, nevertheless, to straightway deny that the conscience or moral sensibility can be a function of organization. But, if all mental operations are not in this world equally functions of organizations, I know not what warrant we have for declaring any to be so. The solution of the much-vexed question concerning the origin of the moral sense seems to lie in the considerations just adduced. Are not, indeed, our moral intuitions results of the operation of the fundamental law of nervous organization by which that which is consciously acquired becomes an unconscious endowment, and is then transmitted as more or less of an instinct to the next generation? They are examples of knowledge which have been hardly gained through the suffering and experience of the race, being now inherited as a natural or instinctive sensibility of the well-constituted brain of the individual. In the matter of our moral feelings we are most truly the heirs of the ages. Take the moral sense, and examine the actions which it sanctions and those which it forbids, and thus analyze, or, as it were, decompose, its nature, and it will be found that the actions which it sanctions are those which may be proved by sober reason to be conducive to the well-being and the progress of the race, and that its prohibitions fall upon the actions which, if freely indulged in, would lead to the degeneration, if not extinc-

tion, of mankind. And if we could imagine the human race to live back again to its earliest infancy — to go backward through all the scenes and experiences through which it has gone forward to its present height — and to give back from its mind and character at each time and circumstance, as it passed it, exactly that which it gained when it was there before — should we not find the fragments and exuviæ of the moral sense lying here and there along the retrograde path, and a condition at the beginning which, whether simian or human, was bare of all true moral feeling?"

"We are daily witnesses of, and our daily actions testify to, the operation of that plastic law of nervous organization by which separate and successive acquisitions are combined and so intimately blended as to constitute apparently a single and undecomposable faculty: we observe it in the formation of our volitions; and we observe it, in a more simple and less disputable form, in the way in which combinations of movements that have been slowly formed by practice are executed finally as easily as if they were a single and simple movement. If the moral sense — which is derived, then, inasmuch as it has been acquired in the process of human development through the ages — were not more or less innate in the well-born individual of this age, if he were obliged to go, as the generations of his forefathers have gone, through the elementary process of acquiring it, he would be very much in the position of a person who, on

each occasion of writing his name, had to go through the elementary steps of learning to do so. The progressive evolution of the human brain is a proof that we do inherit as a natural endowment the labored acquisitions of our ancestors; the added structure represents, as it were, the embodied experience and memories of the race ; and there is no greater difficulty in believing that the moral sense may have been so formed, than in believing, what has long been known and is admitted on all hands, that the young fox or young dog inherits as an instinct the special cunning which the foxes and the dogs that have gone before it have had to win by hard experience "(vol. cit. pp. 54–56).

In regard to memory Prof. Huxley observes: "That memory is dependent upon a physical process stands beyond question. The results of the study of disease, the results of the action of poisonous substances, all conclusively point to the fact that memory is inseparably connected with the integrity of certain material parts of the brain and dependent upon them. . . . We are bound, by every thing we know of the operations of the nervous system, to believe that when a certain molecular change is brought about in the central part of the nervous system, that change, in some way utterly unknown to us, causes the state of consciousness which we term a sensation. It is not to be doubted that those motions which give rise to sensation leave in the brain changes of its substance which answer to what Holler called

'*vestigia rerum*,' and to what that great thinker, David Hartley, termed 'Vibratiuncules.' The sensation which has passed away leaves behind molecules of the brain competent to its reproduction — 'sensigenous molecules,' so to speak —which constitute the physical foundation of memory. Other molecular changes give rise to conditions of pleasure and pain, and to the emotion which in ourselves we call volition. I have no doubt that is the relation between the physical processes of the animal and his mental processes" (*Address before the British Association at Belfast*, 1874).

Although Prof. Huxley refers to animals in his preceding remarks, he tells us in the same lecture that this view applies in its fulness and entirety to man.[1]

[1] In speaking of the fact that many will assert that such doctrines have evil tendencies, Prof. Huxley observes: "If for preaching such doctrines as I have preached to you to-night, I am cited before the bar of public opinion, I shall not stand there alone. On my one hand I shall have, among theologians, St. Augustine, John Calvin and . . . Jonathan Edwards. . . . I should have on my other hand; among philosophers, Leibnitz; I should have Père Malebranch, who saw all things in God; I should have David Hartley, the theologian as well as the philosopher; I should have Charles Bonnet, the eminent naturalist and one of the most zealous defenders of Christianity we have ever had; I think I should have, within easy reach, at any rate, John Locke. Certainly the school of Descartes would be there, if not their master; and I am inclined to think that, in due justice a citation would have to be served on Immanuel Kant himself. In such society it may be better to be a prisoner than a judge; but I would like to ask those who are likely to be influenced by the din and clamor which are raised about these questions, whether they are more likely to be right in assuming

The late Prof. Ferrier remarks: In vain does the spiritualist found an argument for the existence of a separate immaterial substance on the alleged incompatibility of the intellectual and physical phenomena to co-inhere in the same sub-stratum. Materiality may very well stand the brunt of that unspotted broadside. This mild artifice can scarcely expect to be treated as a serious observation. Such an hypothesis cannot be meant to be in earnest. Who is to dictate to nature what phenomena, or what qualities adhere in what substances; what effects may result from what causes? Matter is already in the field as an acknowledged entity — this both parties admit. Mind, considered as an independent entity, is not so unmistakably in the field! therefore as entities are not to be multiplied without necessity, we are not entitled to postulate a new cause, so long as it is *possible* to account for the phenomena by a cause already in existence; which possibility has never yet been disproved (*Institute of Metaphysics*).

"Dr. Bastion teaches that one physical process of change — redistribution of matter and motion — results successively in chemical integration and aggregation, the formation of organisms, life, feeling, thought memory love and will" (Quoted by Dr. Maudsley in *Body and Will*, p. 425).

those great men I have mentioned — the Fathers of the Christian Church and the Fathers of Philosophy — knew what they were about; or that the pygmies who raise the din know better than they did what they meant."

Prof. Tyndale says: "Let us reverently, but honestly look the question in the face. Divorced from matter where is life to be found? Whatever our *faith* may say, our *knowledge* shows them to be indissolubly joined" (*Address before the British Association at Belfast*, 1874).

Descartes is recognized by pre-eminence the philosopher of Immaterialism, being frequently styled the father of modern mental philosophy, so forcibly did he insist on the fundamental and inerasable distinction between matter and mind. He assumed that the soul enters the body endowed with all possible knowledge, but forgets it at birth and gradually recollects it. He refused mind to animals, claiming that they were automatoms or machines.[1] He located the soul in the pineal

[1] "He was the first," says Prof. Huxley, "to reduce in a manner eminently capable of bearing the test of mental presentation, vital phenomena to purely mechanical principles. . . . He sketches with marvellous physical insight a machine, with water for the motive power, which shall illustrate vital actions. He has made clear to his mind that such a machine would be competent to carry on the process of digestion, nutrition, growth, respiration, and the beating of the heart. It would be competent to accept impressions from the external sense, to store them up in imagination, and memory, to go through the internal movements of the appetites and passions, the external movement of limbs. He deduces these functions of his machine from the mere arrangement of its organs, as the movement of a clock or other automaton is deduced from its weights and wheels. 'As far as these functions are concerned,' he says, 'it is not necessary to conceive another vegetative or sensitive soul, nor any other principle of motion or of life, than the blood and the spirits agitated by the fire which burns continually in

gland, defining it as substance which thinks but has no extension, while matter is substance which has extension but does not think.

Prof. Huxley says: "It is very hard to form a definite notion of what this phraseology means, when it is taken in connection with the location of the soul in the pineal gland; and I can only represent it to myself as signifying that the soul is a mathematical point, having place but not extension, within the limits of the pineal gland. Not only has it place, but it must exert force, for, according to the hypothesis, it is competent, when it wills, to change the course of the animal spirits which consist of matter in motion. Thus the soul becomes a centre of force. But, at the same time, the distinction between spirit and matter vanishes; inasmuch as matter, according to a tenable hypothesis, may be nothing but a multitude of centres of force. The case is worse if we adopt the modern vague notion that consciousness is seated in the gray matter of the cerebrum, generally; for, as the gray matter has extension, that which is lodged in it must also have extension. And thus we are led in another way to lose spirit in matter.

"In truth, Descartes' physiology, like the modern physiology of which it anticipates the spirit, leads straight to Materialism, so far as that title is applicable to the doctrine that we have no knowledge of any thinking substance, apart from extended

the heart and which is in no wise different from the fire which exists in immaterial bodies' " — *Address at Belfast*, 1874.

substance; and that thought is as much a function of matter as motion is" (*Lay Sermons*, pp. 370, 371, L. 1870).

Mr. Fearon says: "In proceeding from minute details to a review of general principles, it should seem that the doctrines of Immaterialism totally fail to supply either adequate, or even comprehensible, causes for the endless varieties which are presented by all created beings; and in looking from the insect up to man, an immaterial agency fails in accounting, even according to the doctrines of its supporters, for admitted facts and effects. Why therefore should the position be contested, that matter variously modified and organized offers an intelligible solution of, and an adequate cause for, all these effects? And should the difficulty be raised as to *how* matter can perceive, remember, judge, reason, — the oft-repeated reply at once presents itself by shaping a similar inquiry for the immaterialist, as to *how* spirit can perform these operations, and what evidence can be given of even the existence of spirit, with the qualities ascribed. But are we, because we cannot tell *how* these various phenomena are accomplished, therefore to acquiesce in the gravest absurdities, and the most monstrous contradictions? It certainly is not known *how* the brain accomplishes its purposes; but, as has been well stated, all are equally ignorant as to *how* the liver secretes bile, *how* the muscles contract, *how* any living purpose is effected, *how* bodies are attracted to the earth, *how*

iron is drawn to the magnet, or HOW God exists; and with Elihu in Job we may ask, 'Dost *thou* know the balancing of the clouds, the wondrous work of Him who is perfect in knowledge?'" (*Thoughts on Materialism*, pp. 31, 32, L. 1833.)

Dr. Maudsley remarks: "It is remarkable how little the advocates of a metaphysical soul, though never so exacting in their critical demands upon materialistic theories, ever think of the many difficulties of their own theories, and how quietly they pass them by as parts of the big mystery which they feel no obligations to explain or even to consider. If a soul is to be postulated, surely one is entitled to be told something about it. Of what substance is it made, because substance of some sort it must have if it is individual? If of spiritual substance, what conception of spirit is possible other than a conception of something that is more subtle than the most subtle matter known?

Where was this spirit before it entered into the body? . . . In what part of the body does it dwell? Is it co-extensive with body and yet itself without extension? Will it when it takes leave of the body be able to feel and think and will in the same manner as it does now through the body? And if not how will it keep consciousness of its identity and have continuity of existence as the same being? How does it now act upon the body, and how is it acted upon by it? How many bodily functions are possible without it, and what is its

part and exact range in these functions that are not possible without it? Do the animals that approach nearest to man possess souls, especially those that in some measure think with him, feel with him, and act with him; and if they do whence came their souls before life and where will they go after death? Is the animal soul material, and the human soul immaterial? Are we called upon to make three divisions of substances in nature corresponding to differences of properties — the last two of them being sorts of spiritualizations of matter — namely (*a*) gross and palpable material substance; (*b*) animal and quasi-immaterial; (*c*) human immaterial?

"That other persons feel as I do, I know by their cries and gestures when they are pained or pleased, and that they think as I do by their words which they have taught me to understand; in both cases, that is, by certain movements that are visible, or, so to speak audible to me. I know the same of animals as far as gestures and cries inform me, which are, after all, more genuine indications of mental affections than words; and certainly I feel quite as sure that the crouching, fawning, gambolling dog is expressing emotional states as I am that a gambolling child or any one who tells me he feels them is. What then am I to think of these respective origins? That the same kind of sensation, sentiment, and reason proceeds from entirely unrelated sources in the two cases — in the one betokening a soul, and in the other being

the outcome of matter divinely adapted to perform such functions? And if matter be in any case sufficient by itself to perform them, why call in the superfluous aid of a soul to do the same kind of functions in men? If it be argued that the soul of man stands high on a quite special platform, because it has the subjective certainty of an intuition into its own states, still the objection may be made that the revelations of my self-consciousness can only have individual certainty, and that the intuitions of another person's self-consciousness, however certain to him, and by whatever outward means communicated from his *within*, who is to me *without*, to my *within*, can only have the same sort of objective value to me as the revelations of an animal's conscious states through its modes of communication with me. A subjective psychology, in so far as it is subjective, cannot transcend the personal range, or have more than personal certainty" (*Body and Will*, pp. 119–122, L. 1883).

CHAPTER IV.

MIND IN ANIMALS AND IN THE LOWER RACES OF MEN.

THE best authorities are pretty much agreed in the belief that Mind in animals does not differ in *quality*, but merely in *quantity*, from that of man.

In this connection Dr. Priestley observes: "The souls of brutes, which have very much embarrassed the modern systems, occasioned no difficulty whatever in that of the ancients. They considered all souls as originally the same, in whatever bodies they might happen to be confined. To-day it might be that of a man, to-morrow, that of a horse, then that of a man again, and lastly be absorbed into the universal soul from which it proceeded." Dr. Priestley tells us that the belief in an *immaterial* soul made it necessary for man to make some distinction between the souls of men and those of animals, so it finally came to be considered that the soul of the animal is mortal. "An unhappy distinction," Dr. Priestley thinks, considering "that brutes have the rudiments of all our faculties without exception" (vol. cit. pp. 283, 284).

Dr. Büchner says: "Man has no absolute advantage above the animal; his mental superiority being merely relative. There is not one intellectual faculty which belongs to man *exclusively;* his superiority is merely the result of the greater intensity, and the proper combination of his capacities. The enlarged human faculties are, as we have already seen, the natural and necessary result of the higher and more perfect development of his material organ of thought. As the physical combination of this substance presents an uninterrupted scale from the lowest creature up to man, so is there manifested a corresponding ascending series of mental qualifications. Neither in form nor chemically can any *essential* difference be proved between the animal and human being; the differences are great, but only in *degree*. . . . Singularly overestimating himself man has been pleased to give the name of *instinct* to undoubted psychical manifestations in animals. But there exists no instinct in the sense in which the word is usually applied. It is not a necessity inborn in themselves and their mental organization, nor a blind involuntary impulse, which impels animals to action, but deliberation — the result of comparisons and conclusions" (vol. cit. pp. 226, 227).

Prof. Huxley observes: "I must say for myself — looking at the matter on the ground of analogy — taking into account that great doctrine of continuity which forbids one to suppose that any natural phenomena can come into existence sud-

denly and without some precedent, gradual modification tending towards it, and taking into account the incontrovertible fact that the lower vertebrated animals possess, in a less developed condition, that part of the brain which we have every reason to believe is the organ of consciousness in ourselves, it seems vastly more probable that the lower animals, although they may not possess that sort of consciousness which we have ourselves, yet have it in a form proportioned to the comparative development of the organs of that consciousness, and foreshadow more or less dimly those feelings which we ourselves possess" (*Address before the British Association at Belfast*, 1874).

Mr. Darwin says: "If no organic being excepting man possessed any mental powers, or if his powers had been of a wholly different nature from those of the lower animals, then we never should have been able to convince ourselves that our high faculties had been gradually developed. But it can be clearly shown that there is no fundamental difference of the kind."

"Of all the faculties of the human kind, it will I presume be admitted that *Reason* stands at the summit. Few persons any longer dispute that animals possess some power of reasoning. Animals may constantly be seen to pause, deliberate and resolve. It is a significant fact, that the more the habits of any particular animal are studied by a naturalist, the more he attributes to reason and the less to unlearnt instinct. They are also capable of

some inherited improvement, as we see in the domestic dog compared with the wolf or jackal. If it be mentioned that certain powers, such as self-consciousness, abstraction, &c., are peculiar to man, it may well be that these are the incidental results of other highly advanced mental faculties; and these again are mainly the result of a highly developed language."

"The differences in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not of kind. We have seen that the senses and intuitions, the various emotions and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, reason, &c., of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient or even sometimes in a well-developed condition in the lower animals" (*Descent of Man*, vol. I. pp. 34, 46, 105, N. Y. 1876).

In the second volume of *Descent of Man* (p. 390) Mr. Darwin says: "Every one who admits the general principle of evolution must see that the mental powers of the higher animals, which are the same in kind with those of mankind, though so different in degree, are capable of advancement." "The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable — namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed as in man" (vol. cit. p. 71).

In regard to the moral sense in animals, Dr. Lindsay observes: —

"All the ordinary definitions of what is variously called in man the *moral sense* — sentiment, feeling, faculty, or instinct — apply, though not necessarily equally, in the same degree, with quite the same sense or force, to an equivalent mental attribute or series of psychical qualities in other animals, and which attribute or qualities in other animals there is no good reason for distinguishing by any other name, simply because they are to be found in animals zoölogically lower than man." After giving the definitions of the moral sense, Dr. Lindsay says: "There is not one of these moral qualities that is not possessed, sometimes in a high degree, by certain of the lower animals, and more especially the dog; and there are many authors who have been desirous of drawing marked psychical distinctions between man and other animals, who have nevertheless felt themselves compelled by the evidence of facts to concede to these other animals, or certain of them, the possession of morality akin to that of man. Agassiz, for instance, grants them morals; Froude speaks of their principles of morality; Brodie refers to the moral sentiments as occurring in gregarious animals; Shaftsbury allows to them a sense and practice of moral rectitude; Watson gives instances of their moral feeling, and Wood of their conscience. And certain animals have even been described as possessing a moral law and codes of morals.

"The dog, at least, frequently exhibits a knowl-

edge of *right and wrong*, making a deliberate *choice* of one or the other, perfectly aware of and prepared for the *consequences* of such a selection. The animal has occasionally the *moral courage* to choose the right and to suffer for it, to bear wrong rather than do it (Elam). . . . One of the many evidences that the dog is sensible of right doing is to be found in the familiar fact that when it performs an action which to it seems meritorious, or which it has reason to believe its master will deem so — when it saves a life, or successfully defends a trust, or resists some great temptation — it looks at once for some sign of the said master's *approbation*, perhaps for some reward."

" *Conscience* is frequently as severe a monitor in other animals as in man, its reproaches as stinging and hard to be borne, its torments sometimes intolerable. We may speak quite correctly, for instance, of the *conscience-stricken* animal thief, the cat or dog caught in the act of pilfering from the larder. The signs of detected and acknowledged guilt are the same in kind as would be exhibited under parallel circumstances by the human child. The animal, like the child if rendered sensitive by previous moral training, shows unmistakably its consciousness of delinquencies." " A young dog having committed some offence against the established rules of his master's household after we had shaken our heads at him and turned away . . . although he must have been very hungry, would not touch his food, but sat close to the

door, whining and crying, till we made it up with him by telling him that he was *forgiven* and taking his offered paw, when he ate his supper and went quietly to bed."

"No doubt what is popularly spoken of as a sense of right or wrong, of legality, or illegality, in the lower animals may, or will if strictly analyzed, be reduced to a distinction between what is *forbidden* and what is *permitted* by man, who is recognized as a sufficient lawgiver and administrator — what will bring *punishment* on the one hand, and *reward* on the other. But this is just the kind of feeling as to right and wrong, legality and illegality, that exists in the savage adult, that is generated at first in the civilized child, that is exhibited (if at all) in the criminal, the lunatic or the idiot. It cannot be truthfully affirmed that *abstract* or *refined ideas* of moral good and evil are common to all ranks of men, or are innate even in civilized men. In our brother man with all the help that spoken and written language can give us, there can be no doubt of the difficulty, frequently the utter impossibility, of knowing whether any and what conceptions exist as to right or wrong, good or evil, justice or injustice honesty or dishonesty." "The human child and the young animal can equally be educated both to *distinguish and do the right*" (Article in *Popular Science Monthly*, January, 1879).

Mr. Hudson remarks: "The rational distinction between the human soul and the brute soul is not

very well settled yet; and the fact reflects no great credit on our sagacity or boasted superiority. And in the question of moral capacity, some dogs seem to have as tender a conscience as some men ever had. . . . Many good men — Duns Scotus, Ramsey, Dean, Wesley, Clarke, Tennyson, Theodore Parker, Agassiz — have held or allowed the immortality of brutes. And Bishop Butler and Isaac Taylor have remarked that the metaphysical arguments for our immortality are about as good for the immortal life of our four-footed and footless neighbors" (*Human Destiny*, p. 126).

In regard to instinct, Dr. Lindsay says: "It must be utterly fatal to the supposition, hitherto so popular, that *instinct* is immutable, being already perfect, if it can be shown, as it very readily can be, that the moral and intellectual faculties of the lower animals are capable of *improvement* to a high degree, that there are ample evidences among them of very marked *progress* in skill, ingenuity, adaptiveness, caution and other mental qualities or aptitudes. This mental improvement or progress includes even the acquisition of *new* faculties, the development of those which are latent, with the perfecting of others" (*Mind in the Lower Animals*, vol. I. p. 233).

Dr. Maudsley remarks in this connection: "It has been the custom to make a mighty deal of the difference between instinct and reason, the inclination always being, from a desire to exalt reason, to put a wider gap between them than actually exists.

In regard to that matter I shall take leave to make two propositions by way of raising the low and bringing down the high — first, that logic is just as mechanical as instinct; secondly, that instinct is virtually the stereotyped common sense of the species" (*Body and Will*, p. 42). Dr. Nichols says: "As to the nature of instinct, it is asserted to be habits fixed by heredity" (vol. cit. p. 94).

Sir John Sebright expressed it as his decided conviction, Dr. Carpenter tells us, that by far the greater part of the propensities which are generally supposed to be instinctive, are not implanted in animals by Nature, but are the results of long experience, acquired and accumulated through many generations, so as, in the course of time, to assume the characters of instinct" (*Mental Physiology*, p. 229).

Mr. Tuttle says: "The great gap which is supposed to exist between the intellect and instinct will be filled up and the mind will readily submit to the jurisdiction of fixed physical laws." [1]

Mr. Krahmer says: "The intelligence of the animal manifests itself entirely in the same manner as that of man. No essential difference, but only one in degree can be proved to exist between instinct and reason." [2]

Mr. Burmeister remarks: "The human body is a modified animal form; his soul an enlarged animal soul." [3]

[1] Quoted by Dr. Büchner in *Force and Matter*.
[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

Sir Benjamin Brodie considers "that mind in the inferior animals is essentially of the same nature with that of the human race, and that of those various and ever-changing conditions of it which we term mental faculties, there are none of which we may not discover traces more or less distinct in other animals" (*Mind and Matter*, p. 178, N. Y. 1857).

Dr. Morton Prince thinks that mind in animals differs from mind in man in degree only. He observes: "Materialism teaches us that however lowly, they belong to our kith and kin, and though it should be necessary and proper that man should hold dominion over them, it should be exercised with clemency and discrimination. There can be no doubt that the belief that man is not only superior to the brute, but belongs to a supernatural order of beings, has tended to lessen our sympathy for those lower forms of creation, and blunt our sensibilities regarding them. The belief has become too general that the animal is not only a machine but an insensible machine, and it too often happens that our sympathy remains untouched, even though the dog may lick the hand that slays it with the knife" (vol. cit. p. 158).

"The opinion," says Czolbe, "that animals possess neither conception, judgment, nor the power of forming conclusions, is refuted by experience."

"It is the height of folly," says the *Système de la Nature*, "to deny to animals the possession of mental faculties; they feel, they think, they judge

and compare, they choose and deliberate, they possess memory, they show love and hatred, and their senses are frequently more acute than ours." "It is not from mere instinct that the fox constructs two outlets in his cover, or that he robs the roost at a time when he knows that the farmer and his servants are absent or at dinner, but from deliberation. It is not instinct but experience which renders old animals more prudent than young ones" (Quoted by Büchner in *Matter and Force*).

"Beginning," says Dr. Lindsay, "with the lowest subkingdom of the Invertebrata — the *Protozoa* of zoologists — certain of the *Infusoria*, or *Rhizopoda*, according to Dr. Carter, exhibit will, determination, fixed purpose or aim, intention, cunning, ingenuity in the adaptation of means to an end, the recognition of food and the selection thereof. The *Vorticella* is said to 'contract itself upon its stem when alarmed or irritated' ('Globe Encyclopædia'). Among the *Rhizopoda* Carpenter refers to the selection of the materials of construction by and to constructive art in *Amœba;* while Houzeau mentions way-finding to food supply in *Actinophrys;* and Carter assigns to both animals observation, will, and intention in their food-search. Pouchet speaks of the *Amœba* — the so-called proteus animalcule — changing its shape 'at will.' In the *Protozoa* feeling is excited by external impressions.

"We have then, at the very beginning of the

zoological scale, in the capture of prey, a whole series of mental phenomena exhibited — will, purpose, choice, ingenuity, observation, feeling; and these aptitudes doubtless involve others, such as sensation, patience and perseverance. It seems incontestable that choice or preference in the selection of food is a characteristic of the very lowest animals. If this be the case, certain at least of the mental qualities above specified — with others — are necessarily involved" (vol. cit. I. p. 52).

Mr. Darwin, in speaking of the wonderful difference in size between what is regarded as the brain of the ant and of man, says: "Ants communicate information to each other, and several unite for the same work or games of play. They recognize one another after a long absence. They build great edifices, keep them clean, close the doors in the evening and post sentries. They make roads and even tunnels under rivers. They collect food for the community, and when an object too large for entrance is brought to the nest, they enlarge the door, and afterwards build it up again. They go out to battle in regular bands and freely sacrifice their lives for the common weal. They emigrate in accordance with a preconcerted plan. They capture slaves. They keep Aphides as milch-cows. They move the eggs of their Aphides, as well as their own eggs and cocoons, into warm parts of the nest in order that they may be quickly hatched, and endless similar facts could be given" (vol. cit. I. p. 187).

Dr. Lindsay, in speaking of white ants, says: "They exhibit *foresight* in the construction of long clay chimneys for communication with air or land or both, during inundations. . . . Their edifices or constructive works include galleries and corridors, magazines, nurseries, royal chambers and hall, offices, ordinary rooms and egg rooms, floors and ceilings, pillars and other appurtenances" (vol. cit. p. 59).

Of the agricultural or harvesting ant, Dr. Lindsay says: "It not only stores up seed but cultivates the plants which are to provide it, and carefully gathers in its crop at the right season. . . . In the wet season the seeds in the ant granaries are apt to get wetted and to sprout; and accordingly on the first fine day the ants bring out all the damaged grain and set it in the sun to dry, returning to the store only such as is uninjured. These ants may truly be said to cultivate their estates. They have grass paddocks round their nests and they weed these paddocks. From their fields they clear of all herbage save *Aristidee stricta*, a grain-bearing grass, called by Dr. Lincicum, 'ant rice,' and they sow the seeds of the same grass."

"Among the *Arachnida*," says Dr. Lindsay, "the intelligence, industry, ingenuity, perseverance, cunning, and other mental qualities of *spiders* are well known. An Australian spider constructs a door with bolts (Baden Powell). There are trap-door spiders, that construct and make use of a self-acting hinge to their door, which, as mere

machinery, is superior to much of man's (Baird and Moggridge). Our ordinary British spiders *devise* means for overcoming difficulties, and make repairs of their webs, temporary or permanent (Watson). They must appreciate losses before making them good, they must estimate weakness before they strengthen weak threads. They have a knowledge of mechanical strain; they vary the structure of their web with its position (Houzeau). They even test the strength or security of their webs (Percy Anecdotes). They are liable to be *deceived* and to commit *errors*, but they discover and rectify their mistakes.

"The use of counter-poise is seen occasionally in spiders, for instance when they suspend from one angle of a web a small fragment of stone to keep it on the proper stretch. Thus a correspondent of 'Nature' describes one as having suspended to his web a fragment of gravel as a movable weight, to counteract the effect of gusts of wind" (vol. cit.).

The rose-leaf-cutter bee fixes pieces of rose-leaf to her cell solely by calculating upon the *natural spring* of the leaf, and so adjusts the pieces that the middle one always overlies a join in the other (Wilton). The Chimpanzee constructs a dwelling or huts (Chaillu). The gorilla also builds huts (Cassell). Some monkeys make a new house every day (Cameron). The anthropomorphous apes build for themselves platforms (Darwin).

Many animals possess a wonderfully correct

knowledge of time and its flight, and act upon it. Domestic animals have regular hours for going to bed, getting up, and going for water. Many birds, cats, dogs, and other animals know man's meal hours. Various tame and some wild animals come to be at the meal hours of a family and make no mistake as to these hours. Dr. Carpenter tells us of certain sparrows that knew when it was twelve o'clock, they coming at that time on week days to eat the crumbs that were dropped in the play-ground of a school near Bristol. Also of a swan which came and tapped with its beak at the door of a cottage at which it received a supply of food at a certain hour every afternoon.

A certain Newfoundland dog visited a baker every morning save Sunday as the clock struck eight (Macaulay). A cat belonging to a London barrister came to meet him *regularly* at a certain hour, on a certain road, on his way home from office (Lindsay). An English setter belonging to a Mr. A. in Dedham, Mass., always goes to a certain window when the whistle of the one o'clock train sounds, and watches for his master. Although there are a number of trains coming and going through the day he never makes a mistake.

Certain of the lower animals possess a power of counting or calculating numbers. Thus in Scotland, the shepherd's dog must estimate exactly the number of sheep under his charge. One is mentioned, for instance, that, "during the process of sheep-washing, brought to the washing troughs,

and without instruction, a series of detachments of ten sheep at a time, running off for a fresh detachment whenever he saw three only left in the pen" (Land and Water). "In North Wales a shepherd will order one of his dogs to fetch three sheep out of a flock on a hill some distance away, and the dog will faithfully drive the required number to its master — a circumstance, it is added, 'commonplace enough to sheep-breeders.' The collie, sent to collect a flock or flocks from many square miles of hill pasture, must know their number when he brings all together without a single omission" (Percy Anecdotes).

James Hogg, the Ettrick Shepherd, the associate of Walter Scott and Christopher North, gives the following account of one of the exploits of his favorite dog Sirrah. About seven hundred lambs which were at once under his care at weaning-time, broke up at midnight and scampered off in three divisions across the hills in spite of all that the shepherd and an assistant lad could do to keep them together. "Sirrah," cried the shepherd in great affliction, "my man, they 're a' awa." The dog without delay set off in quest of the recreant flock and when morning dawned was discovered in a deep ravine keeping guard over the seven hundred lambs that he had collected and driven into the ravine (*Mental Physiology*, p. 103).

"A certain Newfoundland dog when offered a coin, 'if not at the moment hungry' would 'hide it under his mat,' thus gradually accumulating a

fund of coppers, 'from which he abstracted a penny or halfpenny at a time, according to the state of his appetite. He knew perfectly well the difference between the coins and their relative value, and that he was entitled to receive two biscuits for the larger sum and only one for the halfpenny.' Sometimes he bought only a single biscuit . . . and wished for the change out of his penny. Now and then he took a fancy for a French roll by way of variety. . . . If you gave him a sixpence he would receive the change and then allow you to take it out of his mouth satisfied with the two biscuits" (Macaulay).

Dr. Hayes, in his work on the Polar Sea, repeatedly remarked that his dogs, instead of continuing to draw the sledges in a compact body, diverged and separated when they came to thin ice so that their weight might be more evenly distributed. This was often the first warning and notice which the travellers had that the ice was becoming thin and dangerous.

Dogs calculate and make allowance for the rapidity and *strength* of *currents* of rivers and tides. A miller's dog in order to save a drowning small dog ran by the side of a certain river till it "got well below the drowning dog" then it sprang into the river and swam across: and so exactly had he calculated the rapidity of the river, and his own speed, that he intercepted the little dog and brought it safely to land (Wood).

Animals patiently submit to, and often seek,

medical treatment. Dr. Lindsay gives the following: A "bull-dog that had seen a broken arm of its master's repeatedly dressed by a surgeon, brought to the doctor's surgery a companion dog with a broken front leg, obviously introducing it as a patient. He gained admission by pawing or scratching at the door, and when the door was opened, the wounded dog held up its broken fore leg to show what was wanted. A second canine patient presented itself at the door of the same surgery — in this case a single dog standing on three legs, the fourth limb having a pin sticking painfully in it. Here admission was gained by yelping, and the foreign body was extracted" (vol. cit. II. p. 373).

Many remarkable stories have been related of way-finding by animals. Dogs and cats have been carried in covered baskets and covered carts to strange places many miles distant and there escaping have returned directly to their homes. Sheep parted from their flocks on their journey to Smithfield market have found their way back to their Welsh Hills. "At Falmouth [Eng.]," says Serjeant Cox, "the crabs caught at the Lizard, some twelve miles distant, are taken to the harbor, branded with the mark of the fisherman and placed in a box alive to await sail. A box was broken and the crabs escaped. Three days afterwards many of them were again captured at the Lizard, to reach which they must have found their way to the mouth of the harbor, and having arrived there,

learned by some strange perceptive power in what direction their homes lay, for it was far out of any possible range of vision and they had been carried to their prison in boats" (vol. cit. pp. 273, 274).

"Many animals," says Dr. Lindsay, "show a singular *prescience* of certain classes of coming events. Thus certain birds and other animals appear to know when a given district or country is becoming infected with *epidemic diseases*, in which case they leave or avoid the infected district or country till the epidemic has disappeared. This has been especially noticed prior to outbreaks of such diseases as *cholera* in man." "It is stated that a few days previous to the terrible ravages of cholera in Galicia in 1872 all the sparrows suddenly quitted the city of Przemysl, and not a single bird returned until the end of November when the disease had entirely disappeared. The same circumstance was remarked in Munich and Nüremberg. During the attack of cholera at St. Petersburg and Riga in 1848, in Western Prussia in 1849, and in Hanover in 1850, every swallow and sparrow forsook the towns and remained absent until the eradication of the scourge" (vol. cit.).

"Rengger," says Mr. Darwin, "states that when he first gave eggs to his monkeys, they smashed them and thus lost much of their contents; afterwards they gently hit one end against some hard substance, and picked off the bits of shell with their fingers. Lumps of sugar were often given

them wrapped in paper, the package sometimes containing a live wasp, so that in hastily unfolding it they got stung. After this had once happened, they always first held the package to their ears to detect any movement within." "In the Zoological Gardens a monkey which had weak teeth used to break open nuts with a stone."

"A crane in the Zoological Gardens, London, being annoyed while feeding, by a pertinacious sparrow, at length pretended indifference; but when the tormentor came within range in order to steal a share of the crane's food, the latter stuck its beak into the sparrow, intending to kill it. Failing in this, however, and then deliberating how to dispose of its victim, the crane thrust it under water in a tank, and it was saved from drowning only by one of the keepers" (*Animal World*).

That animals understand spoken language even when not addressed to them is evident from the following instance that occurred in Dedham. Mr. A. when about to remove from the stove a kettleful of food that had been cooked for his dogs, said to his wife, "I wonder where the holder is." An English setter that was in the room immediately went out and presently returned bringing the missing holder in his mouth, having found it in the doghouse where it had been left the previous day when food was carried to the dogs. The same dog afterwards had a master who had a long and severe illness. The dog was his constant companion until he was able to sit up for the first

time, when, to his surprise, the dog immediately left the room. He soon returned bringing his master's boots in his mouth.

A certain cat, often seen by the writer, evinced no preference for either of her two kittens until it was said one day that one of the kittens must be drowned. The cat was in the room at the time, but went out and took one of the kittens in her mouth, carried it to another part of the house and hid it. The kitten was found and returned to the box where the other kitten was, but was immediately carried away again by the mother who hid it a second time.

Dr. Büchner remarks: "It is often said that *language* is so characteristic a mark of distinction, as to leave no doubt about the deep chasm existing between man and the brute. Such objectors are certainly ignorant of the fact that brutes can also speak. Numbers of instances can be adduced, proving that animals possess the power of mutual communication even on concrete subjects. Dujardin placed a saucer with sugar in the niche of a wall at a considerable distance from a beehive. A single bee happening to discover this treasure, was seen repeatedly to fly about the margins of the niche, and to touch them with the head, in order to remember the locality. It then flew away, and returned shortly after accompanied by a number of friends, who quickly consumed the sugar. Had not these animals spoken to each other? Birds especially, as is proved by many

instances, freely communicate with each other, make appointments, etc. M. Fravière quotes some of the most remarkable and well authenticated facts in relation to the power of inter-communication possessed by bees. The mode in which the chamois place their watches, and inform each other of an approaching danger, equally proves this power of communication. And can instinct have imbued them with this foresight, inasmuch as the chamois are certainly older than the chamois hunter? Many animals which live in communities choose a leader, and place themselves voluntarily under his guidance. Can this be effected without mutual communication? But man, because of his not understanding the language of animals, deems it easier to deny it altogether. Parkyns, an Englishman who in his travels through Abyssinia had opportunities of observing the conduct of monkey-tribes, remarks that 'they possessed a language as intelligible to them as our own is to us.' 'The apes,' observes Parkyns, 'have leaders, whom they obey better than men usually do theirs, and a regular system of depredation. When a tribe leaves the rocky clefts which it inhabits, and descends into the plain, in order to rob a cornfield, it is accompanied by all its members, old and young, male and female. The elders of the tribe, which are easily recognized by their hirsute appearance, are chosen as outposts. They carefully in descending examine every gulf, and climb up all the eminences to obtain a good view. Sentinels

are also placed on the flanks and in the rear; indeed, their watchfulness is remarkable. From time to time they call and reply to each other, to announce whether any danger threatens, or whether all's right. Their cries are so sharply accentuated, so various, so distinct, that they may in time be understood. At the least cry of alarm the whole tribe halts at once, and hearkens until a second cry, differently intoned, bids them again to march."

"An observer relates that he had recently assisted at a remarkable consultation of swallows. A couple had, in the spring, commenced building a nest under the roof of a house. One day a number of other swallows appeared on the roof, when there arose between them and the builders of the nest, a lengthened conversation, manifested by their loud cries and twittering. The consultation having lasted for some time, during which the nest was examined by some individual swallows, the meeting broke up. The result was that the nest was abandoned, and a better location under the same roof selected" (vol. cit. pp. 232–234).

The maternal instinct is exhibited by animals in the most trifling details. Rengger observed an American monkey driving away the flies that plagued her infant, and Duvaucel saw a Hylobates washing the face of her young ones in a stream. "So intense is the grief of female monkeys for the loss of their young, that it invariably caused

the death of certain kinds kept under confinement by Brehm in N. Africa (Darwin).

"Orphan-monkeys," says Mr. Darwin, "were always adopted and carefully guarded by the other monkeys, both males and females. One female baboon had so capacious a heart that she not only adopted young monkeys of other species, but stole young dogs and cats which she continually carried about. Her kindness, however, did not go so far as to share her food with her adopted offspring, at which Brehm was surprised, as his monkeys always divided everything quite fairly with their own young ones. An adopted kitten scratched the above mentioned affectionate baboon, who certainly had a fine intellect, for she was much astonished at being scratched, and immediately examined the kitten's feet, and without more ado bit off the claws."

"A certain species of hermit crab shows 'care and affection' for the cloak anemone which is attached to his shell home. 'He has been noticed to feed the anemone with his pincerlike claws.' And when he casts his shell for a larger one, 'he carefully detaches the helpless anemone from the old habitation, and assists it in gaining a firm basis and support on the new shell'" (Darwin).

"Capt. Stansbury found on a salt lake in Utah an old and completely blind pelican, which was very fat and must have been long and well fed by his companions. Mr. Blyth, saw Indian crows feeding two or three of their companions which were

blind; and I have heard of an analogous case with the domestic cock (Darwin).

"Rats," says Dr. Lindsay, "show a 'thoughtful tenderness for each other that may well put Christians to the blush.' . . . A young rat had fallen into a pail of pig-food. Six elder ones held a consultation so earnest in its character as to lead them to ignore the presence of human onlookers. They decided on an ingenious scheme of rescue, and successfully carried it out. Entwining their legs together they formed a chain hanging downwards over the edge of the pail. The foremost or downmost rat grasped the drowning — and, as it subsequently proved, drowned — young one in its fore paws, and both rescued and rescuer were then drawn up and out. When found to be dead the rescuers gazed at their young comrade in 'mute despair,' . . . wiped the tears from their eyes with their fore paws, and departed without making any attempt to resuscitate it."

The *Animal World* gives an account of certain sparrows that tried to lift a wounded companion by seizing its wings with their bills, and, having failed to lift the bird in this manner, "got a twig and while the maimed bird took hold of its centre by its bill, two of its companions seized, one on each of the ends, so raised the helpless sparrow from the ground, and removed it to a safer place."

Mrs. T——, the wife of an American army officer, while residing at a fort on the New England coast, one day saw an old, gray, blind rat led out

into the sunshine by two young rats who had placed a stick in the mouth of the old rat, each of the young ones having an end of the stick in its mouth. This was repeated day after day at precisely the same time of the day.

"Mr. Lonsdale," says Mr. Darwin, "informs me that he placed a pair of land-snails (*Helix Pomatia*), one of which was weakly, into a small and ill-provided garden. After a short time the strong and hearty individual disappeared and was traced by its track of slime over a wall into an adjoining well-stocked garden. Mr. Lonsdale concluded it had deserted its sickly mate; but after an absence of twenty-four hours it returned, and apparently communicated the result of its successful exploration, for both then started along the same track and disappeared over the wall" (vol. cit. I. p. 325).

The affection that animals exhibit for those who have the care of them is too well known to be commented upon. Dr. Lindsay speaks of the love of a dog for his master as transcending the love of man for his fellow-man, or towards God. "It is love," he says, "that does not change as and because its idol changes, that submits unmurmuringly to all offences . . . a kind of love in short, not usually ascribed to or possessed by man." Robert Burns has said that man is the god of the dog, his deity, idol, or hero.

In order to comprehend that the intellectual scale from brute to man is not interrupted, we must descend to the lower spheres of human society.

Dr. Lindsay remarks: "Those who contend for man's supremacy over all other animals . . . describe him as the only animal that constructs for himself, in the form of dwellings of some kind, a permanent and proper *shelter* from the vicissitudes of the weather. . . . There are, or have been, many savage races who either constructed or construct no dwellings of any kind, or whose huts or hovels cannot compare architecturally with the nests or other habitations of many of the lower animals. Certain pre-historic people, some ancient savage races, such as the Caribs, and also some existing savages, made or make use of the natural shelter afforded by rocks, caves, forests or trees," some digging holes in the earth. The South African Bushmen live in holes in the earth dug out with their hands (Büchner) and thatched with reeds so badly put together that the rain pours through. Here they lie close like pigs in a sty (Sicheser). The huts of many Central African savages resemble externally the ant-hills of Termites (Adanson). There are no dwellings, or no fixed ones, among the Dokas. The natives of the Philippine Islands and Borneo sleep under trees, or on trees, or in caves. The Apache Indians sleep in hollows of the ground (Büchner). The Veddas of Ceylon live in forests without dwellings, or they shelter themselves in caves or hollow tree-trunks, or "roost on trees" (Hartshorn). The Buckonos "roost" in trees on a platform of sticks (Lindsay). These dwellings are nests rather than huts,

though covered with a cone-shaped roof, also of sticks thatched with grass (Lady Verner). The wild people — the jungle dwarfs — of the Western Ghâts in the Tinnivelly district of India have no fixed dwellings or dwelling-places. They sleep in any convenient spot, generally between two rocks, or in caves near which they happen to be benighted (Bond). "These wild folk of the hill jungles of the Madras Presidency are in reality modern troglodytes or cave-dwellers, the representatives of those prehistoric men whose remains possess so much interest for anthropologists" (Lindsay).

"Not only do the wild people have no proper dwelling, but there is incapacity for constructing artificial shelter" (Lindsay).

We are told that "among the many epithets that have been bestowed on man to distinguish him from all other animals, he has been described as pre-eminently a *cooking* animal — the only animal who cooks or prepares his food prior to using it" (Lindsay). "There are many savage races of men who use flesh and fruits in their *raw* state, sometimes, even in a condition of disgusting putridity. Not only so, but they devour living animals, or flesh cut from living animals. Moreover, they tear flesh food with their teeth after the manner of Carnivora" (Lindsay). Until the arrival of the Europeans the Australians knew nothing about cooking or boiling food (Büchner). Carrion-eating is common among the Zulus (Colenso). The Bushmen of South Africa live partly upon small birds which

they swallow unplucked. Lizards are eaten raw by the Digger Indians, and they also eat dead horses. Part of the food of the Apache Indians consists of stolen horses and asses. The beasts are not slaughtered, but torn asunder. There is no cooking of any kind among the Dokas and Mincopies, the food being eaten raw (Büchner). The Hamram Arab in Abyssinia, cuts and eats steaks from live oxen (Lindsay). The Veddas of Ceylon, live on wild honey, lizards, and the flesh of monkeys, deer, and boars (Hartshorn). *Wild men* and the *wolf children* of India tear and eat raw flesh, gather and gnaw bones like dogs, catch and swallow flies, bite the heads off live fowls, lap water with their tongues (Lindsay). Gerhardt says they still pick up bones and sharpen their teeth on them. According to Colonel Sleeman a wolf-child found in company with a wolf and her cubs, delighted in raw flesh and bones putting them out on the ground under his paws like a dog.

The Caribs eat their parents or other relatives and even their own children (Büchner). Other savage tribes are earth-eaters.

The Ladrone Islanders were formerly ignorant of the use of fire for cooking or warmth (Büchner). Savages of Aveyron go on all fours. Among the Nincopies there are either no tools or scarcely any idea of using them, while the Dokas have no weapons (Büchner). The Veddas of Ceylon show a habitual disregard of any sort of

ablutions. They never laugh and are unable to distinguish colors (Hartshorn). The wild men in the interior of Borneo live absolutely in a state of nature. They never cultivate the ground nor live in huts and do not associate with each other but rove about like wild beasts (Dalton). The aborigines of Borneo, in common with the Australian blacks, on account of their unbounded *stupidity* cannot be used as slaves (Büchner). The faculty of memory among the Veddas is almost wholly absent (Hartshorn). The Apache Indians have no notion of their own age, or of counting up years (Büchner). The Dokas have no social or other laws (Büchner). The Mincopies have no specific or proper spoken language (Smith). Some have no policy nor plans of action, no history and scarcely any oral tradition, no idea of time, no territorial, tribal, or other property, no traffic nor commerce, absence of agriculture, sometimes even no hunting of wild animals for food, also absence of money or coinage (Lindsay).

The Veddas of Ceylon are quite unable to count. . . . They cannot count even by the aid of their fingers, having no conception of numbers (Hartshorn). Among the Amazon Indians there are no words for numbers and there is a similar want of arithmetical power. The most limited ideas of numbers prevail among the Eskimo and Australian blacks (Houzeau). Even at the present day many savage tribes of Brazil and Australia cannot count beyond two or four. The aborigines

of New Caledonia "can with difficulty count the lowest numbers." So that counting, arithmetic, or an arithmetical sense, are certainly not innate in man (Büchner).

Such a thing as gratitude is quite unknown in the West African negro (Monteiro). To a New Zealander gratitude was wholly unknown. They have no word for it in their language (Colenso). Among the Fijis gratitude is unknown (Büchner). The Angola negro has no words or expression 'indicative of love;' nor does he show such emotion himself (Monteiro). Among the African Satookas there is no such thing as love. Women are so far appreciated as they are valuable animals (Baker).

Among the Dokas mothers suckle their infants but a short time and then abandon them. There is no home-life, no attachment to kindred (Büchner). In East African negroes there is no attachment between father and child, but on the contrary there prevails, after the time of childhood, a natural enmity between father and son. The children are sold; the wife driven out of doors at pleasure (Burton). Among the Spanish negroes there is no family or personal love. Of certain South African negroes it is seldom that one cares for another . . . even for their sick and dying they have no concern (Dr. Rainey). The Fijians have not the least scruple in burying a father alive when he begins to be infirm, and assist in strangling a mother, so that she may keep him company. . . . It is the glory of a North Ameri-

can Indian boy at as early an age as possible to despise his mother and defy his father, while the young women utterly despise the elder and feebler women, even though they be their own mothers. Girls 'will tear out of the hands' of elder women, including their own mothers, the food which they are about to eat, on the plea that old women are no use, and that the food will be much better employed nourishing the young and the strong (Wood). Among the Bushmen and Australian blacks the father is just as likely as not to murder his child as soon as it is born — perhaps more likely than not. And if he be angry with any one for any reason, he has a way of relieving his feelings by driving his spear through his wife or child, whichever happens to be nearest. Even the mother treats her child rather worse than the cow treats her calf (Wood).

The old navigator, Byron, described a barbarian who dashed his child on the rocks for spilling a basket of sea-urchins (Darwin). A barbarian chief gave one of his many children to a sea-captain of Falmouth, Mass., and told the captain to kill the boy if he was not good.

The Indians of Terra del Fuego will sooner kill their old women than their dogs[1] (Büchner). The South African Bushmen will kill their chil-

[1] Mr. Darwin says of the Indians of Terra del Fuego: "It is certainly true that when pressed in winter by hunger, they kill and devour their old women before they kill their dogs. The boy being asked why they did this answered, 'Doggies catch otters, old women no'" — *Journal of Researches.*

dren without remorse, strangling or smothering them when feed is scarce (Büchner). Putting to death the aged to save trouble is common (Büchner). In New Caledonia the aged are buried alive (Büchner). They have no respect for the dead, no proper burial rites (Lindsay).

"The Digger Indians have a face 'devoid of all expression' while in the Brazilian Botokudo eyes 'without lustre or soul' look staring dull and without intelligence" (Büchner). Mentally the Australian aborigines are mere children, finding amusement only in childish tricks and trifles. They cannot be taught any principles (Büchner). The East African Negro combines all the incapacity of childhood with the obstinacy and stupidity of age (Burton). The Brazilian aborigines are animals in their actions, wholly destitute of any intellectual tendencies (Burmeister). In the wildernesses of Borneo and Sumatra, and Polynesian islands, there are hordes of savages whose resemblance to the baboon is striking, and whose physical and mental superiority above the brute is scarcely perceptible. They possess little memory, and still less imagination. They appear incapable of reflecting on the past, or to provide for the future; nothing but hunger disturbs their apathy. No other mental capacity can be discovered in them, but the low brutish cunning ascribed to apes (Hope).

Among the Ape-like tree-men of the Malay Peninsula not even the rudiments of morality

seemed to exist (Bradley). The nations of the White Nile district are inaccessible to all moral feeling, while the Bari has not a moral human instinct (Baker). With the Brazilian Basokudo immorality is normal (Büchner). The Negroes of East Sudan not merely justify deceit, theft, and murder, but consider them meritorious acts (Brehm). The Somalis consider a well-executed theft the most agreeable way of obtaining a livelihood (Captain Speke). "Among the Fijis, shedding blood is no crime, but a glorious action, whether the victim, man, woman or child, be slain in battle or treacherously murdered. To be acknowledged a murderer is the ambition of these islanders. Children kill their parents and the parents their children without the least scruple" (Büchner).

The Negro of Eastern Tropical Africa "have or know no conscience (Burton). Werner Munzinger says of the Bogos, that their ideas of *good* and *bad* relate only to useful and useless. Waitz says, that a man interrogated about his notions respecting the difference between good and evil, first avowed his ignorance, but after some reflection said, "Good is to carry off the wives of others, but bad when others steal our wives." Captain Burton says it is time to face the fact that *conscience* is a purely geographical and chronological fact.

Australians have no words to express the ideas of God, religion, righteousness, sin; and there are numerous examples of savage nations . . . who

have no words in their language to express such ideas (Büchner). The Andaman Islanders have no conception of a Supreme Being (Dr. Mivart). The blacks of Night Island, according to the French castaway, Narcisse Pellier, have no knowledge of a Supreme Being and no form of religion of any kind whatever. The Kaloshes, an Indian tribe, have no religious mode of worship, and imagine the Supreme Being to be a raven (Büchner). The Corrados, the former masters of the province of Rio de Janeiro, possess no desire for a religion (Burmeister). The South American aborigines have no conception of a religion (Büchner). The natives of Australia are deficient in the idea of a creator or moral governor of the world, and all attempts to instruct them terminate in a sudden break up of the conversation (Hasskarl). The Bechuanas, one of the most intelligent tribes of the interior of South Africa, have no idea of a Supreme Being, and there is no word to be found in their language for the conception of a creator (Anderson). The Kaffirs, a race physically and intellectually much developed, have not the least idea of a Supreme Being—their chief is their God (Opperman). The Indians of King's Mill Islands "have no real religion, nor temples nor idols. They adore spirits; but since they have been decimated by an epidemic, they no longer put any confidence in them" (Randall). The inhabitants of Pasamah Labar, in the isle of Sumatra, worship neither idols nor any natural objects, and have no

idea of a Supreme Being (Büchner). "Ladislaus Magyar found no trace of religion among the Negroes of Oucanyama, one of the numerous stations of South Africa; it seems as if they worshipped their king, by sacrificing to him both human beings and animals" (Büchner). "The indolent Hottentots acknowledge a good and a bad divine principle, but have neither temple nor proper mode of worship, except dancing at the time of the full moon. The dwarfed Bushmen, a degenerate tribe of the former race, possess no worship whatever" (Büchner).

Sir John Lubbock says that we have much difficulty in realizing the extreme mental inferiority of the lower savages.

CHAPTER V.

THE ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE IMMORTAL SOUL.

If the Bible and Science do not give evidence of an immaterial immortal soul or spirit, the question arises as to the origin and wide-spread prevalence of such a belief.

The interesting and elaborate inquiries prosecuted by Sir John Lubbock, Edward Burnett Tylor, and Mr. M'Lennan, with regard to the mental condition and modes of thinking of the lower races, have contributed the first chapter of the doctrine of the soul, bringing the development of religious ideas down to the point where Greek philosophy took its start.

Mr. Tylor observes: "What the doctrine of the soul is among the lower races, may be explained by a theory of its development. It seems as though thinking men, as yet at a low level of culture, were deeply impressed by two groups of biological problems. In the first place, what is it that makes the difference between a living soul and a dead one; what causes waking, sleep, trance, disease, death? In the second place, what are those

human shapes which appear in dreams and visions? Looking at the two groups of phenomena, the ancient savage philosophers practically made each help to account for the other, by combining both in a conception which we may call an apparitional-soul, a ghost-soul. The conception of a personal soul or spirit among the lower races may be defined as follows: It is a thin unsubstantial human image, in its nature a sort of film or shadow; the cause of life and thought in the individual it animates; independently possessing the personal consciousness and volition of its corporeal owner, past or present; capable of leaving the body far behind to flash quickly from place to place; mostly impalpable and invisible, yet also manifesting physical power, and especially appearing to men waking or asleep as a phantom separate from the body[1] of which it bears the likeness; also to enter into, possess, and act in the bodies of other men, of animals and even of things. Though this definition is by no means of universal application, it has sufficient generality to be taken as a standard, modified by more or less divergence among any particular people."

[1] Sir John Lubbock, in speaking of dreams, says: "To the savage they have a reality which we can scarcely appreciate. During sleep the spirit seems to desert the body; and as in dreams we visit other localities and even other worlds, living as it were a separate and different life, the two phenomena are not unnaturally regarded as the complements of one another. Hence the savage considers the events in his dreams to be as real as those of his waking hours, and hence he naturally feels that he has a spirit that can quit the body"—*Origin of Civilization*, p. 126, N. Y. 1870.

"Far," says Mr. Tylor, "from these world-wide opinions being arbitrary or conventional products, it is seldom even justifiable to consider their uniformity among distant races as proving communication of any sort. They are doctrines answering in the most forcible way to the plain evidence of men's senses, as interpreted by a fairly consistent and rational primitive philosophy. So well, indeed, does the theory account for the facts, that it has held its place into the higher levels of education. Though classic and mediæval philosophy modified it much, and modern philosophy has handled it yet more unsparingly, it has so far retained the traces of its original character, that heirlooms of primitive ages may be claimed in the existing psychology of the civilized world. Out of the vast mass of evidence, collected among the most various and distant races of mankind, typical details may be selected to display the earlier theory of the soul, the relation of the parts of this theory, and the manner in which these parts have been abandoned, modified, or kept up along the course of culture."

In regard to the belief that animals possessed souls, Mr. Tylor says: "The sense of an absolute physical distinction between man and beast, so prevalent in the civilized world, is hardly to be found among the lower races. Men to whom the cries of beasts and birds seem like human language, and their actions guided as it were by thought, logically enough allow the existence of souls to beasts,

birds, reptiles, as to men. The lower psychology cannot but recognize in beasts the very characteristics which it attributes to the human soul, namely the phenomena of life and death, will and judgment, and the phantom seen in vision or in dream. As for believers in the great doctrine of metempsychosis, these not only consider that an animal may have a soul, but that this soul may have inhabited a human being, and thus the creature may be in fact their own ancestor or once familiar friend."

In regard to the belief that plants have souls, Mr. Tylor says: "Plants partaking with animals the phenomena of life and death, health and sickness, not unnaturally have some kind of soul ascribed to them. In fact, the notion of a vegetable soul, common to plants and to the higher organisms possessing an animal soul in addition, was familiar to mediæval philosophy, and is not yet forgotten by naturalists."

As souls were supposed to be the shadows and animated images of the body, inanimate objects, such as stones, weapons, household utensils, and, in fact, all objects, natural or artificial, were supposed to possess souls. To confirm this doctrine it is said that "the Fiji people can show you a sort of natural well, or deep hole in the ground, at one of their islands, across the bottom of which runs a stream of water, in which you may clearly perceive the souls of men and women, beasts and plants, of stocks and stones, canoes and houses,

and of all the broken utensils of the frail world, swimming, or rather tumbling along one over the other pell mell into the region of immortality."

"It appears to have been," Mr. Tylor says, "within systematic schools of civilized philosophy that the transcendental definitions of the immaterial soul were obtained, by abstracting from the primitive conception of the ethereal-material soul, so as to reduce it from a physical to a metaphysical entity. . . . As to the whole nature and action of apparitional souls, the lower philosophy escapes various difficulties which down to modern times have perplexed metaphysicians and theologians of the civilized world" (*Primitive Culture*, vol. I. pp. 387–437, L. 1871).

The only theory of soul and body existing in the lower stages of culture appears to have been a *double* materialism. "This," says Prof. Bain, "was within their grasp. An immaterial soul was entirely beyond their intellectual comprehension. Until Greek philosophy taught the world how to use and abuse abstract notions, Immaterialism was not an attainable phase of thought" (*Mind and Body*, p. 143).

A belief in the materiality of the soul was very generally held during the early centuries of the Christian era, as it was held essential to the Christian doctrine of rewards and punishments that mind should be a corporeal substance, as matter only could be susceptible to physical pain and pleasure.

Of Plato's theory Prof. Bain remarks: "It starts from his doctrine of eternal, self-existent Ideas or Forms which were anterior to what we call the universe, or the Kosmos. To the formation of the Kosmos, there concurred two factors, — the Ideas and a co-eternal Chaos, or intermediate matter in discordant and irregular motion. A Divine Architect, or Demiurgus, on contemplating the Ideas, made the world in conformity therewith, so far as the things of sense could be made to correspond with the eternal types. The Architect had to contend with a pre-existing power, called Necessity, represented by the irregular motions of the primitive chaos; only up to a certain point could he control this Necessity, and make it give place to regularity. With such a difficulty to struggle against, the Demiurgus proceeds to construct or fabricate the Kosmos. In its totality this is a vast and comprehensive animated being; the model for it is the Idea of Animal — the Self-Animal. . . . As created, the Kosmos is a scheme of rotary spheres, and has both a Soul and a Body. The Soul, rooted at the centre, and pervading the whole, is *self-moving* and the cause of movement in the Kosmical Body. The Kosmos, in its peripheral or celestial regions, contains the gods; in its central or lower regions of air, water, and earth, are placed men, quadrupeds, birds and fishes. From the Divine part of the Kosmos there was a gradual degeneracy in the creation of men and animals. The human cranium was a little Kosmos,

containing a rational and immortal soul,[1] of adulterated materials; while in the body there are two inferior and mortal souls: the higher of the two situated in the chest, and manifesting Energy, courage, anger, &c.; the lower placed in the abdomen, and displaying appetite. The two lower souls are the disturbers of the higher rational soul, confusing its rotations, and perverting their harmonious properties. Yet notwithstanding its superior dignity, the soul is never detached from the body; it has the corporeal properties of extension and movement; and it is the moving power of the whole system" (*Mind and Body*, pp. 146–148).

Plato's theory of the soul, which was the foundation of the modern doctrine of the immortal immaterial soul, was borrowed from the Pagans of the East.[2] "It is," says Dr. Priestley, "in fact the Oriental system itself, with very little variation; no greater probably than might have been found in the East at the time he visited it." "The au-

[1] "When the dogma concerning the immortality of the soul spread from the school of Plato through Greece, it caused the greatest confusion, and induced a number of individuals dissatisfied with their lot, to commit suicide" — *Système de la Nature*, vol. I. p. 280, note 78.

[2] "All the Pagans of the East," says Loubiere, "do truly believe, that there remains something of a man after his death, which subsists independently and separately from his body" — Quoted by Mr. Locke in *Essays*, vol. II. p. 162.

"Socrates calls the soul's immortality an 'old doctrine, long ago shadowed forth by the founders of the mysteries,' and appeals to antiquity in support of his own views of the spiritual, undying nature of the soul, against the scepticism of his age" — *Human Destiny*, p. 108, N.Y. 1862, Hudson.

thority of Herodotus, the oldest Greek historian, and who himself travelled into Egypt, is very express to this purpose. He says (ed. Steph. p. 137), 'the Egyptians were the first who maintained that the soul of man is immortal, that when the body dies it enters into that of some other animal and when it has transmigrated through all terrestrial, marine, and flying animals, it returns to the body of man again. This revolution is completed in three thousand years.' He adds that several Greeks, whose names he would not mention, had published that doctrine as their own.

"That the doctrine of the immortality of the soul was not of Grecian origin,"[1] Dr. Priestley says, "may be concluded even without historical evidence (of which however there is abundance) from the circumstances of the thing; it being always accompanied with other opinions which were certainly of Oriental extraction. All the Philosophers who believed in the immortality of the soul believed in its pre-existence, thinking it impossible that the soul should subsist after the body if it had not existed before it" (*Disquisitions*, pp. 208, 319, 321).

[1] "It is expressly asserted by Aristotle and others," says Mr. Toland, "that the most ancient Greek philosophers did not dream of any principle, or *actuating* spirit in the universe itself, no more than in any of the parts thereof; but explained all the phenomena of nature by matter and local motion, levity and gravity, or the like; and rejected all that the poets said of God, demons, souls, ghosts, heaven, hell, visions, prophecies, and miracles, &c., as fables invented at pleasure, and fictions to divert their readers"—*Letters to Serena*, p. 22.

"Aristotle," [1] says Warburton, "thought of the soul like the rest, as we learn from a passage quoted by Cudworth, where, having spoken of the *sensitive soul*, and declared it to be mortal, he goes on in this manner. It remains that mind, or intellect (pre-existing), enter from without, and be only divine. But then he distinguishes again concerning this mind or intellect, and makes it twofold, *agent* and *patient*, the former of which he concluded to be immortal, and the latter corruptible" (*Divine Legation*, vol. II. p. 211).

In commenting upon Aristotle's theory of the separate, immaterial, immortal soul, Prof. Bain says: "The climax is now reached; logical consistency is abandoned; and there is gained a transcendental starting-point for the Immaterialism of after ages" (vol. cit. p. 157).

In this connection Dr. Priestley remarks: "That the leaven of this Oriental philosophy was mixed with Christianity at a very early period, even in the lives of the apostles, all antiquity and even their own writings sufficiently testify; and it is far from being purged out even at this day." [2]

[1] "Newton's discovery of the true law of gravitation destroyed the philosophy of Aristotle which had dominated over two thousand years" — Dr. Robert H. Collyer.

[2] Mr. Fearon remarks: "The history of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is a history of the weakness and ignorance of man." "Originating in periods of mental darkness and suited to the quackery of the Schools, to the cravings and the ignorance of man, and to the selfish interest of the Philosophers as well as the Priests, — it became, and still continues to be, formidable from authority and powerfully operative from

"On the first view of things, we are apt to wonder at the propensity of the primitive Christians, to adopt a system so utterly repugnant to their own. But it is not more extraordinary than the propensity of the Israelites to idolatry; and both were deceived by very specious reasons which could not but appear specious *in their circumstances*.

"The Oriental system, besides other flattering allurements, was wonderfully calculated to remove the two great objections that were in those times made to Christianity, and at which the minds of men most revolted, viz. the doctrine of a *crucified man* for the founder of their religion, and of a *resurrection from the dead*. The former, we learn from the apostle Paul, was a great stumbling block both to Jews and Gentiles; and at the latter, all the wise men of Greece absolutely laughed as a thing utterly incredible.

"How ready, then, must those who were dazzled with the *wisdom of this world*, more than with the *true*, but *hidden wisdom of God*, have been to catch at the splendid doctrine of the *emanation of souls from the divine mind*, which was already received in the Gentile world, and to take that opportunity of advancing their Master, the too *humble Jesus*, to the high rank of the first and principal emanation of the Deity.

age. But the history of our species forces the conclusion, that all speculations upon man's condition and future hopes, when not derived from Revelation, have been wild, extravagant, and generally immoral, — giving a sanction to practices tending to debase our nature, and to sink man to a low degree of ignorance and consequently of depravity" — vol. cit. pp. 2, 3.

"More effectually to wipe away the *reproach of the cross*, and make their system more coherent, how natural was it to suppose, that this great Being did not really, but only *in appearance*, put on *flesh*, and, therefore, did not really suffer and die, but only seemed to do so.

"Also, when the philosophers of that age sneered at the doctrine of a *resurrection*, with what pride would these weak Christians pretend to equal wisdom and refinement with themselves, by alleging, that the true christian resurrection was not the resurrection of a *vile body of flesh and blood*, which could only be a burden to the soul, but either a mystical resurrection to a *new life*, or indicated the glorious time when the soul, being freed from all its impurities, would join its bright original, in a vehicle of light, a true spiritual body, and not that carnal one, which had been its punishment here.

"Lastly, the doctrine of the *impurity of matter* has in all ages led to such mortifications and austerities as, requiring great resolution and fortitude, have never failed to strike mankind with respect and reverence; giving an idea of an extraordinary degree of abstractedness from the world, and of greatness and elevation of soul."

"That the doctrine of matter being the source of all evil, accords very ill with the christian doctrine of the *resurrection of the dead*, cannot but be very evident to every person who reflects a moment on the subject. In fact, they are diametri-

cally opposite to one another. On the christian principles, our only hope is founded upon a resurrection; whereas, on the philosophical principles, *a re-union to the body* is a thing most of all to be dreaded.

The opposition of these principles was so manifest, that all the first Christians, who adopted the foreign philosophy, absolutely denied, or explained away, the doctrine of a resurrection; and though the authority of the apostles checked this extravagance, they were not able to prevent the mischief entirely; and even at this very day the advantage of the christian resurrection is, in general, rated very low; and in the eye of reason it must appear an encumbrance upon the philosophical scheme."

"Metaphysicians, who have conceived high notions of the dignity of *immaterial substance*, and who have entertained a great contempt for every thing *material*,[1] are much embarrassed when they consider the *use of the body*. The ancients, indeed, who imagined all souls to have pre-existed, and to have been sent into the bodies in which they are now confined as a *punishment* for offences committed in their pre-existent state, found no diffi-

[1] The complaint, says Dr. Priestley, "of the *evil tendency of matter* is a hackneyed topic of declamation among all the ancients. . . . The whole of this specious doctrine was evidently drawn from other sources than the system of Moses. He speaks of God himself as the maker of the terrestrial world, and of all things in it; and, perhaps with an intended opposition to the principles of the other system, if it existed in his time, he particularly says, *And God saw every thing that he had made, and behold it was very good*" (Gen. I. 31) — vol. cit. p. 390.

culty in this case. The body is necessarily a *clog*, and an *impediment* to the soul, and it was provided for that very purpose. But the moderns, who have dropped the notion of pre-existence, and of offences committed prior to birth, and yet retain from that system the entire doctrine of the *contagion of matter*, . . . must necessarily be exceedingly embarrassed, when they connect with this mutilated *heathenish system* the peculiar doctrines of Christianity" (vol. cit. pp. 326–329, 391, 65).

"Launching beyond the age of the apostles," continues Dr. Priestley, "we find ourselves in a wide sea of this *vain philosophy*, partly of Grecian, and partly of immediate Oriental extraction, which, however, as has been seen, was ultimately the same thing. The most distinguished of the Christian Fathers, as Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, &c., were deeply versed in this philosophy, and studiously covered the *offence of the cross*, by giving such an idea of the author of their religion, and the tenets of it, as was calculated to strike the philosophical part of the world.

"A principal source of the mixture of the Platonic philosophy with Christianity was from the famous school of Alexandria, as will appear from the following general account of it in the *Apology of Ben Mordecai* [Letter I. p. 105]. 'The school of Alexandria in Egypt, which was instituted by Ptolemy Philadelphus, renewed the old academy, or Platonic philosophy, and reformed it. — This school flourished most under Ammonius (the mas-

ter of Origen and Plotinus), who borrowed his choicest contemplations from the sacred scriptures, which he mixed with his Platonic philosophizings; and it is disputed by Eusebius and Porphyry whether he died a Pagan or a Christian. He had great advantages, being bred up in the same school with Philo Judæus. Besides this, there was in the town of Alexandria a famous church, settled by Mark the Evangelist, and the school was continued by Pantænus, Clemens Alexandrinus, &c., and after him successively by Origen, Heraclius, Dionysius, Arthenadore, Malchion, and Didymus, who reached the year 350, which doctors gave an admirable advance to the church. The town was for this reputed the universal school of the church, and the Platonic philosophy was in the highest authority among the Fathers. For it was the common vogue that it differed little from Moses; yea, Cœlius Rhodius thinks that Plato differs little from Christ's placits.

"Origen, scholar to Ammonius, though a professed Christian, followed his master's steps, mixing the Platonic philosophy and the doctrines of the gospel together; hoping thereby to gain credit to the christian religion; and, with Clemens Alexandrinus and others, made use of the Platonic and Pythagoric philosophy as a medium to illustrate the grand mysteries of faith, thereby to gain credit among those Platonic sophists. And F. Simon says, that the mixture of the Platonic philosophy with the christian religion, did not tend to the

destruction of the orthodox faith, but more easily to persuade the Greeks to embrace Christianity. . . . 'In those days,' says Beaufobre, 'it was allowed that, with the fundamental doctrine of Christianity, any person was at liberty to philosophize about the rest; and the nearer they could bring their religion to the established principles of philosophy, the more success they had.' But how dangerous a maxim was that! It was, in fact, setting up their own wisdom against the wisdom of God himself. . . . In these circumstances can it be any wonder that the pure religion of Christ got a tincture that would continue for ages" (vol. cit. pp. 341–347).

Dr. Priestley says of the Greek philosophy, that "it was a system, which, though founded on nothing but *imagination*, without a single *fact* or appearance in nature to support it, has dazzled and captivated the philosophical part of the world from the earliest ages" (vol. cit. p. 299).

"Notwithstanding," continues Dr. Priestley, "the very general spread[1] of this philosophical system, it is remarkable that the minds of the Jews were long uncontaminated with it. The doctrine of a revelation concerning a future life for man depends upon the *resurrection of the dead*, and has no other foundation whatever. No other ground of hope is so much as hinted at in any part

[1] Mr. Fearon tells us that the immortality of the soul was "fully recognized by ALL the religions of the ancient world except the Jewish"— *Thoughts on Materialism*, p. 122.

of the Old or New Testament; and though it is possible that some of the learned Pharisees in our Saviour's time might have been infected with other notions, borrowed from the Greeks, or from the East, they appear not to have been then known to the *vulgar* among the Jewish nation, as is sufficiently evident from the history of the death and resurrection of Lazarus.

"From this valuable history, we find that Martha, the sister of Lazarus, had no hope respecting her brother, but from *the resurrection of the last day* (John xi. 24), and our Lord gives her no consolation but on the same ground. '*I am the resurrection and the life.*' Had the notion of a *separate soul*, released from the fetters of flesh, and enjoying consummate happiness in another life, been known to them, and believed by them, it could not but have been uppermost in their minds; and some mention of it, or some allusion to it, would certainly have been found in the history: whereas no such thing appears.

"This belief of a resurrection, as the only foundation of a future life, evidently existing, and being universally recognized in the time of our Saviour, there can hardly be a doubt, but what it must have been the belief of the most early Jews and Patriarchs.[1] And since the doctrine could

[1] Isaiah says: "Thy dead men shall live, together with my dead body shall they arise. Awake and sing ye that dwell in dust; for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead" — Isa. xxvi. 19.

Job says: "Oh that thou wouldst hide me in the grave, that

never have been suggested by any appearance in nature, it must have been derived from some original revelation, probably prior to the flood" (vol. cit. pp. 300, 301).

"Though a distinction," says Dr. Priestley, "is made in the scriptures between the principle, or seat of thought in man, and the parts which are destined to other functions; and in the New Testament that principle may sometimes be signified by the term *soul*, yet there is no instance, either in the Old or New Testament, of this soul being supposed to be in one place and the body in another. They are always conceived to go together, so that the perceptive and thinking power could not, in fact, be considered by the sacred writers as any other than a *property* of a living man, and therefore as what ceased of course when the man

thou wouldst keep me secret until thy wrath be past; that thou wouldst appoint me a set time, and remember me. If a man die shall he live again? All the days of my appointed time will I wait till my change come. Thou shalt call and I will answer thee: Thou wilt have a desire for the work of thine hands" — Job XIV. 13–15.

Also "For I know that my redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth. And though, after my skin, worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God; whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another, though my reins be consumed within me" — Job XIX. 25–27.

David says: "As for me, I will behold thy face in righteousness: I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness" — Ps. XVII. 15.

Among Jewish writers, Ben Levi maintains that the Jews were acquainted with the doctrine of the Resurrection — *Dissertation on the Prophecies*, p. 171.

was dead, and could not be revived but with the revival of the body.

"Accordingly, we have no promise of any reward, or any threatening of punishment, after death, but that which is represented as taking place at the general resurrection. And it is observable that this is never, in the scriptures, called as with us, the resurrection of the body [1] (as if the soul in the mean time, was in some other place), but always the resurrection *of the dead*, that is, of the man. If, therefore, there be any *intermediate state*, in which the soul alone exists, conscious of any thing, there is an absolute silence concerning it in the scriptures; death being always spoken of there as a state of rest, of silence, and of dark-

[1] The enemies of revelation have not failed to avail themselves of the theory held by the immaterialists that the *same* identical flesh and blood from which the soul took its departure will be again animated at the resurrection, and have thus stated the difficulties with which the theory is attended: "The same piece of matter may happen to be a part of two or more bodies, as a fish feeding on a man and another man afterwards feeding on the fish, — part of the body of the first man becomes first incorporated with the fish, and afterwards in the fish with the last man. Instances have been known of one man feeding upon another; and when the substance of one man is thus converted into the substance of another, such cannot rise with his whole body; — and to which shall the part in common belong?" Whatever force these objections may have they are applicable only to those who contend for the resurrection of the *same* body. St. Paul says: "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God. . . . It [the body] is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body. . . . As we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly" — 1 Cor. xv. 44, 49, 50.

ness, a place where *the wicked cease from troubling*, but where the righteous *cannot praise God*." [1]

"How easy," says Dr. Priestley, "to get rid of all the embarrassment attending the doctrine of a soul, in every view of it, by admitting that the power of thinking belongs to the *brain* of a man, as that of walking to his feet, or that of speaking to his tongue, that, therefore, man, who is *one being*, is composed of *one kind of substance*, and when he dies, he, of course, ceases to think; but when his sleeping dust shall be re-animated at the resurrection, his power of thinking, and his consciousness, will be restored to him" (*Disquisitions*, p. 102).

That the immortality of the soul was a subject of dispute in the church as late as 1464, we learn from the accounts of the disputes on the subject in Rome. These disputes we are told afforded one pretence at least to Pope Paul II., to abolish the college of Abbreviators, and to persecute the members of it, of whom Platina was one, and the celebrated Pomponius Lætus another. The pope objected to them that they disputed upon the immortality of the soul, and held Plato's opinion upon that subject, which Platina did not deny.

Among the earlier events of the Reformation was Luther's protest against the decree of the immortality of the soul which had been made in a canon enacted in what "may be called the *rump* of the Lateran council," held under Leo X. in the

[1] *History of the Corruptions of Christianity*, vol. I. pp. 230, 231.

year 1513. This canon as published by Caranza is as follows: —

"Whereas in these our days, some have dared to assert concerning the nature of the reasonable soul, that it is mortal, or one and the same in all men; and some rashly philosophizing, declare this to be true, at least according to philosophy, we, with the approbation of the sacred council, do condemn and reprobate all those who assert that the intellectual soul is mortal, or one and the same in all men, and those who call these things in question; seeing that the soul is not only truly, and of itself, and essentially the form of its human body, as is expressed in the canon of Pope Clement V., published in the general council of Vienna; but likewise immortal, and, according to the number of bodies into which it is infused is singularly multipliable, multiplied, and to be multiplied. Which manifestly appears from the gospel, seeing that our Lord saith, *they cannot kill the soul:* and elsewhere, *he who hateth his soul in this world*, &c., and also because he promises eternal pain and eternal torments to those who are to be judged according to their merit in this life. OTHERWISE the incarnation, and other mysteries of Christ, would not profit us, nor were a resurrection to be expected; and the saints and righteous would, according to Paul, be most miserable of all men. And seeing that *truth never contradicts truth*, we determine every assertion, which is contrary to revealed faith, to be false; and we strictly inhibit

all from dogmatizing otherwise, and we decree that all who adhere to the like erroneous assertions, shall be shunned and punished as heretics." [1]

In the year 1520 Luther published a defence of his propositions condemned by a bull of Leo X. The 27th is as follows: "It is certain that it is not in the power of the church or the pope to establish articles of faith, or laws for morals or good works." The reason he gives for this is, that these articles and laws are already established in the word of God; which he proves from 1 Cor. III. 11. After which he goes on, "but I permit the pope to make articles of faith for himself and his faithful, such as, *the bread and wine are transubstantiated in the sacrament. The essence of God neither generates nor is generated. The soul is the substantial form of the human body. The pope is the emperor of the world, and the king of heaven, and God upon earth.* THE SOUL IS IMMORTAL, with all those monstrous opinions to be found in the Roman dunghill of decretals, that such as his faith is, such may be his gospel, such his disciples, and such his church, that the mouth may have meat suitable for it and the dish a cover worthy of it."

Luther, as is well known, espoused the doctrine

[1] "Pomponatius, a philosopher of Mantua, not at all intimidated by the Lateran thunder, published a book in the year 1516, on the immortality of the soul; in which he exposed the futility of that argumentation by which the followers of Aristotle had endeavored to prove the immortality of the soul" —Priestley's *Disquisitions*, p. 277.

of the sleep of the dead[1] (until the resurrection) upon scripture authority, and made use of it as a confutation of purgatory and saint-worship, and continued in that belief to the last moment of his life.

It was not many years before the doctrine of the separate existence of the soul began to creep into the public confessions of divers protestant churches, and consequently to be equally sacred among the reformed, as the canons of Clement and Leo had made it among the papists.

The confession of the Protestant faith presented to the Emperor, Charles V., by the free cities of Strasburg, Constance, Niemmingen, and Lindau, contains nothing concerning the immortality of the soul. The confession presented to the Emperor in 1530, at the Diet of Augsburg, touches upon it very lightly, while the first Helvetic confes-

[1] In 1534, in the city of Orleans, "a ghost was conjured up" by the Franciscans, which played a number of pranks. Sleidan, who tells the story, proceeds to observe what excellent purposes of the ecclesiastical kind, were answered by these same spectres, particularly in supporting the doctrine of purgatory, encouraging private masses, and bringing in large profits to the priests. "But," continues he, "after Luther's doctrine came to be understood, and had gained a little strength, this kind of spectres by degrees vanished away. For Luther teaches from the scriptures, that the souls of the dead are at rest, waiting for the final day of judgment; and that those disturbances, frightful noises and phantoms, are raised by satan, who loses no opportunity of confirming men in the practice of impious rites, and the belief of false opinions, that he may render ineffectual the blessings conferred upon us by our Saviour Christ"— *Sleidan Comment*, L. IX. pp. 239–242.

sion, exhibited at the convention of divines at Wittenberg in 1536 makes no mention of the separate soul. In 1551 confessions were prepared to be exhibited to the Council of Trent by divers churches, among them being one by the Duke of Würtemberg, and one by the churches of Saxony. The Würtembergers acknowledge the intercession of saints, while the Saxons speak of joining their prayers with "all saints in heaven and earth," but in another place affirm that the saints are dead and cannot hear the prayers of their votaries. When the harmonizers of the Protestant confessions, under the auspices of the Belgic and Gallican churches, undertook in the year 1581 to make all things smooth and consistent, they changed *the intercession* of the saints in heaven, to the *holy desires* of the saints, deeming that in this way only could the saints in heaven help sinners on earth.

As yet nothing in any of these confessions formally condemned the doctrine of the sleep of the soul. The honor of first condemning such as dissented from the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle which were derived, as we have seen, from the heathen nations of the East, was reserved for English reformers on the continent. They, in the fortieth of King Edward's articles presented in 1552, confess themselves thus: —

"They who say that the souls of such as depart hence do sleep, being without all sense, feeling and perceiving, until the day of judgment, or affirm

that all souls die with the bodies, and at the last day shall be raised up with the same, do utterly dissent from the right belief declared unto us in the holy scriptures." This article was however dropped in 1562 when Parker and his associates came to review the article. They had probably studied the scriptures more attentively than their predecessors.

In the year 1566 the second Helvetic confession was published, being entirely on the Calvinistic plan. The following is a part of the seventh article : —

"We hold that man consists of two, and these different substances in one person; of an immortal soul, seeing that, being separate from the body, it neither sleeps nor dies; and of a mortal body, which yet, at the last judgment, shall be raised from the dead, that the whole man from thenceforward may remain to eternity, either in life or death. We condemn all who scoff at the immortality of the soul, or bring it into doubt by subtle disputations, or who say that the soul sleeps, or, that it is a part of God." The Calvinists also believed with Clement and Leo, in the substantial form of the soul.

When in the year 1611, the confession of the remonstrants appeared, the Calvinists censured it, and among other things for omitting to mention, the happy immortality of souls in heaven after this life, which, they say, is expressly delivered in their catechism, and for this omission, the

remonstrants are accused of Socinianism. Episcopius defends himself and his associates by observing that "the judgments of the greatest divines had formerly, and still did vary, concerning the state of departed souls; that the fathers seemed to be pretty well agreed, that no souls were admitted into paradise, till our Saviour by his death, opened the door and went in, with the penitent thief in his company; that though all the fathers down to the end of the fourth century, judged that the souls of the faithful were received into paradise after our Lord had opened it, yet they were far from agreeing what or where this paradise was. Some understood that it meant *Heaven*, others *Hades*, not the place of torment but a common receptacle where the souls of the good and bad were reserved till the last judgment, for which he cites Lactantius, lib. VII. cap. 21. — The Greek fathers, he says, were unanimous in their opinion, that the souls of the saints, did not enjoy the vision of God, nor were admitted into the fruition of glory, till the resurrection; and that Calvin himself seems to have favored this notion, both in his Psychopannychia and in his institutions; and lastly that the Socinians themselves acknowledge as much concerning the reception of souls into heaven, immediately after their departure from the body, as is expressed in the general words of their catechism," &c.

The Calvinists were grievously provoked and

[1] Bishop Blackburne's *Works*, III. pp. 91, 92.

mortified by the reply of Episcopius,[1] the truth of which they could not deny. "To show," says Bishop Blackburne, "that they went against the stream of the most orthodox fathers in their catechism, was bad enough. But that was a small matter in comparison of his putting it out of their power to fix Socinianism on the remonstrants, without stigmatizing their venerable master with the same brand-mark" (*Works*, vol. III. p. 92).

The doctrine of *substantial forms* so strenuously advocated by the papists and Calvinists, imported that natural bodies are made up of two substances, matter and form. That the form of all natural bodies, man only excepted, is a corruptible being, which never fails to be destroyed, when the compound perishes, that is, whenever a stone, or a tree, or a dog are converted into natural bodies of another species.

"It was observed," says Bishop Blackburne, "that they who followed this system, could give no proofs of the immortality of the soul; for in order to that, they should make it appear that the soul is immaterial; which the very notion of its being the substantial or essential form of a material body, would not admit of.

[1] "The orthodoxy of Episcopius was called in question by his theological opponents; and the rage of the Calvinistic party went so far as to threaten violence. In 1614 he went to Amsterdam to attend a baptism, and the minister, Heyden, having stigmatized him as a heretic, he was saved from stoning only by the zeal of his friends" — McClintock & Strong's *Cyclopædia*.

"The scholastic hypothesis indeed, was thus effectually overthrown, but the church could not spare the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, or its conscious existence in a separate state, and they who had sense enough to demolish the hypothesis of Aristotle and Aquinas, never attempted to find out another that would answer the same purpose.

"This honor was reserved for Descartes whose *Meditations* appeared in the year 1640. The sum of his system is 'that all thinking substances are distinct from matter, from whence it necessarily follows, that the soul of man is a spirit, or a simple indivisible being and consequently immortal.' Hence it followed again, that a substantial form, being co-extended with the body, to which it belonged, and consequently divisible, must be incapable of thinking.[1]

"The doctrine of Descartes was immediately controverted by the great Gassandi, who maintained, 'that though it may be granted that mind and body may be conceived apart, it would not follow that they are two distinct substances, and,' he says, 'Descartes neither has proved, nor can prove from reason (for he grants the fact in compliment to the church), that thought and extension may not go together, constituting one being or composition, and that all Descartes' pretended

[1] The inquisitors at Rome put Descartes' book into their *index expurgatorius*. An immaterial soul could not suffer in their purgatory.

demonstrations, are mere affirmations, and *petitiones principii*" (vol. cit. III. p. 118).

William Tyndall, the author of the first printed edition of the Bible in English, observes: "And ye in putting them [souls] in heaven, hell, and purgatory, destroy the argumentes wherewith Christ and Paul prove the resurrection. What God doth with them, that shall we know when we come to them. The true faith putteth the resurrection, which we be warned to looke for every houre. The heathen philosophers denying that, did put that the souls did ever lyve. And the pope joineth the spiritual doctrine of Christ, and the fleshly doctrine of philosophers, together, things so contrary that they cannot agree, no more than the sperite and the fleshe do in a christen man. And because the fleshly minded pope consenteth unto heathen doctrine, therefore he corrupteth the scripture to establish it. . . . If the soules be in heaven, tell me why they be not in as good case as the angels be? And then what cause is there of the resurrection?" [1]

In regard to the belief of an immortal soul in connection with the resurrection of the dead, Dr. Priestley remarks: "It seems, however, that when the Christian, after having long struggled and maintained a very unequal combat in its present state of confinement, in which his soul can have

[1] Quoted from Tyndall's *Defence of Luther* in answer to Thomas More the Platonist, by Bishop Blackburne, *Works*, vol. III. p. 66.

little or no use of its native powers and faculties, has, by the benevolent constitution of nature got rid of this *encumbrance of clay*, *these fetters of matter*, and this dreadful contagion of *flesh and blood*, and with all the privileges, and with all the powers of action and enjoyment, naturally belonging to an *unembodied spirit*, has ranged the region of empyrean for some thousands of years, these powers are to be again clogged and impeded by a *second union to matter*, though better tempered than before, and, therefore a less, though a real and necessary encumbrance. And what is most extraordinary in the case is, that this *second degradation* takes place at a period which Christianity points out to us as the great jubilee of the virtuous and the good, when (all mankind being judged according to their works) they shall receive the plaudit of their judge, and shall enter upon the *inheritance of a kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world;* at which time and not before, they are to be admitted to be for *ever with the Lord Jesus Christ*" (*Disquisitions*, p. 67).

Dr. Maudsley says: "Whosoever believes sincerely in the doctrine of the resurrection of the body as taught by the Apostle Paul, which all Christians profess to do, must surely have some difficulty in conceiving the immortality of the soul apart from that of the body; for, if the Apostle's preaching and the Christian's faith be not vain, and the body do rise again, then it may be presumed that the soul and it will share a common

immortality, as they have shared a common mortality. So far, then, from materialism being the negation of immortality, the greatest of the apostles, the great Apostle to the Gentiles, earnestly preached materialism as essential to the life which is to come" (*Body and Mind*, pp. 260, 261).

St. Paul says: "Now if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen: and if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God, because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ: whom he raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not . . . then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished"[1] (1 Cor. xv. 12–18).

"Admit the force of the Apostle's argument," says Mr. Fearon, "and the doctrine of the materiality of man follows as an inevitable consequence: for . . . death and resurrection are terms opposed to each other; a real resurrection must be preceded by an actual death; that which does not die, cannot be raised *from* the dead; the resurrection made known in the Scriptures is a resurrection from the dead.[2] This view of future existence

[1] Here the Apostle Paul makes the future happiness of all Christians to depend upon a single matter of fact, the resurrection of Jesus Christ.

[2] See "*The Resurrection from the Dead an Essential Doctrine of the Gospel*," by R. Wright, p. 6, 1820.

will be seen directly to emanate from the declarations of Jesus, as well as from the teaching of his Apostles; it having been announced as 'the will of him that sent me, that every one that seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life; and I *will raise him up* at the last day.[1] And he who from right principles could give entertainment to others, is told to 'call the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind: and thou shalt be blessed; for they cannot recompense thee — thou shalt be recompensed at *the* RESURRECTION *of the just.*'[2] Thus, the will of him that sent the Messiah was to make known to the world 'everlasting life;' a life, from the very terms of the communication, not derivable from a self-existent, immaterial principle; but from the 'resurrection from the dead,' when all that are in their graves shall come forth to the resurrection of life, or to that of condemnation. It was for proclaiming this doctrine, and that too in defiance of both Jewish and Heathen authorities, and even of martyrdom itself, on the part of the Apostles, that the 'priests, and the captain of the temple, and the Sadducees came upon them; being grieved that they taught the people, and preached through Jesus (not the immortality of the soul) the *resurrection from the dead*'"[3] (vol. cit. pp. 106, 107).

St. Paul says to the Thessalonians: "But I would not have you to be ignorant, brethren, concerning them which are asleep, that ye sorrow not,

[1] John VI. 48. [2] Luke XIII. 13, 16. [3] Acts IV. 1, 2.

even as others which have no hope. For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him. For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent them which are asleep. For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first: then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord. Wherefore comfort one another with these words" (1 Thess. iv. 13–18).

Mr. Fearon says in this connection: "Upon the supposition of all being animated by an immaterial principle, how or why should the Apostle, when expressly treating of a future state, and the hopes consequent upon its belief, have omitted all reference thereto? And, upon the same hypothesis why should the Thessalonians 'sorrow'?—why should they have 'no hope'? for, whether Jesus had 'risen again' or not, that fact could neither retard nor accelerate the future life of immortal souls. But in addition, the Apostle concludes a portion of his argument to the Corinthians, with a remark which should put this question beyond all controversy; for, 'if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain, ye are yet in your sins. Then they also *which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished!*

If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable' " (vol. cit. p. 108).

Of the argument pursued by Paul to convince those in the Corinthian church who were sceptical as to a future state, Mr. Fearon says: "It is of great importance; seeing, that whilst he does not even glance at the theories of the Immaterialists, yet, had his argument been expressly shaped for the purpose of overthrowing their doctrines, it could not have been more successful; and while the *certainty* of futurity is maintained, some of the particular characteristics thereof are also treated upon, by which means the Apostle thus presents a connected view of the whole subject; for 'now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first fruits of them that slept;' the first fruits in the Mosaic law[1] being the first ripe corn gathered from the rest, such being the earnest and pledge of the future harvest; a figure as applied to a future state of existence, illustrative of the situation occupied by Jesus relatively towards others. 'But every man in his own order: Christ the first fruits; afterwards they that are Christ's at his coming. . . .

'Behold, I show you a mystery; we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed; *for the dead* (not the immortal souls) *shall be raised* incorruptible, and we shall be changed; for this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality,' then shall be brought to pass

[1] Lev. xxiii. 10.

the saying that is written, 'death is swallowed up in victory.' Need it be here pointed out that that which is immaterial cannot be corruptible, that that which is immortal can neither be called upon '*to put on*' immortality, nor can it become mortal; that the future existence of a being inherently immortal, could neither be 'a mystery,' nor 'a victory,' neither could it excite unexpected exultation; and the grand climax of the Apostle, 'O death! where is thy sting? O grave! where is thy victory?' would have been a satire upon the understanding of those to whom he wrote, and could not have failed to have furnished his enemies with a triumphant weapon against himself: for in the language of Archdeacon Blackburn, 'of what consequence is it, if they have immortal life by nature, whether they have it by promise or not? What does it signify, whether they have hopes of a resurrection or not, if they are sure of a future life by provision and allotment, without a resurrection?'" (vol. cit. pp. 117, 121).

Bishop Blackburne remarks: "The more any one is convinced of the immortality of the soul from the principles of Aristotle and Descartes, the less will he concern himself about the Gospel account of futurity" (*Works*, vol. III. p. 121, Camb. 1804).

In reference to the text, "There is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave whither thou goest," Luther remarks: "Another proof that the dead are insensible. Solomon

thinks, therefore, that the dead are altogether *asleep*, and think of nothing. They lie, not reckoning days or years, but when *awakened* will seem to themselves to have slept scarcely a moment" (*Debt and Grace*, p. 258).

Lactantius, "the Christian Cicero" (about A.D. 300), says: "There would be no difference between the just and the unjust, if every man that is born were made immortal. Immortality, therefore, is not a law of our own nature, but the wages and reward of virtue" (*Insti. Div.* I. 7, c. 5).

Bishop Blackburne remarks: "All these fine-spun notions of the immortality of the soul, and all the artificial deductions from that principle, teach nothing but the art of blowing scholastic bubbles, which will certainly go peaceably to their rest, without the least detriment, either to sound learning or true religion" (Quoted by Mr. Fearon in *Thoughts on Materialism*, p. 62).

Mr. George Rawlinson, M.A., late fellow and tutor of Oxford University, in commenting upon the amount of evidence furnished by the Catacombs of Rome with respect to the belief of the early Christians in the resurrection of the dead, remarks: "The doctrine of the resurrection is implied or expressed on almost every tombstone which has been discovered" (*Bampton Lectures at Oxford*, 1859, p. 286).

The universal desire for immortality is thought by the immaterialsts to be a powerful argument in favor of its gratification. Mr. Fearon comments

upon the fact that the desire for riches and power may be said to be universal, yet furnishes anything rather than a rational and confident assurance of gratification. Also the desire that is cherished alike by the peasant and the philosopher, by the king and the beggar, and yet never has been gratified — the desire for a longer continuance of life than that generally allotted to man. Mr. Fearon thinks if the claim of the immaterialists were a just one, man would not require futurity, as he could by his *desire* insure to himself immortality in the present state of things (vol. cit. p. 25).

CHAPTER VI.

BIBLE PROOF OF THE SINGLE-SUBSTANCE THEORY.

THAT the Bible does not teach that man was created with an immaterial, immortal soul, we learn from the account of his creation in Genesis (II. 7).

"And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul" [Hebrew, *nephesh chaiyah*, soul living, or living soul, as it is rendered in English].

From this verse we learn that the *whole* man was made of the dust of the ground, as it is not intimated that any part of him had a higher or different origin. When the whole man was completely formed, we are told that God made the man to breathe and live. It is perfectly evident from the text that nothing but the circumstance of *breathing* made the difference between the *unanimated* earth and the *living soul*. St. Paul says: "The first man Adam was made a living soul;" "the first man is of the earth earthy" (1 Cor. XV. 45, 47).

Dr. Kitto renders Gen. II. 7, as follows: —

"And Jehovah God formed the man [Heb. the

Adam] dust from the ground, and blew into his nostrils the breath of life and man became a living animal." In regard to an immaterial immortal spirit Dr. Kitto observes: "We should be acting unfaithfully if we were to affirm its being contained or implied in this passage" (*Cyclopœdia of Biblical Literature*).

The term *breath of life* is also applied to animals equally with man: "And behold, I, even I, do bring a flood of waters upon the earth, to destroy all things wherein is the breath of life under heaven; and every thing that is in the earth shall die" (Gen. VI. 17).

"And then went in unto Noah, into the ark, two and two of all flesh, wherein is the breath of life" (Gen. VII. 15).

"All in whose nostrils was the breath of life, that was in the dry land died" (Gen. VII. 22). Mr. Hudson tells us that the literal translation of the preceding verse is: "All in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of lives [*nishmath ruach chajin*] died" (*Human Destiny*, p. 64).

If Adam was created with an immortal soul, then all animals and creeping things were created with immortal souls, as the term *nephesh chaiyah* (living soul) is applied to animals equally with man.

That Adam was not created immortal, we have conclusive proof in the following verse: "And the Lord God said, Behold, the man has become as one of us, to know good from evil: and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and

eat and live forever: therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken" (Gen. III. 22, 23).

We also read: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return" [1] (Gen. III. 19). If Adam was created with an immortal soul, which is the real man, the body being only the senseless instrument of the soul, as taught by theologians, the Creator was talking to the senseless instrument of the soul in this passage, and the sentence of death passed upon Adam was simply a decree against the insensible instrument, the material body, of the real man Adam, and the serpent was right when he said to Eve, "Ye shall *not* surely die" (Gen. III. 4).

The writers of the Old Testament did not understand that man possesses an immortal soul. David says of man: "His breath goeth forth, he returneth to his earth; in that very day his thoughts perish." Also, "Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled; thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust." And again,

[1] Bishop Law, in commenting upon this decree, observes: "Nor can we well conceive the unhappy subjects of it to have been at that time so very ingenious, as to explain it all away by distinguishing upon the different parts of their constitution; and so concluding that by death no more was intended than only *living* in some different manner, or a continuation of their consciousness and real existence in some other place. No; that was the philosophy of after ages" — *Theory of Religion*, p. 338.

"For in death there is no remembrance of thee: in the grave who shall give thee thanks?" (Ps. CXLVI. 4; CIV. 22; VI. 5.)

Solomon says: "For the living know that they shall die: but the dead know not anything." "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave whither thou goest" (Eccles. IX. 4, 10).

Job asks: "Shall *mortal* man be more just than God?" (Job IV. 17.)

The writers of the New Testament agree with the writers of the Old Testament in teaching that man is mortal. St. Paul says: "For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this *mortal* must put on immortality" (1 Cor. XV. 53). St. Paul tells us that God will give eternal life to those "who by patient continuance in well doing seek for honor and immortality" (Rom. II. 7). If man is immortal, why is he to be rewarded for *seeking immortality?* Indeed, St. Paul distinctly states that God only hath immortality (1 Tim. VI. 16). The word immortal occurs but once in the Bible, and is then applied to God (see 1 Tim. I. 17).

Peter seems not to have been aware of the fact that souls have a conscious existence separate from the body, for he says: "Men and brethren, let me freely speak unto you of the patriarch David, that he is both dead and buried . . . for David is not ascended into the heavens" (Acts II. 29–34). Also, "For David, after he had served his own genera-

tion by the will of God fell on sleep, and saw corruption" (Acts XIII. 36).

The Hebrew word *nephesh*,[1] which is rendered soul, occurs seven hundred and fifty-two times in the Old Testament, and in the common English version is rendered in forty-four different ways;[2] viz., man, men, him, he, himself, me, myself, we, her, herself, thee, thyself, they, themselves, yourselves, any, one, lust, ghost, thing, his own, she will, mortally, will, tablets, the dead, fellows, discontented, greedy, breath, deadly, hearty, appetite, pleasure, fish, desire, mind, heart, creature, beast, body, life and lives, person, and soul.

Hebrew nouns are derived from Hebrew verbs, and *nephesh* is from a verb which signifies "to breathe," "to respire." Roy, in his lexicon, renders *nephesh* as follows: "the soul," "vital part," "a man," a "creature," "affection," "person," "substance."

The word *nephesh* is first applied in the Bible to *beasts*. "Let the water bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life" [*nephesh chaiyah*], margin, living soul. "And God created great whales and every living creature [*nephesh chaiyah*, living soul] that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly." "And God

[1] There are two other words that are rendered soul in the Old Testament. *N'shamah*, which is usually rendered breath, is rendered soul in Isa. LVII. 16. *N'deevah*, which means liberality, excellence, is rendered soul in Job XXX. 15.

[2] For the passages see *The Soul: What is It?* (Rev. Miles Grant), from which this is taken.

said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature [*nephesh chaiyah*, living soul] after his kind, cattle, and creeping things, and beast of the earth after his kind."

"And to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the earth, wherein is life [*nephesh chaiyah*, living soul], I have given every green herb for meat." "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul"[1] [*nephesh chaiyah*].

We see from these passages that our English translators have rendered the Hebrew words, *nephesh chaiyah*, living soul, when applied to man, but have refrained from rendering the same words living soul when applied to beasts. Dr. Clarke, in commenting upon *nephesh chaiyah*, says: "It is a general term to express *all* creatures endowed with life in *any* of its varied gradations."

Parkhurst, an eminent Hebrew lexicographer, says: "As a noun *nephesh* hath been supposed to signify the spiritual part of man, or what we commonly call his soul; I must for myself confess that I can find no passage where it hath *undoubtedly* this meaning."

McCullock says: "There is no word in the Hebrew language that signifies either soul or spirit, in the technical sense in which we use the terms

[1] Gen. I. 20, 21, 24, 30; II. 7.

as signifying something distinct from the body" (*Credibility of the Scriptures*, vol. I. p. 471).

Gibbon observes: "The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is omitted in the Law of Moses" (*Works*, vol. I. p. 530).

In *Cruden's Concordance*, an orthodox authority, we are told that the word "soul" in Scripture, "especially in the style of the Hebrews, is very equivocal" (Article *Soul*).

Psyche, the Greek word which is rendered soul in the New Testament, is rendered in seven different ways; viz., life and lives, wind, you, heart, us, heartily, and soul.

As *nephesh* is used primarily to express the whole being, in the Old Testament, *psyche* is likewise used in the same sense in the New Testament. "Then they that gladly received his word were baptized, and the same day there were added unto them about three thousand souls" [*psyche*] (Acts II. 41). "And fear came upon every soul" [*psyche*] (Acts II. 43). "And it shall come to pass that every soul [*psyche*] that will not hear that prophet, shall be destroyed from among his people" (Acts III. 23). "Then sent Joseph, and called his father Jacob to him, and all his kindred, threescore and fifteen souls" [*psyche*] (Acts VII. 14). "We were in all in the ship two hundred threescore and fifteen souls" [*psyche*] (Acts XXVII. 37). "I will very gladly spend and be spent for you" [*psyche*] (2 Cor. XII. 15). "How long dost thou make us [*psyche*] to doubt?" (John X. 24.)

Ruach, the Hebrew word which is rendered spirit[1] in our translation, occurs four hundred times in the Old Testament, and is rendered in twenty-two different ways; viz., blast, quarters, anger, mind, courage, vain, side, breath, cool, tempest, spiritual, air, windy, whirlwind, smell, smelleth, smelled, understanding, accept, toucheth, wind, and spirit, which occurs two hundred and forty times.[2]

The general uses of the word *ruach* are to denote a being; an influence proceeding from a being; a state of mind or feeling; and the atmosphere which is generally called the "breath of life."

The following are some of the passages in which *ruach* is rendered in other words beside spirit.

"The blast of the breath [*ruach*] of his nostrils" (2 Sam. XXII. 16). "By the breath [*ruach*] of his nostrils are they consumed" (Job IV. 9). "He will not suffer me to take my breath [*ruach*], but filleth me with bitterness" (Job IX. 18). "The flame shall dry up his branches; and by the breath [*ruach*] of his mouth shall he go away" (Job XX. 30). "My breath [*ruach*] is corrupt" (Job XVII. 1). "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath [*ruach*] of his mouth" (Ps. XXXIII. 6).

[1] The Hebrew word *n'shah-mah*, usually rendered breath, is twice rendered spirit in the Old Testament; first, in Gen. II. 7, second, in Job XXXI. 4 — *The Spirit in Man*, Rev. Miles Grant.

[2] For the passages in the Old Testament in which *ruach* is rendered in other words beside spirit, see *The Spirit in Man.*

"And there went forth a wind [*ruach*] from the Lord" (Num. XI. 31). "The heaven was black with clouds and wind [*ruach*], and there was a great rain" (1 Kings XVIII. 45). "In four quarters [*ruach*] were the porters, toward the east, west, north and south" (1 Chron. IX. 24). "Their anger [*ruach*] was abated towards him when he said that" (Judg. VIII. 3). "Which were a grief of mind [*ruach*] unto Isaac and to Rebekah" (Gen. XXVI. 35). "Then shall his mind [*ruach*] change, and he shall pass over" (Hab. I. 11). "Shall vain [*ruach*] words have an end" (Job XVI. 3). "He sayeth among the trumpets, ha, ha; and he smelleth [*ruach*] the battle afar off" (Job XXXIX. 25).

Pneuma,[1] the Greek word which is rendered spirit in the New Testament, is rendered in six different ways; viz., spirit, spiritual, spiritually, ghost, life, wind.

Pneuma is from *pneo*, "to blow, breath, of the wind and air." 2. "To breathe, send forth an odor," "to breathe or smell of a thing." 3. "Of animals, to breathe hard, pant, gasp." 4. "Generally, to draw breath, breathe, and so to live" (Liddell and Scott).

Mr. Tylor observes: "Terms corresponding with those of life, mind, soul, spirit, ghost, and so forth, are not thought of as describing really separate entities, so much as the several forms and

[1] Pneuma is the only word that is rendered spirit in the New Testament, with the exception of the word *phantasma*, which occurs in Matt. XII. 26, and in Mark VI. 49.

functions of an individual being. Thus the confusion which here prevails in our own thought and language, in a manner typical of the thought and language of mankind in general, is in fact due not merely to vagueness of terms, but to an ancient theory of substantial unity that underlies them."

"The act of breathing so characteristic of the higher animals during life, and coinciding so closely with life in its departure, has been repeatedly and naturally identified with the life or soul itself. Laura Bridgman showed in her instructive way the analogy between the effects of restricted sense and restricted civilization when one day she made the gesture of taking something away from her mouth: 'I dreamed,' she explained in words, 'that God took away my breath to heaven.'"

"The conception of the soul as breath may be followed up through Semitic and Aryan etymology, and thus into the main streams of the philosophy of the world. Hebrew shows *nephesh*, 'breath,' passing into all the meanings of 'life, soul, mind, animal,' while *ruach* and *neshamah* make the like transition from 'breath' to 'spirit,' and to these the Arabic *nefs* and *ruh* correspond. The same is the history of Sanscrit *âtman* and *prâna*, of Greek *psyche* and *pneuma*, of Latin *animus*, *anima*, *spiritus*. So Slavonic *duch* has developed the meaning of 'breath' into that of soul or spirit; and the dialects of the Gypsies have this word *dūk*, with the meanings of 'breath, spirit, ghost.' . . . German *geist* and English *ghost*, too, may possibly

have the same original sense of 'breath.' . . . It is thus that West Australians used one word *wang* for 'breath, spirit, and soul;' that in the Netela language of California *piuts* means 'life, breath, soul;' that certain Greenlanders reckoned two souls to man, namely his shadow and his breath; that the Malays say the soul of the dying man escapes through his nostrils, and in Java use the same word *nawa* for 'breath, life, soul'" (vol. cit. vol. I. pp. 390–393).

Bishop Tillotson says: "The immortality of the soul is rather *supposed* or taken for *granted* in the Bible" (*Sermons*, vol. II.).

Richard Watson admits that the doctrine of the *natural* immortality of the soul is contradicted by Scripture (*Institutes*, II. 83).

"He [Satan] assumed most fully that the death threatened [in Gen. II. 17] would be a form of existence. The devil could not hope to be believed if he had given that word the sense of annihilation" (*Oberlin Evangelist*, June 19, 1861).

"The Bible generally *assumes* the immortality of the soul, as it does the existence of God" (*The Presbyterian Quarterly*, 1869, p. 600).

"The intuitional persuasion . . . we know that the soul is immortal, as we know there is a God." "The whole projection of a rational being assumes the fact of its inherent immortality" (*The Boston Review*, 1861, pp. 446, 452).

Dr. Proudfit says: "The best and highest of revelations . . . announces not an immortal *soul*

(that is everywhere taken for granted in the New Testament) but an immortal man" (*Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1858, p. 804).

"The doctrine," says A. Vinet, "of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are everywhere taken for granted in his [Christ's] words, but are never proved" (*A Characteristic of the Gospel*).

"Christ's teachings presuppose monotheism and immortality" (*The American Theological Review*, 1862, p. 180).

Mr. Hudson observes: "Did Christ assume as already known that which he came to bring to light?"

"The existence of God, while assumed as too clear for doubt, is named, spoken of, alluded to, and otherwise *explicitly* assumed, in many hundreds of scriptural expressions. But the immortality in question, if assumed, is never at all alluded to, but is treated with utter and profound silence. This difference cannot be explained by supposing the immortality of man so much clearer than the divine existence; for the former has been far more doubted by mankind than the latter. Nor is the difference due to the higher importance of the doctrine of God's existence; for though the being of a God is of more account *to the universe* than the immortality of man, yet *to man himself* it is *not* more important. And the Bible is given not to the universe at large, but as a special revelation to mankind, to instruct them in their duties

and destinies. Given to bring life and immortality to light" (*The Rights or Wrongs?* p. 9).

Prof. Ives of Yale College remarks: "Immortality as an essential attribute of the soul, is not only nowhere affirmed in the Bible, as theologians confess, but is in fact positively denied." "The soul is not an immaterial, immortal part of human beings" "but is the proper ORGANISM, of all *animated* [Latin, anima, soul] beings, whether human or animal, while spirit, likewise a common attribute of man and animals, is THE VITAL PRINCIPLE, denominated also in the Bible the breath of life." "While this spirit is infused into the organism, or soul, the man, or animal, is a living soul; when the spirit is taken away the same becomes a dead soul" (*The Bible Doctrine of the Soul*, p. 73).

It is very evident that the scriptures have been made, by the English translators, to teach erroneous doctrines that have in vast numbers of cases led to scepticism.

The translators were professors of the mystical doctrines, derived, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, from heathen nations, and naturally were inclined to bend the text to fit their views. In the words of Dr. Kennicott, "the present English version frequently expresses, *not what the translators found in the text*, but what they thought *should* have been there."[1]

Not only have the translators led the people astray, but the theologians have done their full

[1] Quoted by Mr. Fearon in *Thoughts on Materialism*, p. 62.

share in misleading the people. For instance, the word death, when used to represent the state of the lost, has been made to mean life. John Locke observes in this connection: —

"They shall not live forever. This is so plain in Scripture, and is so everywhere inculcated, that the wages of sin is death, and the reward of the righteous is everlasting life, — the constant language of the Scripture in the current of the New Testament as well as Old, is life to the just, to believers, to the obedient, and death to the wicked and unbelievers,[1] — that one would wonder how the reader could be mistaken where death is threatened so constantly, and declared everywhere to be the ultimate punishment and last estate to which the wicked must all come. To solve this, they have invented a very odd signification of the word *death*, which they would have stand for eternal life in torment.[2] They who will put so strange and

[1] The Scriptures in their general tenor expressly promise to the righteous "life," "eternal" or "everlasting life," "life for ever more," "length of days for ever and ever," "immortality," "incorruption," and that they shall "live," "live for ever," and be "incorruptible." On the other hand, the destiny of the lost is called "death," "second death," "destruction," "everlasting destruction," "perdition," "corruption," and they are said to "die," "surely die," to be "destroyed," "destroyed forever," to "perish," "utterly perish," to be "consumed," "burned," "devoured," "cut off," to be "as nothing," and "put away as dross."

[2] "We have an example of scepticism," says Mr. Hudson, "produced directly by the doctrine in question, in the Earl of Shaftsbury. 'In a moral point of view his character was very estimable, both as a public and as a private man, and obtained the suffrages of all who knew him.' He was a firm believer in

contrary a signification upon a word in a hundred places, where, if it had not its true and literal sense, one would wonder it should be so often used, and that in opposition to *life*, which in these places is used literally, ought to have good proofs for giving it a sense in those places of Scripture directly contrary to what it ordinarily has in other parts of Scripture, and everywhere else" (*Life by Lord King*, pp. 319–322, Bohn's ed.).

"The early Christian writers," says Mr. Hudson, "plainly understood our word destroy in its literal and ordinary sense. Tertullian paraphrases the passage [Matt. x. 28] thus: 'Who is able to kill and destroy (occidere et perdere) both soul and body.' And Cyprian: 'Who can slay (occidere) both soul and body.' Likewise Jerome and Augustine. And Origen says: 'Who is able to destroy and blot out both soul and body, either in Gehenna or as he may choose.' And not only do the other terms used require the literal sense of

the fundamental doctrines of natural religion, and wrote an eloquent defence of the doctrine of a Deity and providence, which is ranked by Bishop Hurd among the most finished productions of the kind in the English language. He also professed a respect for Christianity. But, Dr. Kippis tells us, 'there is a tradition that, amongst other difficulties which occurred to him in regard to the Christian Revelation, he was startled at the idea of its containing the doctrine of the eternity of hell-torments; that he consulted some eminent churchmen whether the New Testament positively asserted that doctrine; and that, upon being assured that it did, he declared himself incapable of assenting to a system of religion which maintained a tenet so repugnant to all his views of the great Government of the Universe"—*The Doctrine of Endless Misery*, p. 21.

the word 'destroy,' but the reason of the case demands it. Christ was 'the faithful and true witness.' And would he give his most solemn warning in ambiguous terms? The ordinary sense of these words plainly names an infinite loss — the loss of being, and of eternal life; the literal loss of the soul. The same faithful witness elsewhere reminds us that to gain the whole world and lose the soul is a foolish exchange. Did he here expect us to understand that the soul is imperishable, that it can never be strictly lost, but that we have something infinitely worse to fear? 'Endless annihilation,' says the younger Edwards, 'is an *endless or infinite* punishment;' and the ordinary sense of Christ's words denotes extinction. Did he mean a twofold infinitude of punishment?" (*Immortality through Christ Alone*, p. 3.)

In another work Mr. Hudson remarks: "I here venture to say that it is impossible to put the now popular doctrine of immortality into proper words, without at least a *verbal* contradiction of the Scriptures. . . . When Jehovah says, 'Dying thou shalt die,' and expositors say that the lost 'in dying shall never die;' when the prophet says, 'The soul that sinneth it shall die,' and we are afterwards told, 'when you hear that there is a death of the soul, do not think that the soul dies; for it is immortal;' when the apostle declares, 'No murderer hath eternal life abiding in him,' and it is explained that there are 'two kinds of eternal life,' one 'in shame and everlasting contempt,' then we

insist that there is a verbal contradiction between the words of the Holy Spirit in the Bible, and the words of man outside of the Bible."

"I am not specially fond of the arithmetical argument," says Mr. Hudson, "but it has its use when it can show the general tenor of the language of a book. Sitting down once to count out this argument in the Scriptures, I reckoned about five hundred instances in which the term 'life,' 'everlasting life,' 'to live forever,' etc., and on the other hand, 'death,' 'destruction,' 'to be consumed,' etc., are applied apparently to the final destiny of the righteous and wicked respectively. And now we ask are all such passages to be taken in a metaphorical sense, or in the usual and ordinary sense of these terms? When the wicked shall 'utterly perish' will they retain immortality? Do they who fail of eternal life still live eternally? (*The Silence of the Scriptures on the Immortality of the Soul*, pp. 3, 4, 7.)

The Rev. Joseph Blain, in his work, *Death not Life*, gives two hundred and eighty-four texts which have been changed from their Bible and common-sense meaning for the purpose of proving the doctrine of endless torment by assuming that all men are immortal.

In regard to the pernicious effect of the immortal soul doctrine, Edmund Law, Bishop of Carlisle, observes: "All proper and consistent notions of death, resurrection, and future judgment, are confounded; in fine all the great sanctions of the

Gospel are rendered meaningless or useless." He continues, "If we have hurt our own cause, and corrupted Christianity, by an improper mixture of human wisdom, falsely so called, or by the dregs of heathen philosophy; — if we have disguised the face of it, or rather substituted something else in its room, and therefore put arms into the hands of infidels, which they have used but too successfully against us; — if this is so; I ask whether it is not high time to examine our Bibles, and try to exhibit the true Christian plan as it is there delivered, — and abide by it: to consider whether we may not safely trust it to its own original ground, without any of those rotten props and buttresses, which after ages have been building up for its support? Whether we may not securely rest upon that solid rock of a *resurrection* without any of those visionary prospects which imagination is ever apt to furnish us with, but which will ever fail us on a thorough trial" (*Theory of Religion*, pp. 420–422, L. 1759).

"Imagine a creature," says Bishop Newton, "nay, imagine numberless creatures . . . delivered over to torments of endless ages, without the least hope or possibility of relaxation or redemption. Imagine it you may, but you can never seriously believe it, nor reconcile it to God and goodness" (*Dissertations*, No. 60).

The following are passages in which death is threatened to the wicked: "The wages of sin is death" (Rom. VI. 23). "The soul that sinneth, it

shall die" (Ezek. xviii. 4). "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish" (Luke xiii. 3). "Behold, ye despisers, and wonder, and perish" (Acts xiii. 41). "For as many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law" (Rom. ii. 12). "And if Christ be not raised, . . . then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished" (1 Cor. xv. 17, 18). "The Lord is . . . not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance" (2 Pet. iii. 9). "Shall utterly perish in their own corruption" (2 Pet. ii. 12). "It is not the will of your Father which is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish" (Matt. xviii. 14). "Every soul which will not hear that prophet shall be utterly destroyed from among the people" (Acts iii. 23). "Will destroy those husbandmen," etc. (Matt. xxi. 41). "Know ye not, that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey, whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness?" (Rom. vi. 16.) "What fruit had ye in those things whereof ye are now ashamed? for the end of those things is death" (Rom. vi. 21). "Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned" (Rom. v. 12). "That as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord" (Rom. v. 21). "For since by man came death, by man came also the resur-

rection" (1 Cor. xv. 21). "To the one we are the savor of death unto death" (2 Cor. ii. 16). "How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation?" (Heb. ii. 3.) "We know that we have passed from death unto life because we love the brethren" (1 John iii. 14). "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away" (Rev. xxi. 4). "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life" (John iii. 16). "And I give unto them eternal life and they shall never perish" (John x. 28). "The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death" (1 Cor. xv. 26).

We see from the last text quoted that death cannot denote an eternal state of consciousness, for death is to be destroyed. We read in Revelation (xx. 13, 14), "And the sea gave up the dead which were in it; and death and hell [*hades*, the grave] delivered up the dead which were in them: and they were judged every man according to his works. And death and hell [hades] were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death."

In Ezek. xviii. 26, we read, "When a righteous man turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, and dieth in them; for his iniquity that he hath done shall he die." This text plainly indicates that there is a death for the wicked that takes place after the natural death; in fact, the death that comes after the resurrection.

The following are passages in which *life* is promised to the righteous: —

"This do, and thou shalt live" (Luke x. 28). "Keep my commandments and live" (Prov. iv. 4; vii. 2). "And your heart shall live that seek God" (Ps. lxix. 32). "He is just, he shall surely live, saith the Lord God" (Ezek. xviii. 9). "Nevertheless if thou warn the righteous man, that the righteous sin not, and he doth not sin, he shall surely live" (Ezek. iii. 21). "When the son hath done that which is lawful and right, and hath kept all my statutes, and hath done them, he shall surely live" (Ezek. xviii. 19). "The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God: and they that hear shall live" (John v. 25). "He that eateth me, even he shall live by me" (John vi. 57). "He that eateth of this bread shall live forever" (John vi. 58). "He that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal" (John xii. 25). "Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection, and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live" (John xi. 25). "Because I live, ye shall live also" (John xiv. 19). "Now if we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him" (Rom. vi. 8). "If ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live" (Rom. viii. 13). "In this was manifested the love of God toward us, because that God sent his only begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him" (1 John iv. 9). "I have set before you life and

death, blessing and cursing; therefore choose life" (Deut. xxx. 19). "See, I have set before thee this day, life and good, death and evil" (Deut. xxx. 15). "And unto this people thou shalt say, thus saith the Lord; Behold, I set before you the way of life and the way of death" (Jer. xxi. 8). "Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, that leadeth unto life; and few there be that find it" (Matt. vii. 14). "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments" (Matt. xix. 17). "Ye will not come unto me, that ye might have life" (John v. 40). "I am come that they might have life" (John x. 10). "But these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name" (John xx. 31). "And Jesus said unto them, I am the bread of life" (John vi. 35). "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day" (John vi. 53, 54). "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life" (John iii. 36). "Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life" (Prov. iv. 23). "For whoso findeth me findeth life, and shall obtain favor of the Lord" (Prov. viii. 35). "As righteousness tendeth to life: so he that pursueth evil pursueth it to his own death" (Prov. xi. 19). "The fruit of the righteous is a tree of life" (Prov. xi. 30). "Lest

he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever: therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden" (Gen. III. 22, 23). "In the way of righteousness is life; and in the pathway thereof there is no death" (Prov. XII. 28). "Christ, who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the gospel" (2 Tim. I. 10).

From the following passages we learn *when* the righteous are to receive their reward.

"For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive. But every man in his own order: Christ the firstfruits; afterward they that are Christ's at his coming" (1 Cor. XV. 22, 23). "So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory" (1 Cor. XV. 54). "Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day" (John VI. 54). "When Christ, who is our life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory" (Col. III. 4). "And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day" (John VI. 39). "And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life; and I will raise him up at the last day" (John VI. 40). "But when thou makest a feast,

call the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind: and thou shalt be blessed; for they cannot recompense thee: for thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just" (Luke xiv. 13, 14). "As therefore the tares are gathered and burned in the fire; so shall it be in the end of this world. . . . Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father" (Matt. xiii. 40, 43). "But I would not have you to be ignorant, brethren, concerning them which are asleep, that ye sorrow not, even as others which have no hope. For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him. . . . For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first; then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord" (1 Thess. iv. 13–17).

In reference to eternal punishment, Mr. Hudson observes: "With the exception of one dubious expression in the book of Daniel, the Old Testament is entirely silent on the subject of the eternity of future punishment. The same thing is true of a very large majority of the books of the New Testament. But in the 44th, the 46th, and the 48th verses of the ninth chapter of the Gospel of St. Mark, we find our Saviour speaking with the most emphatic iteration of 'their worm'

which 'dieth not,' and of 'the fire' which 'is not quenched;' and in the 43d and 45th verses of the same chapter, He, with yet deeper emphasis, refers to 'the fires that never shall be quenched.' . . . But while the reverence due to our Divine Teacher forbids us to subtract one jot or tittle from the force of his expressions, it no less distinctly forbids us to enhance their force by adding one jot or tittle to them. Let it, then be considered, *first*, that the words quoted from the 43d and 45th verses ('the fire that never shall be quenched') are rejected by some eminent critics as a spurious interpolation, and, *secondly*, that, supposing the text to be genuine, the words[1] . . . mean, not 'the fire that never shall be quenched,' but the 'inextinguishable fire;' and, *thirdly*, that no one of these five verses in St. Mark's Gospel asserts, either in express terms or by any necessary implication, that the pains to which they refer will be endured throughout eternity. They assert only that the agent or instrument by means of which those pains are to be inflicted is of an immortal or indestructible nature" (*Human Destiny*, pp. 9, 10).

The illustrations given in Matt. III. 12, Luke III. 17, of the *effects* of the "unquenchable fire," clearly denote that it consumes and destroys. Jude says: "Even as Sodom and Gomorrha, and the cities about them . . . are set forth for an example of eternal fire" (7th verse). If the fire that

[1] The author gives the Greek words, which I omit.

burned Sodom and Gomorrah was eternal fire, then it follows that the wicked will not suffer forever in unquenchable fire, for no one supposes that the cities of the plain are still burning. Compare Ps. I. 4; John XV. 6; 2 Kings XXII. 17; Ps. CXVIII. 12; Isa. I. 28, 31; Jer. IV. 4; VII. 20; XVII. 27; Ezek. XX. 47, 48; Amos V. 6.

In Matt. XXV. 46, we read, "And these shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal." In this verse punishment is used instead of death. Eternal death will certainly be eternal punishment, but it is not implied that this punishment will be an eternal conscious state. It is frequently asserted by believers in eternal torment that a punishment that is not *felt*, is no punishment.[1] The punishment that is threatened the wicked is said to be destruction, not torture.

Jeremy Taylor, having cited Justin Martyr and Irenæus as holding that the lost will become extinct, says: "Concerning this doctrine of theirs, so severe, and yet so moderated, there is less to be objected than against the supposed fancy of Origen; for it is a strange consideration to suppose an eternal torment to those to whom it was never

[1] That "extermination is the greatest of all punishments," is a common remark of Maimonides, the Eagle of the Jewish Doctors, and of other Rabbis. One of these, speaking of the death of the soul, says that it is "perfected punishment, and excision absolute, and perdition and corruption, which is never reversed, and is the greatest among all punishments" — *Human Destiny*, p. 84.

threatened, to those who never heard of Christ, to those that lived probably well, to heathens of good lives, to ignorant and untaught people, to people surprised in a single crime, to men that die young in their natural follies and foolish lusts, to them that fall in a sudden gayety and excessive joy, to all alike; to all infinite and eternal, even to unwarned people; and that this should be inflicted by God who infinitely loves His creatures, who died for them, who pardons easily, and pities readily, and excuses much, and delights in our being saved, and would not have us to die, and takes little things in exchange for great. It is certain that God's mercies are infinite, and it is also certain that the matter of eternal torments cannot be truly understood;[1] and when the schoolmen go about to reconcile the Divine justice, and consider why God punishes eternally a temporal sin, or a state of evil, they speak variously, and uncertainly, and unsatisfyingly" (*Christ's Advent to Judgment*, Sermon III).

Bishop Blackburne observes: "Indeed the liberties our translators have taken with the word *psyche*, are quite unaccountable; particularly Matt. XVI. 25, 26, where this pretence of a double signification can have no place.

"*Whosoever*, say they, *will save his life* [*psyche*]

[1] Mr. Hudson says: "If, then, God chooses that evil should exist for ever, or if he lacks the power or the right to bring it to an end, or to let it die, the proof of its sad eternity must be a plain declaration from God himself that such is his free choice or his dire necessity" — *The Rights or Wrongs?* p. 8.

shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life [*psyche*] *for my sake shall find it. For what is a man profited if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul* [*psyche*] or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul" [*psyche* again]?

"Here it is manifest that our Lord is speaking of *psyche* under one and the same idea in both verses. And what reason could the translators have to render it by two different words, but an unwarrantable inclination to accommodate our Saviour's language to their own system? Had they dealt impartially with the sacred text, they must either have put soul in the 25th verse, or life in the 26th" (vol. cit. p. 204).

Dr. Clarke, in commenting upon the 26th verse, says: "On what authority many have translated the word *psyche* in the 25th verse *life*, and in this verse *soul*, I know not; but I am certain it means *life* in both cases."

The account of the bringing to life of the widow's son by the prophet Elijah is thought to prove the existence of an immaterial soul that leaves the body at death. In 1 Kings xvii. 22, we read, "And the soul of the child came into him again, and he revived." What this soul was that left the child at death we are told in the 17th verse of the same chapter. "The son of the mistress of the house, fell sick; and his sickness was so sore, that there was no *breath* left in him." We see by this that "the breath of life" was

what left the child at death. In the account of the vision of the valley of dry bones, given us by Ezekiel (XXXVII.), after the flesh had come upon the dry bones, we read: "But there was no breath in them. Then said he unto me, Prophesy unto the wind, prophesy, son of man, and say to the wind, Thus saith the Lord God; Come from the four winds, O breath, and breathe upon these slain, that they may live. So I prophesied as he commanded me, and the breath came into them, and they lived, and stood up upon their feet, an exceeding great army."

The passage in the Book of Numbers (XVI. 22) in which Moses and Aaron address the Supreme Being as the God of the *spirits* of *all* flesh has been advanced in order to prove the separate existence of the soul. Those who advance it ignore the word *all*, which is the gist of the remark, placing as it does the cause of life throughout *the whole creation* upon the same foundation: so, if man has a separate soul, animals also have a separate soul.

"The children of this world marry and are given in marriage. But they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage; neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection. Now that the dead are raised even Moses showed, at the bush, when he calleth the

Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob" (Luke xv. 34–38).

Some have supposed that the expression, "a God of the living," proves that the dead are now alive. "But this," says Mr. Hudson, "would manifestly vacate the proof of a resurrection — the very thing that Christ was to show. What need of a resurrection for those who live? 'Ye destroy the arguments wherewith Christ and Paul prove the resurrection,' says Mr. Tyndall, answering the Platonic Thomas More, 'If the souls be in heaven, tell me why they be not in as good case as the angels be? And then what cause is there of the resurrection?'" In John vi. 47, Jesus says, "Verily I say unto you, He that believeth on me *hath* everlasting life." The text does not say, He will *have*, but *He hath*. And again, "Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day" (John vi. 54).

The following passage is thought by the immaterialists to prove that man has an immortal soul. "And fear not them which kill the body but are not able to kill the soul (*psyche*); but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul (*psyche*) and body in hell" [1] (Matt. x. 28).

[1] Hell, "in Hebrew, Scheol; this word most commonly signifies the grave." — *Cruden's Concordance.* "The word *Hell* is of Saxon extraction, and signifies *a covered place;* from the same original we still retain, in our language, the word heal, or *hele*, which signifies to *cover over*." — Rees's *Cyclopædia.* "It is certain that the Greek word we render *Hell* does properly sig-

If the Greek word *psyche* which is in this verse rendered soul were rendered *life*, this passage would harmonize with the rest of the Bible. *Psyche* is rendered *life* forty times out of the one hundred and five times it occurs in the New Testament, and there appears to be no reason why it should not have been so rendered in this verse. In the *Emphatic* Diaglott it is so rendered. This exhortation was addressed to the Apostles *only*, and at that period of the mission of Jesus when, after having selected his twelve disciples, and having given them power to perform miracles, they were sent forth as "sheep in the midst of wolves." The meaning of the verse undoubtedly is, that they should not fear those who can destroy this present life, but cannot destroy the *eternal life* that he had promised his followers; "This is the promise that he hath promised us, even eternal life" (John II. 25.

In Luke XII. 4, 5, the same exhortation is given in the following words: "And I say unto you, my friends, be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do. But I will forewarn ye whom ye shall fear; fear him, which after he has killed hath power to cast into hell; yea, I say unto you, fear him."

The word rendered hell in this passage is Gehenna, the word that originally represented the valley of the son of Hinnom, near Jerusalem, also

nify no more than a place that is withdrawn from our view." — Goadby's *Bible*, note on Luke XXI. 23.

called Tophet, Abaddon, and Valley of Slaughter. This was a region of desolation and death. Hither were carried carcasses and other filth of the city to be destroyed by worms and fire, but nothing was ever deposited there that was to be preserved alive. Dr. Watson observes: "As the worm itself dies not, but destroys that it feeds upon, and as a fire unquenched consumes that upon which it kindles, so when temporal judgments are expressed by this phrase, the utter destruction of persons, cities, and nations appears to be intended."[1] Hence the expression in Isa. LXVI. 24, respecting "the carcasses of the men that have transgressed" against the Lord; "for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh." The same reasoning which deduces the immortality of the lost, in other words, a state of eternal torment, from Mark IX. 43–48, will also prove the immortality of "carcasses" from the passage in Isaiah. Fire either purifies or consumes. It is employed in purifying gold and silver, and for consuming thorns, briers, stubble, and tares. The wicked are compared with the last-named objects, but never with anything that would not be burned up if cast into the fire. The scriptural use of the term "unquenched" indicates the complete destruction of that upon which the fire is said to act (see 2 Kings XXII. 17; Ps. CXVIII. 12; Isa. I. 28, 31; Jer. IV.

[1] Quoted by C. F. Hudson in *Immortality through Christ Alone.*

4; XVII. 27; Ezek. XX. 47, 48; Amos V. 6; Matt. III. 12; Luke III. 17). That the fire of Gehenna is a symbol not of mere torment, but of destruction, might be inferred from the manifold use of the term fire in the Scriptures, and from other Jewish writings. Thus the Targumist on Gen. III. 24, speaks of Gehenna as "burning up the wicked," and in Eccles. VIII. 10: "They have gone to be consumed in Gehenna." The expression in Matthew, "there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth," may be explained by the passage in Ps. CXII. 10: "The wicked shall see, and shall be grieved; he shall gnash with his teeth, and melt away; the desire of the wicked shall perish." In regard to Matt. X. 28, Mr. Fearon asks: "Is it not understood of the power of the Deity, that it could as easily destroy himself, as that which is inherently immortal?" (vol. cit. p. 58.)

Of Luke XII. 4, 5, Bishop Blackburne observes: "Here is no mention of the soul's subsisting after its separation from the body; no mention of any thing after death but the *casting into hell;* which is plain does not happen till that which has been killed, viz. the man, is put into some new capacity of suffering, or, in other words is once more become a living soul" (vol. cit. p. 202).

"Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the spirit [*ruach*] shall return to God who gave it" (Eccles. XII. 7). This text is said to teach that the immortal soul, or spirit, returns to God at death. From David we learn what it is

that "returns to God who gave it." David says: "His breath [*ruach*] goeth forth, he returneth to his earth; in that very day his thoughts perish" (Ps. CXLVI. 4). It will be observed that the Hebrew word *ruach*, that is rendered breath in the latter verse, is rendered spirit in the former. There is no reason why it should not be rendered breath in both instances, especially as that was given by God when he created the man from the dust of the earth.

"Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?" This passage has been quoted to prove that man has an immortal soul that ascends to heaven at death, while the very argument of the writer was intended to show that at the moment of death there is no longer any difference between man whose breath goeth upward, man's figure being erect, and that of the beast which goeth downward, not being erect.[1] Solomon says: "I said in mine heart concerning the estate of the sons of men, that God might manifest them, and that they might see that they themselves are beasts. For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast: for all is vanity. All go unto one place; all are of the dust and all

[1] See Bishop Blackburne's *Works*, vol. II. p. 58; also *Thoughts on Materialism*, p. 46, Fearon.

turn to dust again. Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward?" (Eccles. III. 18–21.)

Substitute for the word spirit [*ruach*] in the last verse, the word breath, which the translators have rendered from the word *ruach* in the sentence, "they have all one breath," and no difficulty occurs.

The following passage is often quoted to prove the existence of an immaterial soul: "But ye are come unto Mount Sion, and unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to an innumerable company of angels, to the general assembly and church of the first-born, which are written in heaven, and to God the judge of all, and to the *spirits* [*pneuma*] of just men made perfect, and to Jesus the mediator of the new covenant, and to the blood of sprinkling that speaketh better things than that of Abel" (Heb. XII. 22–24). In commenting upon these passages, Dr. Clarke says: "The description in these verses does not refer to a heavenly state." "In heaven there is no need of a Mediator or sprinkling of blood; but these are mentioned in the state which the apostle describes." The "first-born," he says, "are those who first received the gospel of Christ, and who are elsewhere termed the 'first fruits,'—'the spirits of just men made perfect.'" He says we cannot understand these terms without the assistance of Jewish phraseology. The Jews divide mankind into three classes: first the

just perfect; second, the wicked perfect; third, those between both. "The just perfect are those who have conquered all brutal appetites and gross passions." "The wicked perfect are those who never repent." "The intermediate are those who are influenced partly by the evil principle and partly by the good." "The spirits of the just men made perfect, or the righteous perfect, are the full-grown christians."

Of the verse, "I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the word of God, and for the testimony which they held" (Rev. vi. 9), Mr. Fearon says: "Though adduced with much confidence," it has not "even the semblance of an argument in its favor; for the 'souls' in this case should be 'lives;' and then the representation of such being under the altar, will be seen to be perfectly appropriate; forming, as the verse does, part of a most highly figurative representation of the opening of the six seals; in which the stars from heaven are said to be falling, and the mountains and islands moving out of their places: and the particular allusion in the sixth verse, appears to be borrowed from the practice at the altar of victims in the temple; at the foot of which altar the *blood (the life — the soul*[1]) was poured out, which blood being close to the sanctuary, it was supposed that it apprised God of the sacrifice that had

[1] Mr. Tylor says: "The idea of soul and blood, familiar to the Karens and Papuas, appears prominently in Jewish and Arabic philosophy" — *Primitive Culture*, vol. i. p. 389.

been offered to him, and that he saw it; thus the lives of those who had sacrificed themselves in the cause of Revelation, are here, in bold and beautiful language, described as being under the altar, in the sight of God" (vol. cit. pp. 96, 97).

The account of the rich man and Lazarus given by our Saviour in Luke XVI. 19–21, is frequently quoted for the purpose of proving a conscious state of everlasting torment, thus showing the immortality of the soul. That this account is a parable is generally acknowledged. Of this account Mr. Hudson observes: —

"That it was regarded as a parable by many of the Christian Fathers will be readily inferred from the application which they made of it. And this opinion was so strong that in some manuscripts it came to be expressly called a parable. A manuscript of the seventh century prefaces it thus: 'And he spake also another parable.' Another of the tenth century reads: 'The Lord spake this parable;' and with this agree some copies of the Gospels. The scholiast in a few later manuscripts says: 'The scope of the passage respecting the rich man and Lazarus is a parable and it was spoken parabolically, if indeed the evangelist did not prefix this title[1] to the account' (See 'Tischendorf,' N. Y. 1859). Lightfoot says: "That it was a parable, not only the consent of all expositors may

[1] This title is not prefixed to the parables of the prodigal son and the unjust steward, which immediately precede this account.

assure us, but the thing itself speaks it" (*Heb. and Talm. Exercit., in loco*).

In order to understand this account fully, it will be necessary to go back to the fifteenth chapter of Luke, in which we read: "Then drew near unto him all the publicans and sinners for to hear him. And the Pharisees and scribes murmured, saying, This man receiveth sinners and eateth with them." In order to show the Pharisees and scribes that he came not to save the righteous, but sinners, Jesus relates to them the parables of the lost sheep and the lost piece of money. He then gives them the parable of the prodigal son, in which he shows them their selfishness in not rejoicing that the publicans and sinners, also God's children, are to be saved. Jesus then relates to his disciples the parable of the unfaithful steward, and says to his disciples, "Ye cannot serve God and mammon." In the next verse we read: "And the Pharisees also, who were covetous, heard all these things: and they derided him." Jesus said unto them, "Ye are they which justify yourselves before men; but God knoweth your hearts: for that which is highly esteemed among men is abomination in the sight of God." Jesus goes on to tell the Pharisees that the "law and the prophets were until John: since that time the kingdom of God is preached." He illustrates this fact by referring to the law regulating the marriage relations, which allows a woman to marry if her husband be dead (see Rom. VII. 1–3). St. Paul says: "Wherefore, my

brethren, ye also are become dead to the law by the body of Christ; that ye should be married to another, even to him who is raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God" (Rom. VII. 4). By this Jesus shows the Pharisees that the law being dead they were free to accept him, but had not done so. Then he gives them the parable of the rich man and Lazarus.

This parable undoubtedly sets forth the past and future relations of the Jews and Gentiles. Dives is the Jewish nation, "clothed in the purple of the king and the fine linen of the priest." "He fares sumptuously," the Jews being richly provided with all spiritual privileges, not hungering and thirsting but filled with their own righteousness. The miserable Lazarus represents the Gentile nation upon which the Jews looked with contempt. The rich man and Lazarus both die. The former state of things is abolished. Lazarus is carried by angels[1] into Abraham's bosom, while Dives is cast into hell. "The middle wall of partition" being broken down, the Gentiles are carried by messengers — Jesus and his disciples, into the kingdom, or church of God which originated with Abraham. The Gentiles abandoned their idolatrous worship, became followers of Christ and have been greatly

[1] "The word angel is not properly a denomination of nature, but of office; denoting as much as *nuncius*, *messenger*, a person employed to carry one's orders, or to deliver his will" — Rees's *Cyclopædia*. "The Greek word we render angel does, in its primitive sense, signify nothing more than messenger" — Goadby's *Bible*, vol. IV. p. 910.

exalted both morally and politically, while the Jews have been degraded both morally and politically and are still "trodden down" or tormented by the Gentiles. The Jews had their good things before the new covenant, the Gentiles have had theirs since. The Jews would have no dealings with the Samaritans because they permitted Gentiles to have some privileges in their city, and they have since been in the same condition that they tried to keep the Gentiles. The beggar has been comforted and the rich man tormented.

The "great gulf fixed," which is said to separate Dives and Lazarus, probably represents the *new covenant*, "established upon better promises," of which Jesus was the mediator. The Jews rejected this covenant and were married again to the *law*, from which Christ and the apostles most plainly declare they were divorced. The Gentile Christian cannot join the Jewish church and become a Christian because he would be rejecting Christ and connecting himself with the law from which he is divorced, hence the *new covenant* stands as a gulf between Jews and Gentiles.[1]

In regard to the *five brethren* mentioned in the parable, Mr. Grant remarks: "As has been already intimated, we understand that they represent the ten lost tribes of Israel, who were carried captive by Shalmanezer, seven hundred and twenty-one years before Christ. They were not joined with the Jews (the other two tribes) in condemning

[1] See *The Rich Man and Lazarus*, p. 17, Miles Grant.

and crucifying the Saviour, and therefore they are represented as being in a safer and better condition than the rich man." "When they went into captivity they took the Scriptures with them, hence it is said, 'they have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them'" (*The Rich Man and Lazarus*, pp. 18, 19).

If this account is to be taken literally, then the beggar, not an immaterial soul, but Lazarus, "full of sores," was carried by angels to Abraham's bosom, and the rich man, not his soul, lifted up his eyes in the grave, for the word *hades* which is here rendered hell means the grave.

If it be maintained that it was the immaterial soul of Lazarus that was carried to Abraham's bosom, then it must be admitted that an immaterial soul can be buried in the grave, and be in a conscious state while there, for the passage distinctly states that the rich man was buried. It must also be admitted that an immaterial soul has a tongue that can be cooled by water and that an immaterial soul has fingers that can be dipped in water, also that an immaterial soul can be tormented by fire while buried in the grave.

If it be asserted that the Saviour would not have used such a parable had not such a state of existence after death been a fact, we would ask if the parables in Ezek. XVII. 2–8, and in Judg. IX. 8–15, are founded on facts?

A similar parable to the parable of the rich man and Lazarus is found in the Talmud, which is a

body of Jewish tradition. Lightfoot renders it as follows: "There was a good man and a wicked man that died. As for the good man he had no funeral rites solemnized; but the wicked man had. Afterward there was one saw in his dream, the good man walking in gardens, and led by pleasant springs; but the wicked man, with his tongue trickling, drop by drop, at the bank of a river, endeavoring to touch the water but he could not" (*Jerusalem Talmud, in Chagigah*, fol. 77, cal. 4).

The following parable was taken by Hammond from the Babylonian Talmud (ad. cod. Berachoth): "A king made a great feast, and invited all the strangers; and there came one poor man, and stood at his gates, and said unto them, Give me one bit or portion; and they considered him not. And he said, My lord, the king, of all the great feast thou hast made, is it hard for thee to give me one bit or fragment, among them? And the title of this passage there, is, a 'parable of a king of flesh and blood.'"

These extracts show that there were different versions of the parable and incidentally confirm its parabolic character. They also appear to show that the parable did not originate with Christ.

The following passage is thought to prove that the soul, or spirit of man enters at once into another state of conscious existence: "And Jesus said unto him, verily I say unto thee, To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise" (Luke xxiii. 43).

"It may be shown," says Mr. Fearon, "that it

in no way warrants the application made of it; and indeed the genuineness of the passage itself is also a fair subject of dispute. The fact is recorded by Luke only, who was not present, and who probably had not even seen Jesus. It is not mentioned by John, who witnessed the whole scene of the crucifixion. By Mark it is not referred to. Nay, more: it is absolutely contradicted by Matthew, who states that 'the thieves' (i.e., both) 'joined with the priests and those that passed by, in reviling Jesus;' whereas the passage in Luke speaks of one only as reviling, and of the other as being favorable towards Jesus. The critical part of the argument on this subject has been thus shortly but well summed up in a note of the *Improved Version:* 'This verse was wanting in the copies of Marcion and other reputed heretics, and in some of the older copies in the time of Origen; nor is it cited either by Justin, Irenæus, or Tertullian; though the two former have quoted almost every text in Luke which relates to the crucifixion, and Tertullian wrote concerning the intermediate state.' The silence of such writers as these, desirous as they constantly were of supporting their Pagan notions by a constant reference to the Christian writers, may be taken as affording strong evidence against the genuineness of the passage" (vol. cit. p. 61).

The fact that the thieves did not die the same day that Jesus is said to have spoken these words and to have died, points to an error somewhere.

The Jewish day begins and ends at six o'clock, the evening or night being the first half of the day. We are told that Jesus died the ninth hour of the day (Mark xv. 34–37), which was three o'clock in the afternoon.

"And now when the even was come, because it was the preparation, that is the day before the sabbath, Joseph of Arimathæa . . . went in boldly unto Pilate and craved the body of Jesus" (Mark xv. 42, 43). In John xix. 31–33, we read: "The Jews therefore, because it was the preparation, that the bodies should not remain upon the cross on the sabbath day (for that sabbath day was an high day), besought Pilate that their legs might be broken, and that they might be taken away. Then came the soldiers, and brake the legs of the first, and of the other which was crucified with him. But when they came to Jesus, and saw that he was dead already, they brake not his legs." Thus we see that Jesus died at three o'clock on the day that the crucifixion took place, and that in the evening of that day, which was the beginning of another day, the thieves were still alive.

Still another fact points to an error in this connection. In Matt. xii. 40, we read: "So shall the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth." It does not say the body of the Son of man, or the habitation of the immortal soul of the Son of man, but, the Son of man. St. Paul says: "Now that he *ascended*, what is it but that he *also descended first* into the lower parts of

the earth" (the tomb) (Eph. v. 9). Jesus on the morning of his resurrection said to Mary, "Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my Father" (John xx. 17). If Jesus was in the grave three days after his death, he could not have gone immediately to paradise, so that if he made any promise to the thief he could not have meant that the promise was to be fulfilled on the day that he made it. The "*to-day*" in the promise must have referred solely to the day on which the promise was made instead of referring to the time of the fulfilment of the promise.

In commenting upon this verse, Bishop Blackburne says: "That our Lord adapted his language to this man's notions as far as was necessary, there can be no doubt. But the first question before us is, what were this man's notions (not of paradise but) of the kingdom of Christ? Now by the kingdom of Christ, the Jews of our Saviour's time generally understood a temporal kingdom of earthly happiness; to this they likewise gave the name of the future world; and many of those among them who believed a resurrection considered it introductory to the felicities of such a kingdom only. And that the penitent thief himself still retained that notion of it, appears pretty plainly from his words," "*when thou comest* (not into as our translation gives it, but) *in thy kingdom*, i.e., when thou comest on earth in power and great glory as we expect — *then remember me.*" "But it must not be forgot that there is one con-

struction of the Greek words containing our Saviour's promise to the penitent thief, which limits no time for his being in paradise with Christ. Remove the comma from *thee*,[1] where the common editions place it, and put it after *to-day*, —*I say unto thee to-day, thou shalt be*, &c., and the time fulfilling the promise will be left indefinite." "The propriety of this construction arises from hence, — that the penitent thief having desired to be remembered when our Saviour should come in his kingdom; that is, to be remembered at a future period, the answer of Jesus gives him to understand that he was remembered at that instant, and so effectually remembered, that whenever Jesus himself should be in paradise, the thief might be sure of being there with him."[2]

It should be borne in mind that the Scriptures were originally written without any pauses, hence any one may punctuate the Bible as the sense may demand. To those who affirm that the *to-day* in this arrangement is superfluous, we would say that the phrase is frequently used in the Old Testament in a way that would be equally superfluous: "I command thee this thing *to-day*" (Deut. xv. 15). "I denounce unto you *this day* — that ye shall surely perish" (Deut. xxx. 18). "I command thee *this* day" (Deut. xxx. 11). Indeed all

[1] The English word is here substituted for the Greek which is used by Bishop Blackburne.

[2] Bishop Blackburne's *Works*, vol. II. pp. 187, 193, 194, Camb. 1804.

classes of persons frequently use to-day, to-night, this day, and this night, in the same sense in which to-day is used in the text. Thus Daniel Webster, in a speech delivered on the 7th of March, 1850, says: "I speak to-day for the preservation of the union." Also Rufus Choate at one time said, "*To-day*, fellow-citizens, we also speak for the Union."

The account of Saul and the woman of Endor is adduced by many to prove the existence of immortal souls, and also an intermediate state for their reception. In regard to this account Mr. Fearon remarks: "In forming a judgment of this case, it may be well to glance at the characters who are represented as acting in it: — First, the king of Israel, who upon disobeying the commands of the Deity was told, that, 'the Lord had rejected him from being king over Israel,' and who in all his subsequent engagements with the enemies of Israel was uniformly unsuccessful; and the cause of such disasters was known by the whole people to be, that the God of Israel had rejected Saul from reigning over his chosen people; in consequence of which he was oppressed with melancholy (*i.e.* 'an evil spirit came upon him;') 'and when he saw the host of the Philistines, he was afraid, and his heart greatly troubled him; and he inquired of the Lord, and the Lord answered him not. Then said Saul unto his servants, Seek me a woman that hath a familiar spirit, that I may inquire of her.' The second personage in this

representation is the woman so selected, one whose occupation agreed with the necromancers of the heathen nations, 'who summoned the spirits of the dead to appear before them; and who carried on their trade in subterranean caverns, which were well calculated to insure successful imposition.'[1] But the Lord of Israel had prohibited the exercise of such arts; commanding his people, that 'When thou art come into the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, thou shalt not learn to do after the abominations of those nations. There shall not be found among you any one that maketh his son or his daughter to pass through the fire, or that useth divination, or an observer of times, or an enchanter, or a witch, or a charmer, or a consulter with familiar spirits, or a wizard, or a necromancer. For all that do these things are an abomination unto the Lord: and because of these abominations the Lord thy God doth drive them out from before thee.'[2] The third character assumes to be that of Samuel, whom 'all Israel, from Dan even to Beersheba, knew to be a prophet of the Lord,' and, when he 'died, all the Israelites were gathered together, and lamented him, and buried him in his house at Ramah.'

"These facts being premised, we approach the chapter under examination, in which the defenders of Immaterialism would fain make God to sanction

[1] See Michaeli's *Commentaries on the Laws of Moses*, vol. IV. pp. 83–92, 8vo, edit. 1814.

[2] Deut. XVIII. 9–12.

that which he had solemnly denounced as an abomination in his sight; and which is supposed to confer upon one whom he had commanded to be 'cast out of the land,' the power to raise from the dead even a prophet of God, and through whose instrumentality, although Jehovah would not answer Saul, 'neither by dreams, nor by urim, nor by prophets,' yet he is made to answer him by the power of one that had 'a familiar spirit;' for it is puerile in Mr. Granville Sharpe to attempt to get over this difficulty by asserting that the communication was not made 'by the incantations of the witch, but by some *respectable* agent of the divine will,' — the text being, 'Then said the woman (to Saul), whom shall *I* bring up unto thee? And he said, Bring me up Samuel. And when the woman saw Samuel, *she cried* with a loud voice,'[1] &c. So that to the immaterial system may be well left whatever benefit it can derive from the serious imputations which such an hypothesis casts upon the divine government. Besides which, how can immaterialism be reconciled with the present relation? and how can that which is spiritual and not visible to the sight, be *seen* to be 'an old man covered with a mantle'? But the whole case is clearly one of imposition dexterously practised upon the weak, desponding, and superstitious mind of Saul, and effected clearly by the practice of the art of ventriloquy. 'The term "*ventriloquus*" is compounded of *venter*, belly, and *loquor*, to speak;

[1] Deut. xviii. 11, 12.

and is applied to persons who speak inwardly, so that the voice proceeding out of the thorax seems to come from some distance, and in any direction.' See the Work of M. de la Chapelle, published in 1772, in which is shown that in the case of Saul, the speech supposed to be addressed to him by Samuel, proceeded from the mouth of the sorceress of Endor, and that the ancient oracles derived their influence from the exercise of this art; and a reference to the original will tend to aid this view of the case: —the Hebrew of the '*familiar spirit*' of the witch is 'OB,' and the 'plural OBOTH;' and such persons were afterwards denominated '*Pythonesses*,' thereby implying a pretence to divination: accordingly, in the Vulgate version of 1 Sam. XXVIII. 7, 8, the word used is 'Python:' besides which the witch must have necessarily known Saul, who 'from his head and shoulders was taller than any man' in Israel. Saul throughout the whole performance did not of himself *see* Samuel; the relation is — 'When *the woman* saw Samuel, *she* cried with a loud voice,' &c. And Saul said to her, '*What sawest thou?* And he said unto her, What form is he of?' And when she had answered the foregoing question, Saul 'perceived,' or acknowledged from the representation of the witch, that it was Samuel. Thus the deception upon Saul completely succeeded; and *he* 'stooped with his face to the ground, and bowed himself.' And it is especially deserving of remark, that the whole of the after-relation made to Saul,

while thus prostrate before the sorceress, consists in a repetition of what had been *long previously announced concerning his rejection by God, and of the triumph of the Philistines over him*, and which was known to the Jewish people at large. Thus the whole case in reference to Saul admits solely of being viewed, on the part of the witch, as a successful juggle" (vol. cit. pp. 97–100).

The verse, "By which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison," is thought by many to refer to an intermediate state of conscious existence, thus showing that the soul has an existence separate from the body. In order to understand this verse it will be necessary to refer to the circumstances under which it was written. Peter commences his epistle by addressing the believers scattered abroad; exhorting them to withstand persecution. His words are: "For it is better, if the will of God be so, that ye suffer for well doing, than for evil doing. For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the spirit: by which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison; which some time were disobedient, when once the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing, wherein few, that is, eight souls, were saved by water. The like figure whereunto, even baptism, doth also now save us . . . by the resurrection of Jesus Christ" (1 Pet. III. 17–21).

The object of the Apostle evidently is to encourage the believers to hold fast to their faith, even though they have to suffer in consequence of so doing. For this purpose he cites the example of Jesus, who had also suffered unjustly, "being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit," that is, "by the power of God," as St. Paul expresses it (2 Cor. XIII. 4), by which power "he preached unto the spirits in prison." The spirits in prison were evidently persons who were in that state of moral darkness which in the succeeding chapter is represented as one of death; "for the gospel was preached also unto them that are dead," that is, "dead in trespasses and sins." "To be carnally minded is death." "Thou hast a name to live but art dead." "She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth." "To you hath he given life which were dead in trespasses and sins." To such persons Jesus, by preaching the Gospel, broke their fetters and released them from prison in the sense in which moral delivery is spoken of by Isaiah: "The spirit of the Lord God is upon me, to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound."

Again, Isaiah, in prophesying of Christ, says: "Behold my servant, whom I uphold; mine elect, in whom my soul delighteth; I have put my spirit upon him: he shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles." "I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand, and will keep

thee and give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles; to open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison house" (Isa. XLII. 1, 6, 7). Looking, therefore, to corresponding passages as to what was meant by the word prison, and who the spirits were to whom Jesus preached, this passage ceases to be of difficult solution. But had not Isaiah furnished us with an illustration, the connection of the Apostle's argument in the after verses would have effected the object; the intention of the writer being to draw a parallel between those persons who were in a state of mental darkness in the days of Noah and in the apostolic age, which intention would have been more obvious had our translators introduced a single supplemental word, as they have so frequently done in other instances.

Of the passage, *Father into thy hands I commit my spirit* (Luke XXIII. 46), Bishop Blackburne tells us that the translators have here once more misled us. "For instead of that solemn recommendation of our Saviour's soul to God which their English words put into his mouth, the plain Greek words are only these, *Father*, *into* [or in] *thy hands I will deposit my spirit* or *breath;* importing only our Lord's readiness to lay down his life, in consequence of the command he had received from the Father (John X. 18) *to lay down his life*, that he *might take it again.*"

"The expression," continues Bishop Blackburne,

"of the dying martyr Stephen, *Lord Jesus, receive my spirit* (Acts VII. 59), is much to the same effect as if he had said, *Lord Jesus, accept*[1] *the sacrifice of my life which I may lay down for thy sake* (*Works*, vol. II. pp. 204–206).

Before bringing this volume to a close, it will be necessary to refer to a subject that has probably occurred to the reader as being inconsistent. If man is to be perfected by Evolution, why was it necessary that the Son of God should be sent into the world to bring man to God?

The perfection that is reached by Evolution appears not to include a spiritual perfection. Prof. Drummond makes this point very clear.

He observes: "If the doctrine of the Spontaneous Generation of Spiritual life can be met on scientific grounds, it will mean the most serious enemy Christianity has to deal with, and especially within its own borders, at the present day. The religion of Jesus has probably always suffered more from those who have misunderstood than from those who have opposed it. Of the multitudes who confess Christ at this hour how many have clear in their minds the cardinal distinction established by its Founder between 'born of the flesh' and 'born of the spirit'?

[1] Bishop Blackburne observes in a footnote: "What inclines me to give this paraphrase to Stephen's words, is, that the verb *dekomai*, with its compounds and derivatives, is of frequent and familiar occurrence in the Greek Scriptures for that acceptance with which Almighty God honors those sacrifices, offerings, and gifts which are well pleasing to him." A list of the passages are given — See *Works*, vol. II. p. 206.

"Let us first place vividly in our imagination the picture of the two great kingdoms of Nature, the inorganic and the organic, as these now stand in the light of the Law of Biogenesis. What essentially is involved in saying that there is no Spontaneous Generation of Life? It is meant that the passage from the mineral world to the plant or animal world is hermetically sealed on the mineral side.

"This inorganic world is staked off from the living world by barriers which have never yet been crossed from within. No change of substance, no modification of environment, no chemistry, no electricity, nor any form of energy, nor any evolution can endow any single atom of the mineral world with the attribute of life. Only by the bending down into this dead world of some living form can these dead atoms be gifted with the properties of vitality, without this preliminary contact with Life they remain fixed in the inorganic sphere forever."

"Nature to the modern eye stands broken in two. The physical Laws may explain the inorganic world; the biological Laws may account for the development of the organic. But of the point where they meet, of that strange borderland between the dead and the living, Science is silent. It is as if God had placed every thing in earth and heaven in the hands of Nature, but reserved a point at the genesis of Life for His direct appearing. . . .

"Where now in tne Spiritual spheres shall we meet a companion phenomenon to this? What in the unseen shall be likened to this deep dividing-line, or where in human experience is another barrier which never can be crossed?

"There is such a barrier. In the dim but not inadequate vision of the Spiritual World presented in the Word of God, the first thing that strikes the eye is a great gulf fixed. The passage from the Natural World to the Spiritual World is hermetically sealed on the natural side. The door from the inorganic to the organic is shut, no mineral can open it; so the door from the natural to the spiritual is shut, and no man can open it. This world of natural men is staked off from the Spiritual World by barriers which have never yet been crossed from within. No organic change, no modification of environment, no mental energy, no moral effort, no evolution of character, no progress of civilization can endow one single human soul with the attribute of Spiritual Life. The Spiritual World is guarded from the world next in order beneath it by a law of Biogenesis — *except a man be born again . . . except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter the Kingdom of God.*

"It is not said in this enunciation of the law that if the condition be not fulfilled the natural man *will not* enter the Kingdom of God. The word is *cannot.* For the exclusion of the spiritually inorganic from the Kingdom of the spirit-

ually organic is not arbitrary. Nor is the natural man refused admission on unexplained grounds. His admission is a scientific impossibility. Except a mineral be born 'from above' — from the Kingdom just *above* it — it cannot enter the Kingdom just above it. And except a man be born 'from above,' by the same law he cannot enter the Kingdom just above him. There being no passage from one Kingdom to another, whether from inorganic to organic, or from organic to Spiritual, the intervention of Life is a scientific necessity if a stone or a plant or an animal or a man is to pass from a lower to a higher sphere.

"The plant stretches down to the dead world beneath it, touches its minerals and gases with its mystery of Life, and brings them up ennobled and transformed to the living sphere. The breath of God blowing where it listeth, touches with its mystery of Life the dead Souls of men, bears them across the bridgeless gulf between the natural and the spiritual, the spiritually inorganic and the spiritually organic, endows them with its own high qualities, and develops within them these new and secret faculties, by which those who are born again are said to *see the Kingdom of God.*"

"'He that hath the Son hath Life and he that hath not the Son of God hath not Life.' Life, that is to say, depends upon contact with Life. It cannot spring up of itself. It cannot develop out of anything that is not Life. There is no Spontaneous Generation in religion any more than in

Nature. Christ is the source of Life in the Spiritual World; and he that hath the Son hath Life, and he that hath not the Son, whatsoever else he may have, hath not Life. Here in short is the categorical denial of biogenesis and the establishment in this high field of the classical formula *Omne vivum ex vivo* — no Life without antecedent Life. In this mystical theory of the Origin of Life the whole of the New Testament writers are agreed. And as we have already seen, Christ Himself founds Christianity upon Biogenesis stated in its most literal form. 'Except a man be born of water and the Spirit he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit. Marvel not that I say unto you that ye must be born again.'"[1]

"The attitude of the natural man, again, with reference to the Spiritual, is a subject on which the New Testament is equally pronounced. Not only in his relation to the Spiritual man, but to the whole Spiritual World, the natural man is regarded as *dead*. He is as a crystal to an organism. The natural world is to the Spiritual as the inorganic to the organic. 'To be carnally minded is *Death*.' 'Thou hast a name to live but art Dead.' 'She that liveth in pleasure is *Dead* while she liveth.' 'To you hath He given Life, which were *Dead* in trespasses and sins.'

"It is clear that a remarkable harmony exists here between the Organic World as arranged by

[1] John III.

Science and the Spiritual World as arranged by Scripture. We find one great Law guarding the thresholds of both worlds, that entrance from a lower sphere shall only take place by a direct regenerating act, and that emanating from the world next in order above."

"The natural man belongs essentially to this present order of things. He is endowed simply with a high quality of the natural animal Life. But it is Life of so poor a quality that it is not Life at all. 'He that hath not the Son *hath not Life;*'—but he that hath the Son hath Life—a new and distinct and supernatural endowment. He is not of this world. He is of the timeless state, of Eternity. 'It *doth not yet appear what he shall be.*'

"Why a virtuous man should not simply grow better and better until in his own right he enter the Kingdom of God is what thousands honestly and sincerely fail to understand. Now Philosophy cannot help us here. Her arguments are if anything against us. But Science answers to the appeal at once. If it be simply pointed out that this is the same absurdity as to ask why a stone should not grow more and more living till it enters the Organic World, the point is clear in an instant."

"It is an old-fashioned theology which divides the world in this way—which speaks of men as Living and Dead, Lost and Saved—a stern theology all but fallen into disuse. This differ-

ence between the Living and the Dead in souls is so unproved by casual observation, so impalpable in itself, so startling as a doctrine, that schools of culture have ridiculed or denied the grim distinction. Nevertheless the grim distinction must be retained. It is a scientific distinction. 'He that hath not the Son hath not Life' (*Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, pp. 68–83, L. 1893).

APPENDIX.

As it will probably be some time before the mind-cure will be universally resorted to for the cure of disease, it will not be amiss to give in this connection the discovery of a remedy for nervous prostration and melancholia, which has thus far proved to be an unfailing cure for those diseases. The remedy is as follows: —

Three drams of pulverized guaiacum, three drams of colombo-root, one pint of sherry wine, and two ounces of sugar. The dose is from one to two tablespoonfuls, three times a day, just before eating.

It should be prepared several days before it is taken. It should be frequently shaken, but should be allowed to settle before it is used, as the clear liquid only is to be taken.

Great care should be exercised in purchasing the guaiacum, as it is necessary that it should be pulverized some time before it is used, in order

that it may be perfectly dry; and when pulverized it is apt to lose its strength. If it is not perfectly dry, it becomes a lump of gum when added to the wine. When strong, it leaves a burning sensation in the mouth.

This remedy was discovered by being taken as a tonic in a case of nervous prostration and mental depression. The patient had been prostrated by a severe shock to the nervous system, and for five months had grown steadily worse in spite of medical treatment. After the medicine had been taken a few times, the depression of spirits entirely disappeared, and there was a decided improvement in all of the symptoms. In a few weeks the patient was restored to perfect health.

Another cure effected by this remedy was a case of melancholia of a year's standing, that had been pronounced hopeless. The cure in this case, incredible as it may appear, was complete in five days. From a state of the deepest melancholy, the patient was restored to perfect cheerfulness, and has never suffered from a relapse. It is eight years since this occurred.

Another case cured was that of an elderly woman whose mind was becoming permanently weakened. In this case mental depression had been induced by great anxiety, which was caused by the dangerous illness of an only daughter, who was in a distant part of the country.

A fourth case that was cured was an apparently

hopeless case of melancholia of more than a year's standing. The patient was a man over sixty years of age. His father and two of his brothers had suffered from the same disease. His mother, a brother, and a sister died insane. The cure in this case was not as rapid as in the other cases mentioned.

A fifth case was a case of paralysis in a man eighty-four years of age. The mind only of the patient appeared to be affected. There was inability to connect ideas, and also inability to remember the words by which to express them. The cure in this case was very rapid.

In all of the foregoing cases there were decided indications of poor circulation. In one case a patient was told by her physician that there was an insufficient supply of nourishment for the brain, on account of the poor circulation of her blood.

Prof. Bain observes: "Deficiency in the circulation is accompanied with feeble manifestations of mind." "General depletion lowers all the functions generally, mind included. On the other hand, when the cerebral circulation is quickened, the feelings are roused, the thoughts are more rapid, the volitions more vehement" (*Mind and Body*, p. 15).

It was accidentally discovered that the efficacy of this remedy is due to the guaiacum it contains.

Guaiacum is a resin of the Lignum Vitæ tree, which was so highly prized in the sixteenth cen-

tury that four ducats were often given for a piece of the wood. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries guaiacum was the great remedy for poor circulation of the blood, gout, chronic rheumatism, and chronic skin-diseases. "It possesses the property of stimulating the system generally, causing vascular action, augmented heat of the body, and promotes the secretions of the skin and lungs" (*National Cyclopædia*).

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